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ABSTRACT 
CEO succession is an important event in the life of an organization. It is 
unavoidable. Around 80% of succession events are relay successions, where a CEO 
successor is identified a few years before the actual succession event takes place. The 
success of relay succession compared to horse race and outside successions has been 
credited to the learning an heir apparent acquires during the transition period. However, 
to my knowledge, none of the CEO succession research examines the learning process of 
heirs apparent. Studies exploring leaders’ or executives’ learning have not investigated 
whether their learning is any different due to their designation as heirs apparent or future 
CEOs. 
This study attempts to fill this gap through empirical qualitative research by 
examining the change in executives’ learning and sensemaking processes after their 
designation as heirs apparent. While executives have learned throughout their career, their 
designation as heirs apparent has a direct impact on their identity, social context, and 
interactions with their environment, the main properties used in the proposed theoretical 
framework. Using a combination of learning and sensemaking perspectives, this study 
builds premises proposing that the designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their 
learning processes by (1) eliciting a new identity for them, (2) triggering a potential for a 
future identity, (3) changing their social context, and (4) influencing their enacted 
environment. 
The research question guiding this study is: “how does the designation of 
executives as heirs apparent affect their learning and prepare them to become CEOs?”. 
To empirically validate my model and answer this thesis research question, I use a 
ii 
 
phenomenological approach. Qualitative data were collected through interviews with 22 
CEOs who were promoted from within their organizations, outgoing and ex-CEOs, board 
members, and consultants, as well as secondary data. 
My findings provide a rich basis for analysis and some indications to support the 
proposed model regarding the impact of designation on executives’ learning during the 
transition period. This study suggests designation elicits a new identity for the executives 
and induces changes in their environment affecting how they interpret cues from the 
environment and adjust their behaviours and cognition accordingly. It also suggests 
executives, after designation, undergo a deep thinking process to establish the standards 
for their future identity as CEOs. 
This thesis contributes to CEO succession literature in three ways. Firstly, the 
research describes the conjectured learning process executives experience after 
designation. Secondly, the thesis demonstrates the impact of the three types of enactment; 
namely act, interact, and double interact; on the learning outcomes. Thirdly, the findings 
also provide a basis to re-examine many of the prevailing descriptions, definitions, and 
assumptions in the existing literature with respect to relay succession and heirs apparent. 
This research helps generate important insights that may improve the CEO succession 
process in organizations. 
Keywords: CEO succession, relay succession, heir apparent, learning, 
sensemaking, enactment, phenomenology 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
First listed reason to sell 
The remarkable success of Berkshire Hathaway is nearly wholly attributable to 
Warren Buffett and Charles Munger. Though Buffett has put in place a succession 
plan and has chosen a successor, the names of the to-be CEO remain under a veil. 
However, there remains an air of uncertainty regarding the performance of the 
company under a new CEO. In our view, it is unlikely that any new management of 
this conglomerate will be able to continue Buffett and Munger’s long-term market 
out-performance. (“Berkshire Hathaway”, Zacks Equity Research, August 22, 2013, 
available through Lexis Nexis) 
First listed reason to buy 
Prior to market open on 3 April TD announced its succession plan for President and 
CEO Ed Clark, a process that will play out in steps over the next 19 months and will 
culminate with current U.S. banking chief Bharat Masrani assuming the top spot at 
TD to begin November 2014. We believe that no bank we cover has been as closely 
linked with the strategic vision of its leader as has been the case with TD and CEO 
Clark, and as such the news of the elongated transfer provides answers to the 
important questions of “who?” and “when?” that have been an ongoing point of 
discussion for TD investors in the past few years. (“TD Bank Financial Group”, 
Macquarie Equities Research, April 4, 2013, available through Thompson One) 
1.1. Motivation for the Study 
CEO succession is an inevitable event every organization has to face 
(Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005; Grusky, 1960; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). A change in 
any senior managerial position affects a firm’s political, financial, and social climate, as 
well as its morale (Friedman & Saul, 1991). Thus, the turnover in the firm’s CEO position 
is believed to have a significant impact on the firm’s performance (Alexander, Fennell, & 
Halpern, 1993; Helmich & Brown, 1972). The above statements regarding Berkshire 
Hathaway and TD Bank show the impact of CEO succession planning on analysts’ 
valuation of companies. Both reports use succession as the primary reason for their 
recommendation to shareholders on whether to buy or sell the stock under consideration, 
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which explains why CEO succession is one of the critical responsibilities of boards of 
directors – second only to the financial performance of organizations (Biggs, 2004). 
Given its importance, many researchers have studied the event of CEO 
succession. Most studies have investigated the succession event itself or the passing of the 
CEO title, emphasizing the impact of the characteristics of the incoming CEO or the 
different types of succession on post-CEO-succession organizational performance 
(Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). However, the recent examples 
provided below from The Wall Street Journal and The Globe and Mail indicate the 
process of transferring the CEO title often starts with the identification of an heir apparent 
long before the actual succession event. 
Helping assess that strategy is the company’s new president and chief operating 
officer Keith Creel, a long-time protegé of Mr. Harrison from their days together at 
Illinois Central Railroad and then at Canadian National Railways Co. Mr. Harrison 
described Mr. Creel as his clear heir apparent (Dixon, 2013). 
… Bank of Nova Scotia became the first of the major banks to strongly signal its next 
CEO. Brian Porter, a 31-year veteran of Canada’s third-largest bank, was named 
president of the bank on Wednesday, assuming that role from current chief executive 
officer Rick Waugh. Though Scotiabank executives did not elaborate on their reasons 
for the move, it is widely seen as setting the stage for Mr. Waugh’s eventual 
departure after nearly 10 years at the helm (Robertson, 2012). 
The transition has already taken place at Toyota Motor Corp., where Akio Toyoda, 
56 years old, a great-grandson of the company’s founder, was elevated to CEO in 
2009. It is expected to happen soon at Ford Motor Co., where Mark Fields, 51, was 
recently named chief operating officer, making him the heir-apparent to CEO Alan 
Mulally, who is 67 (Ramsey, 2012). 
While Vancil (1987) was among the first researchers to emphasize the importance 
of studying CEO succession, Cannella and Shen (2001) were among the first researchers 
to highlight the importance of acquiring a deeper understanding of heir apparent or relay 
succession. Relay succession refers to the process where a successor, usually referred to 
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as the heir apparent, is identified a significant period of time before the actual succession 
event (Rowe, 1996; Vancil, 1987). Relay succession is the most common and least 
disruptive form of succession in major corporations (Rowe, 1996; Vancil, 1987). It 
constitutes more than 80% of total CEO changes in publicly traded companies (Carey, 
Phelan, & Useem, 2009). Understanding the characteristics of effective relay succession 
is hence a critical factor in understanding CEO succession more generally. In a landmark 
study on CEO succession, Vancil (1987) suggested heirs apparent learn about the CEO 
role during their transition tenure. In a similar, more recent study, Zhang and Rajagopalan 
(2004) conjectured that heirs apparent outperform other types of successors because they 
have the time to learn before becoming CEOs. These authors used the overlap time 
between the incoming and outgoing CEOs as a proxy for learning, but they did not 
provide any evidence about the actual learnings or learning processes of the heirs 
apparent during the transition period. In the corporate world, human resource executives 
focus on naming the replacement or heirs apparent to the outgoing executives. They 
assume the incoming executives’ learning and development will happen naturally and 
their interference is unnecessary (Hall, 1986). While most studies and management 
practice infer that learning happens, the most recent literature review on CEO succession 
by Giambatista et al. (2005) calls for more understanding between learning and CEO 
succession. 
In summary, CEO succession affects the valuation of companies (Graffin, 
Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011; Shen & Cannella, 2003). Heir apparent or relay succession 
constitutes the majority (around 80%) of succession practices in large organizations. The 
majority of the research conducted on heirs apparent attributes the success of relay 
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succession to the learning heirs apparent acquire during the transition period (Vancil, 
1987; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004), but little evidence has been provided to support this 
argument. Consistent with Hall’s (1986) predictions, heir apparent research assumes 
learning happens during the transition period. The most recent literature review study on 
CEO succession has invited researchers to examine how the learning happens during 
transition periods (Giambatista et al., 2005). However, to my knowledge, how the 
designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their learning has not yet been studied. 
In this dissertation, I explore the impact of the designation of executives as heirs 
apparent on their learning during the transition period to becoming CEO. I focus on the 
impact of designation on triggering a change in identity and in the social environment for 
the executive affecting their learning.  This is important because research has shown the 
learning process is influenced by who the learners are (Jarvis, 2006) and by context 
(Weick, 1995). Additionally, I elaborate on the learning process designate CEOs 
experience and the impact of their enactment style with the incumbent CEOs on their 
learning outcomes during the transition period. I also present some of the barriers and 
enablers affecting their learning process. The main research question for this study is 
hence: “how does the designation of executives as heirs apparent affect their learning 
and prepare them to become CEOs?”. 
The key concepts used in this dissertation are: 
Designation: refers to the event when the executives themselves realized they were 
appointed to be the next CEO. 
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Heirs apparent: refers to any officer who was a senior manager at the organization before 
assuming the CEO role. This terminology has been replaced with CEO-Ds after the 
fieldwork for reasons explained later. 
Learning: describes a long-term change in the individual’s behaviour, cognition, and 
identity. 
Identity: though individuals have multiple identities, the executives’ identity used in this 
dissertation refers to the meanings and behaviours executives attach to their professional 
role as future CEO. 
Social context: represents the perceived or actual influence of relevant actors in the 
executives’ professional environment. 
Enactment: denotes the interaction, mainly between the designated CEOs and incumbent 
CEOs. It includes three different forms of interaction: Act, interact, and double interact. 
1.2. Theoretical Lenses 
While many things may occur during a relay succession process, this thesis 
focuses on understanding the learning heirs apparent undergo during their transition 
period. This is a focal point because the aforementioned learning is a common 
explanation for the relative advantage of relay successions in terms of post-succession 
organizational performance. Many studies have been conducted on how managers and 
leaders learn. The thesis studies how the designation as an heir apparent affects 
executives’ learning and CEO preparation. The aforementioned focus  enhances our 
knowledge of relay succession processes in particular and CEO succession in general 
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(Cannella & Shen, 2001; Giambatista et al., 2005). It also assists boards of directors as 
well as incumbent and incoming CEOs to improve CEO succession practices. 
The thesis’ research question is “how the designation of executives as heirs 
apparent affects their learning and prepares them to become CEOs”. This question aims 
to understand how the designation as heirs apparent affects, if at all, the behaviour, 
cognition, and identity of the designated executives during the transition period. To 
address this question, I develop premises which support a model describing the impact of 
the designation as future CEO on the executives’ identity and social context. I also 
illustrate the influence of different executives’ enactment styles of their environment; 
namely act, interact, and double interact; on the change in their behaviour, cognition, and 
identity. I propose that the designation itself is important because it triggers a new 
identity for the executives, that of future CEOs, and produces a corresponding effect on 
their behaviour and mindset in order to affirm the new identity. 
In addition to triggering an immediate identity, the heir apparent one, I expect the 
designation will result in executives undergoing a learning process and questioning their 
existing and perceived standards of the new role to create a new set of standards for their 
future identity, the CEO identity. The incumbent CEOs represent the most well-known 
exemplification to the designate CEOs of how CEOs act.  I therefore propose that the 
styles and standards of the incumbent CEOs constitute the starting point for the 
designated CEOs’ new standards. 
The designation creates a new social environment for the executives. I propose the 
expectations of employees, board members, and stakeholders regarding the designated 
executives, change immediately upon designation as the future leaders of the 
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organization. Executives may feel the need to align their behaviours and their mindset to 
meet the new expectations of their social environment. 
Finally, I suggest not all designate CEOs experience the same level of learning 
during the transition period as conjectured in prevailing research on the heirs apparent 
succession process. I propose different types of enactment result in different learning 
outcomes. Since the incumbent CEO is an important potential person for the designate 
CEO to learn from during the transition period, I build my arguments distinguishing 
among three types of interaction – act, interact, and double interact (defined later in 
chapter 3) (Weick, 1995, 2012); between the designate and the incumbent CEOs. I 
propose  double interact is the form of interaction that leads to the creation of shared 
mental models between the CEOs, incumbent and designate, while act is the least likely 
to reduce ambiguity and create a shared mental model. Interact leads to learning outcomes 
in between the two extreme enactment forms. 
I use sensemaking to explain meaning making from a social and action-oriented 
perspective. This research starts at the individual level, the designate CEOs, and 
transcends to the group level, the designate CEOs and members of their social context, 
especially the incumbent CEO, the board of directors, and other relevant stakeholders. 
Sensemaking helps to span these two levels to understanding the learning process of 
designate CEOs during the transition period. However, it falls short in its ability to 
explain how designate CEOs change or acquire new professional identities. To overcome 
this gap, I use learning theories to explain how the designate CEOs create identity 
standards for their future role. The combination of learning and sensemaking provides the 
opportunity to explore the research question of this study (“how the designation of 
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executives as heirs apparent affects their learning”). Combining learning and 
sensemaking also allows for the consideration of both the individual and social levels 
surrounding my area of interest. 
1.3. Research Design 
The prior research on heirs apparent and relay succession is limited despite the 
importance of this phenomenon for organizations (Cannella & Shen, 2001), and is 
primarily quantitative (Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Previous studies 
in this field rely heavily on large samples and archival data to understand the impact, 
mainly on organization performance, of measurable variables related to incoming and 
outgoing CEOs (c.f. Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). These quantitative 
studies describe simplified relationships between variables (c.f. Antonacopoulou, 2001) 
that result in the process of “learning” being accepted as “obvious”. 
To understand the learning process of heirs apparent during the transition period, I 
conducted a phenomenological study and in doing so, I answered a call for more 
qualitative research by Giambatista et al. (2005) for the validation of quantitative studies’ 
interpretations of CEO succession. In this research, I attempted to explore the inference 
regarding the learning of heirs apparent during the transition period (cf. Zhang & 
Rajagopalan, 2004). A phenomenological study is most appropriate for research exploring 
a specific experience of individuals, in this case, the learning of designate CEOs during 
the transition period. 
This methodology enabled me to capture the relationships between designation 
and change in identity and social context reported by the respondents.  The methodology 
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furthermore aided me in gaining an understanding of the learning process and outcomes 
under three different types of enactments. I used semi-structured structured interviews 
with 22 CEOs to understand their experience during the transition period. I also 
conducted interviews with outgoing CEOs, ex-CEOs, chairs of boards of directors, and 
board members to establish a more comprehensive understanding of the CEO succession 
event. I interviewed a consultant who specializes in helping organizations through CEO 
succession and a journalist who reports on CEO successions in organizations in order to 
have an external, independent view on the phenomenon. Given the public nature of my 
participants and their organizations, I found a wealth of public information on their 
succession event, which I used to validate some of the interviews. However, I used the 
secondary information with extreme caution because of the tendency of organizations to 
report a favourable image and change the representation of any possible 
misunderstandings inside the organization. While these articles were helpful to me to 
understand some of the complexities of the succession events, I was not in a position to 
use any of this information directly in my research because of the risk of disclosing my 
participants’ identities.  
I analyzed data from the semi-structured interviews using NVivo to identify 
shared elements in the experiences of the participants related to identity, social context, 
and forms of enactment. I performed several transformations in the participants’ 
transcribed interviews in order to reach a thorough understanding of their experiences. I 
used this data to produce a structure representing the shared elements in the experience of 
all of the participants with respect to each of the premises constructed in the theoretical 
model. 
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Undoubtedly, my beliefs and experiences shaped this research (Creswell, 2013; 
Giorgi, 2009). To inform the readers about my biases, I have included a reflexivity 
statement to help readers interpret my findings while identifying my beliefs. 
1.4. Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized in seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the 
area of interest, the research questions, and a brief description of the theoretical model 
and methodology used. Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant literatures on CEO 
succession – with an emphasis on relay succession, learning, and sensemaking in order to 
prepare the necessary background for the proposed theoretical model. Chapter 3 describes 
the theoretical model and the supporting premises that explain the impact of heir apparent 
designation on executives’ identity and social context and the resulting change in 
behaviour and cognition. It also includes premises regarding how the different types of 
enactment between the incumbent and incoming CEOs impact the incoming CEOs’ 
learning during the transition period. Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in this 
study, including the rationale for the use of a phenomenological approach, the data 
collection methods and the coding and analytical procedures. Chapter 5 presents the 
analysis and interpretation of my findings and their support or lack thereof to the premises 
and model. Chapter 6 offers a discussion of my findings given the special context of the 
research. Chapter 7 provides a summary of the academic contributions and practitioner 
implications of the findings, the limitations of this study, as well as the directions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
CEO succession events are unavoidable and disruptive for organizations. Rowe 
(1996) argued relay successions are the least disruptive, horse races are more disruptive, 
and CEO dismissals are the most disruptive. When an incumbent CEO is associated with 
the good performance of an organization, the high expectations of this CEO may lead 
stakeholders, especially shareholders, to believe the heir apparent may not achieve the 
same level of performance. Thus, the disruption may occur because the stakeholders 
question the capabilities of the incoming CEO. 
Will the incoming CEO develop the necessary skills and knowledge to sustain the 
good performance of the organization? Relay succession researchers assume heirs 
apparent learn from outgoing CEOs but fail to explain how. To answer this question, I 
used two complementary lenses: sensemaking and learning. Sensemaking explains the 
impact of identity and social context on the executives’ learning.  Sensemaking also 
includes the social process through which executives interact with others to enact their 
environment and update their capabilities. Learning explains how humans grow and build 
a new set of standards for their changed professional identity. In this chapter, I review the 
relevant literature on CEO succession, namely relay succession, learning, and 
sensemaking and proceed to integrate these theories, as represented in Figure 2.1. 
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2.1. CEO Succession 
What a firm becomes can be significantly influenced by how and to whom 
this [CEO’s] power and authority are passed … This makes CEO 
succession a defining event for virtually every organization (Kesner & 
Sebora, 1994, p. 352. Brackets are added.). 
2.1.1. A General Overview 
Strategy and organization scholars’ interest in CEO succession research grew 
mainly because of the importance of the event to organizations. Succession is 
unavoidable, and even a smooth succession  results in insecurity in organizations 
(Grusky, 1960). When the turnover in any managerial position affects a firm’s political, 
financial, social climates, as well as its morale (Friedman & Saul, 1991), then the 
turnover in the firm’s CEO position is believed to have a major impact on the firm’s 
performance (Alexander et al., 1993; Helmich & Brown, 1972). Even in poorly 
Figure 2.1: From the Heir Apparent to the CEO: The Theoretical Context 
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performing companies, changing the CEO may result in distancing the only individual, 
i.e. the incumbent CEO, who understands the problem(s) and who may be the only one 
able to suggest appropriate remedies (Morrow Jr., 2002; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). 
In addition to its importance to strategy and organization scholars, CEO 
succession is also important for managers and boards of directors. CEO succession 
constitutes a major concern for boards of directors, second only to corporate performance 
(Biggs, 2004). It is also important for other stakeholders and continues to be a hot topic in 
the popular media (Giambatista et al., 2005). Nominations of best and worst CEOs remain 
a perennial favourite for news media at the beginning of every year. Analysts identify 
companies lacking clear succession plans, speculate about who will succeed the current 
CEOs, and try to predict companies’ post-succession performance. Berkshire Hathaway is 
currently one of the companies under scrutiny for its unclear succession plans to the 
outside world. 
There have been two comprehensive reviews of prior research on leader 
succession to date. The first review, by Kesner and Sebora (1994), was conducted on 
leader succession research completed prior to the end of  1994. The second study, by 
Giambatista et al. (2005), covered the period from 1994 to 2004. Most of the research 
conducted on leader succession research  is quantitative and addresses the antecedents 
and consequences of succession (Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994), with 
less emphasis on what happens during the transition period (Giambatista et al., 2005). 
A question often addressed in the CEO succession literature is the origin of the 
incoming CEO (Giambatista et al., 2005). Who are the better performers, insiders or 
outsiders? Findings are equivocal. A few researchers argue that insiders outperform 
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outsiders most of the time (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004, 2006).  Others find the results to 
be contextually based, where insiders outperform outsiders in well-performing 
organizations and outsiders outperform insiders in poorly performing organizations 
(Citrin & Ogden, 2010). Parker, Peters, and Turetsky (2002) found that companies in 
distress with  externally recruited  CEOs double their risk of going bankrupt as compared 
to companies  where CEOs are internally promoted. 
There are mainly two processes for insider CEO successions: a relay succession 
and a horse race succession (Vancil, 1987). The relay process occurs when an 
organization grooms one successor mostly known as the heir apparent for the CEO 
position. Horse race succession occurs when several executives are considered as possible 
candidates for the CEO position. Some companies may use a combination of these 
processes whereby they use the horse race to appoint the heir apparent who later becomes 
the CEO. General Electric employed this strategy during the transition between Reginald 
Jones and Jack Welch in 1981 and between Jack Welch and Jeffrey Immelt in 2001. 
Though both processes result in an insider at the top of the organization, they are different 
in terms of their benefits and risks and in the degree of instability or turbulence that they 
cause in the organization. A horse race usually leads to the exit of important talent from 
the organization. Candidates who lose the race often feel compelled to leave and are 
likely to find attractive jobs elsewhere (Lehmberg, Rowe, White, & Phillips, 2009). 
Relay succession is considered the least disruptive form of all succession 
processes (Vancil, 1987), both internally and externally. Internally, employees’ morale 
and confidence are maintained by the smooth transition of leadership (Zajac, 1990). 
Externally, companies with heirs apparent suffer fewer negative market reactions 
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(Davidson III, Nemec, & Worrell, 2001) and more positive shareholders reactions (Behn, 
Riley, & Yang, 2005; Shen & Cannella, 2003) to their CEO succession events than 
companies who select CEOs following a public horse race or hire outside CEOs. 
This research focuses on understanding the heir apparent transition period for the 
following two reasons. First, despite the mixed findings on the consequences of CEO 
succession, relay succession is still the most common form of succession (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996) representing more than 75% of all succession procedures (Allgood & 
Farrell, 2003; Carey et al., 2009; Moriarty, 2009; Rowe, 1996; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 
2004). Second, relay succession is assumed to be the least disruptive form of succession 
for post-succession organizational performance (Helfat & Bailey, 2005; Vancil, 1987). 
2.1.2. Heir Apparent Defined 
Relay succession involves identifying a CEO successor, whom Vancil (1987) 
referred to as the heir apparent, a few years before the actual succession event takes place. 
Vancil (1987) did not limit the title of heir apparent to the COO or president. Later 
studies, however, used the role of COO and/or president as a proxy to identify the heirs 
apparent in organizations. This occurred because the studies were based on archival 
datasets. Cannella and Shen (2001), among the first researchers to explore the position of 
heirs apparent (Giambatista et al., 2005), defined an heir apparent as “any officer who 
was the only person in a firm holding the title of president or of COO or both and who 
was at least five years younger than the incumbent CEO” (p. 259). Many researchers, 
interested in the concept of heirs apparent, adopted Cannella and Shen’s definition of an 
heir apparent (Behn et al., 2005; Cannella & Shen, 2001; Shen & Cannella, 2003). Others 
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modified it to exclude the condition related to the age difference between the CEO and 
heir apparent (Boyer & Ortiz-Molina, 2008; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004, 2006).  
Drawing on Vancil’s (1987) description of an heir apparent and Cannella and 
Shen’s (2001) definition and later related adjustments, this study adopts the following 
definition of an heir apparent: any manager in the company who was a senior executive, 
including being the COO and/or president, before assuming the CEO role. This definition 
is appropriate for this work because reliance on archival data is minimal. I conducted 
extensive checking on each executive chosen before data was collected. I was able to 
identify inside successors whether they were appointed COO and/or president or whether 
they had a different title before becoming the CEO.  
2.1.3. Learning of Heirs Apparent 
In a relay succession, the heir apparent is selected a few years before the actual 
succession event takes place (Vancil, 1987). This key feature of the relay succession 
process has led many researchers to conjecture that heirs apparent have the time to learn 
from incumbent CEOs. For example, using the upper echelons literature on executives’ 
cognitive orientation, Bigley and Wiersema (2002) argued that the longer the tenure of an 
executive as the heir apparent, the more likely the incoming CEO will learn from the 
outgoing CEO, not only in terms of job-related skills but also the outgoing CEO’s 
strategic orientation. Using a learning lens, Zhang and Rajagopalan (2006) assumed  heirs 
apparent have enough time to learn the necessary job skills and outperform other types of 
successors once they become the sitting CEOs. Shen and Cannella (2003) assumed heirs 
apparent, given the status of incoming CEOs and the time, use the transition period to 
build relationships with key stakeholders of companies and enhance investors’ post-
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succession expectations. Harris and Helfat (1997) built on the key feature of relay 
succession to justify their argument that internal CEOs have more company-specific skills 
and knowledge than external CEOs. The following anecdotal stories told by retired CEOs, 
incumbent CEOs, and heirs apparent also provide insight into the dynamic between 
outgoing and incoming CEOs and support the assumptions made by CEO succession 
researchers: 
I saw practically everything he did. I learned how to make decisions, for Kirk was 
excellent at making them fast and making most of them right. When you have his kind 
of experience and feel for a business, you can make very rapid decisions, particularly 
where you can forecast the result (Watson & Petre, 2000, p. 132). Retired Thomas 
Watson Jr. recalls his experience during the transition period from being an heir 
apparent to becoming IBM’s CEO. 
I learned [from Jobs] that focus is key. You can only do so many things well, and you 
should cast aside everything else. I think he taught all of us that life is fragile, and 
we’re not guaranteed anything tomorrow, so give it all you’ve got.… It was a gift. It 
was an art… I saw it daily (Tweney, 2012). Tim Cook during his first year as Apple’s 
CEO. 
There’s a lot I can learn from Jack. I think the transition is going to be natural. Both 
of us are always guided by doing what’s best for the company (CNNfn, 2000). Jeff 
Immelt when he was declared GE’s heir apparent and Welch’s successor. 
However, while learning is assumed to be an essential component of the 
development of heirs apparent, little is known both theoretically and empirically about 
this phenomenon. Aside from a few anecdotal stories, previous research (cf. Bigley & 
Wiersema, 2002; Harris & Helfat, 1997; Shen & Cannella, 2003; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 
2004) only conjectures that given the time overlap between incoming and outgoing 
CEOs, heirs apparent learn from incumbent CEOs. For example, Harris and Helfat (1997) 
and Shen and Cannella (2003) did not include any variables measuring learning. Bigley 
and Wiersema (2002) and Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004) argued for the learning of heirs 
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apparent based on their speculation that the tenure overlap allows the incoming CEOs to 
learn from the outgoing CEOs.  They thus measured learning as the length of executives’ 
tenure as heirs apparent. These studies account neither for the negative potential impact of 
learning nor for the possibility that incumbent CEOs may be unwilling to train heirs 
apparent and pass the baton. 
Along with the advantages attached to learning from predecessors come the 
disadvantages. Some researchers believe the ability of heirs apparent to induce strategic 
change after they become CEOs is limited because they are trained by the previous CEOs 
(Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). Many CEOs are suspected of selecting successors who are 
similar to them and will carry on their vision for the company (Devries, 1988; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996). The cognitive independence of some heirs apparent is hence believed to 
be compromised by the intense influence of and socialization by their predecessors 
(Charan, 2005; Fondas & Wiersema, 1997). To show the limited ability of heirs apparent 
to induce strategic change, Bigley and Wiersema (2002) used the literature on managerial 
cognitive orientation.  They argued the longer the executives have been designated as 
heirs apparent, the more likely they acquire the same cognitive orientation as the 
incumbent CEOs, and the less likely they are to induce strategic change. To achieve this, 
they used heir apparent tenure (independent variable) as the proxy for the similarity 
between the incoming and outgoing CEOs’ strategic orientation, and strategic refocusing 
(dependent variable) as their measure of strategic change. They measured strategic 
refocusing as the percentage variation in the organization’s level of diversification for the 
three years following the succession event. However, their study did not control for the 
past strategic orientation of each company and hence their conclusion was based solely on 
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the ability of an heir apparent to induce strategic refocusing over and above the status quo 
of the organization. They also did not account for the quality of interaction between the 
heir apparent and the CEO; they simply assumed the interaction between the two 
executives led to similarities in their cognitive maps. Nevertheless, while heirs apparent 
have the opportunity to “learn the ropes” from outgoing CEOs, it is assumed they may 
run the risk of being restricted to learning the outgoing CEO’s mindsets (Bigley & 
Wiersema, 2002).  
Other streams of executive turnover research show CEOs are not always eager to 
educate heirs apparent and give up their positions even when they are performing poorly 
(Boeker, 1992; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Sonnenfeld, 1988). Some 
CEOs do not like to pass the baton for fear of losing their source of power and realizing 
they are dispensable (Devries, 1988; Goh, 2002) and/or mortal (Levinson, 1974; 
Sonnenfeld, 1988). Steve Jobs, for example, was disappointed when Apple’s share price 
increased under the management of Tim Cook during his medical leave: “He (Steve Jobs) 
was coming to grips with the thought that he might not be indispensable to the company. 
Apple stock had fared well while he was away, going from $82 when he announced his 
leave in January 2009 to $140 when he returned at the end of May” (Isaacson, 2011, p. 
272). Whether the incumbent CEO chooses the heir apparent or not, it is believed some 
incumbent CEOs will want to hold onto the power and prestige of the position for as long 
as they can. Empirically, Cannella and Shen (2001) showed the more powerful the CEO 
is, the less likely the heir apparent will get the CEO position. Immelt, for example, was 
supposed to become the CEO of GE at the end of 2000 (CNNfn, 2000), yet Jack Welch 
held onto the position until the end of 2001. However, Cannella and Shen (2001) 
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measured only the CEO power and ignored the CEO’s refusal to give up power. If the 
CEOs were willing to give up power, they are more likely to help the heir apparent during 
the transition period to assume the CEO role.  
2.1.4. Summary 
CEO succession events can be disruptive to organizations (Helfat & Bailey, 
2005). There is a general agreement in the existing literature and practice-based research 
on leader succession that grooming an heir apparent contributes to a smoother CEO 
transition (Vancil, 1987) and positive post-succession performance (Zhang & 
Rajagopalan, 2004). Most researchers who study heirs apparent argue the main reason 
behind the preference for relay succession is the opportunity presented to the heir 
apparent to learn the skills required from the incumbent CEO. This thesis will explore the 
heir apparent learning process. Specifically, it will examine the impact of the designation 
of executives as heirs apparent on their learning processes and highlight the enabling and 
restricting conditions affecting the learning in an attempt to enhance the succession 
process. This thesis answers Giambatista et al.’s (2005) call to explore the link between 
learning and CEO succession. 
2.2. Learning 
Learning helps individuals acquire new behaviours, skills, and ideas. Learning to 
learn helps individuals to continue to develop and grow (Jarvis, 2006; Ormrod, 2012). 
Inherent in these statements is the following assumption: learning has a positive outcome. 
However, individuals may also learn undesirable behaviours or beliefs (Jarvis, 2006) 
leading to negative outcomes or miseducation (Dewey, 1938). This research aims at 
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understanding the learning process necessary for the development of human beings, 
which is worth studying both for theoretical enrichment and practical value. The direct 
scope of this research is not to qualify the outcome of learning as negative or positive, 
some reference will be made if and when feasible. The purpose of this research is to shed 
some light on the learning process in order to help companies and their boards develop a 
learning environment to reach their intended outcome.  
Human beings do not live in a vacuum. They construct their own personal 
philosophies or mental models based on their interactions with the world. These mental 
models represent individuals’ own perceptions of how the world operates (Craik, 1943) 
and guide their thought processes, decisions, and behaviours (Feynman, Leighton, & 
Hutchings, 1985), and hence represent their accumulated learning. New learning may 
occur when an individual experiences disjuncture (Jarvis, 2006) or dissonance caused by 
the occurrence of unexpected events or the non-occurrence of expected ones (Mandler, 
1984). These unforeseen situations challenge the ability of an individual’s existing mental 
models to explain what happened. While disjuncture or dissonance is necessary for new 
learning, its mere occurrence is an insufficient condition to lead to new learning. The 
following sections show that even in the presence of dissonance, the learner plays an 
important role in whether new learning occurs. 
2.2.1. Learning Defined 
Behaviourism is one of the first perspectives applied to learning. Behaviourists 
focus mainly on observable behaviours (i.e. objectively measured) to infer learning. They 
investigate the relationship between an external stimulus and the resulting behaviour. 
Two main examples of behavioural theories are classical conditioning and instrumental 
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conditioning (Ormrod, 2012). Pavlov (1927, 2010) was the pioneer of the classical 
conditioning impact on learning. This perspective explains the relationship between 
external stimuli and behaviours or responses. The instrumental conditioning perspective 
examines the effects of reinforcement in increasing or suppressing behaviour, known 
respectively as operant conditioning or punishment. Rather than looking at the stimuli–
behaviour relationship, this perspective looks at the frequency of repeating or avoiding 
certain behaviours as a result of whether the behaviour is followed by reinforcement 
(Skinner, 1938) or punishment (Ormrod, 2012). Pure behavioural theorists assume 
repetitive stimuli or repetitive consequences will lead to the expected behaviour and 
ignore the cognitive models, maps, and abilities of the learners. 
Cognitive theorists believe understanding learning cannot be reduced to the 
analysis of the exhibited behaviour. They argue the information resulting from the 
learner’s interaction with the environment is an unobservable process and may or may not 
lead to observable behaviours. Purposive behaviourism or latent learning suggests a new 
perspective for the study of learning. Unlike instrumental conditioning, this perspective 
suggests reinforcement affects performance or the end result and not learning (Tolman & 
Honzik, 1930). While the behaviourists believe learning happens when it can be observed 
through new behaviours, Tolman and Honzik (1930) demonstrated learning may occur 
without the individual’s behaviour necessarily reflecting the  new behaviour. 
Reinforcement triggers the change in behaviour not the learning. The latent learning 
perspective links the occurrence of new behaviour, or the previously used variable to 
measure learning, to reinforcement not to learning. Hence, rather than relying solely on 
observable behaviour as a measure of learning, cognitive theorists explore unobservable 
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internal processes such as memory, attention, and cognitive schemas or mental models 
(Jarvis, 2010; Mazur, 1993, 1998; Ormrod, 2012).  
Behaviourists argue that in order to identify if learning happened we need to see it 
in behaviour. Cognitive theorists contend learning may occur without behaviour 
necessarily reflecting the learning.  Inkpen and Crossan (1995) combine these approaches 
and assert integrated learning occurs when changes in both behaviour and cognition take 
place. Figure 2.2 below illustrates the relationship between cognition and behaviour.  
When neither cognition nor behavioural changes occur due to an 
experience/stimulus, then no learning occurs. When both change, then integrated learning, 
which is a form of sustained learning, occurs. When change occurs only in one area (for 
example, cognition) without respective change in the second area (for example, 
behaviour) then change is expected to be temporary and cannot lead to sustained learning; 
the ultimate result is no learning.  An example of this is blocked learning. The authors 
argue temporary change in one or the other may lead to sustained learning only if it is 
followed by the respective change in the other element, such as in the case of anticipatory 
change and experimental learning. 
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Figure 2.2: The Relationship between Cognition and Behaviour 
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Source: Inkpen, A. C., and Crossan, M. M. 1995. Believing is seeing: Joint ventures and organization 
learning. Journal of Management Studies, 32(5): p. 599 
 
The earliest research in the field links learning to behaviour while later studies 
link it to cognition, and the most recent views connect learning to a change in both 
behaviour and cognition (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995; Ormrod, 2012). However, these 
definitions apply to all living organisms, not only human beings (cf. Tolman & Honzik, 
1930). The most recent developments in the learning perspective emphasize the human 
learner in order to provide a richer understanding of the learning process (Jarvis, 2006, 
2010). By acknowledging the impact on and change in individual cognitive assets, 
cognitive theorists highlight the importance of the learner in the learning process. Within 
this perspective, the individual’s internal processes largely shape the learning (Burke & 
Stets, 2009). Researchers in the field believe human learners bring to the learning 
situation their own experiences, meaning systems, and self.  The ‘self’ referenced 
includes self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-perception (Jarvis, 2010). 
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Building on the role individuals’ mental models play in understanding the world 
around them, Mezirow (1997) developed transformational learning theory, which 
explains how human beings learn to think like adults (Mezirow, 2012). The main focus of 
Mezirow’s transformation theory is how individuals learn using their own purposes, 
values, emotions, and beliefs. Mezirow differentiated between four ways of learning, 
ranging from the expansion of current understanding to the total transformation of frames 
of reference (Sherlock & Nathan, 2008). Mezirow explained how the change in 
individuals’ social status may lead the individuals to evolve a new set of standards and 
upgrade their frame of reference. Bandura (2001) explained how the social environment 
influences the human learning and hence helps in the development of their new set of 
standards. He argued human beings may imitate the observed and retained behaviour of 
other beings in their social context if they believe these individuals and/or their 
behaviours are important to their well-being. 
My research emphasizes the criticality of the individual learner in the learning 
process and develops premises accounting for the changes which might influence the 
identity and internal processes of the heir apparent.  The research builds on these concepts 
in order to provide an explanation for the learning executives receive upon their 
designation as heir apparent. The thesis contributes to the literature by providing a 
perspective to explain how designated heirs apparent build the standards for their future 
CEO identity. Building on cognitive, behavioural, and adult learning theories, this 
dissertation adopts a customized definition to reflect human learning and acknowledges 
the importance of the learner’s mental models in linking the antecedents, process, and 
outcomes of learning as follows: 
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 Learning is a continuous process where the learner experiences equivocality or 
disharmony in a situation, which he/she then processes in his/her own mind (i.e. 
existing mental models) or body (i.e. reproduces physically), resulting in a long-
term change in the mental models, behaviour, or identity of the learner. 
There are several important elements in this definition. At the beginning and end 
of the process there is the learner who is learning.  In the context of this research the 
learner is the designate CEO. The learning process is a recurring one with the heir 
apparent at the end of one experience becomes the starting point to the next one. This 
definition assumes that learning is triggered only when the existing mental models of the 
heir apparent experiences disharmony or equivocality. Learning happens when the heir 
apparent tries to resolve the disharmony or equivocality and updates his/her existing 
mental models, behaviour, or identity accordingly. Thus, if the heir apparent merely 
confirms existing knowledge, learning is not assumed to have taken place. 
2.2.2. Summary 
The learning theoretical perspective provides us with a general framework to 
explain the learning heirs apparent experience during the transition period, which is 
assumed in CEO succession literature but unexplored. The adult learning perspective aids 
in accounting for the unique mental models of heirs apparent while explaining their 
learning processes and how they learn to act given the circumstances. Adult learning 
theories provide a framework which explains how heirs apparent build a set of standards 
for their future CEO identity. This perspective lacks an ability to explain how the 
designation of heir apparent affects the learning processes of executives within 
organizations. The designation of heir apparent is an action which  may change the way 
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the executive learns in action (Argyris & Schön, 1992). To explore this aspect of the heir 
apparent learning process, the thesis examines sensemaking next. 
2.3. Sensemaking 
Sensemaking predominately describes how people construct meaning of their 
social world and the resulting consequences. The main focus of sensemaking is to provide 
an explanation for the behaviour of actors, practitioners, and individuals as they 
experience equivocality in their world (Smerek, 2011). Karl Weick coined the term 
“sensemaking”  (Schwandt, 2005). Weick (1979, 1995) used sensemaking to understand 
how people think and act in social contexts. Sensemaking helps explain how executives 
make meaning of their designation as heirs apparent and the impact of this designation on 
their ongoing flow of experience. Weick (2008) described sensemaking as the process 
through which human beings deal with equivocality, look for meaning, accept plausible 
explanations, and “move on”. 
Sensemaking is the ability to build a plausible story to aid the individual in 
reducing equivocality from the environment. Sensemaking helps one rationalize one’s 
actions in order to create meaning from an experience within the specific social context. 
The new meaning will then form a new environment and one’s new experiences will then 
be explained within the understandings of the new environment. This explains Weick’s 
inference that individuals enact their own environment, which in turn affects their actions. 
The environment of heirs apparent, however, is not merely their “creation”. While heirs 
apparent contribute to the creation of their environment, they interact with others, thus 
their environment is a product of co-creation. Co-enactment results from the interaction 
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between heirs apparent and those of the other top management team members, including 
CEOs and boards of directors.  
To some extent, heirs apparent are expected to conform to current CEOs’ 
corporate visions (Saporito & Winum, 2012). The incumbent CEOs’ and boards of 
directors’ cognitive maps represent companies’ governing dominant logic (Bettis & 
Prahalad, 1995) which heirs apparent are expected to preserve. The ability of heirs 
apparent to learn is dependent on the way they enact their environments.  Some heirs 
apparent might interpret constraints as being their creation and might act to overcome 
them. Other heirs apparent might interpret them as objects present in their environment to 
which they need to react (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). The different ways heirs 
apparent enact their environment are a fundamental component of this research and are 
presented more fully in the next chapter. 
2.3.1. Sensemaking Defined 
Weick (2008) defined sensemaking as “the ongoing retrospective development of 
plausible images that rationalize what people are doing” to reduce equivocality. 
Sensemaking explains how individuals learn every day in a social context. According to 
Weick (2012), learning is a social, collective phenomenon between people -  not a 
detached phenomenon inside of a single mind. Sensemaking aims to explain how people 
learn new behaviours and beliefs to reduce the equivocality resulting from disharmonies 
they face. The process of sensemaking starts with an enactment, followed by the selection 
of explanations, and finishes with the retention of the most plausible explanation for the 
situation. To help us better understand sensemaking, Weick (1995) described seven 
properties affecting how individuals select cues to understand an event and change their 
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understanding of the situation to fit a specific context. Below is a brief description of 
these properties. 
Individual identity. Identity refers to “parts of a self composed of the meanings 
that persons attach to the multiple roles they typically play” (Stryker & Burke, 2000, p. 
284).  How individuals think and act is highly connected to who they are (Burke & Stets, 
2009). Identities influence the cues we select from the environment in order to interpret 
our surroundings. Our interpretation of our environment accordingly influences the 
sensemaking process (Weick, 1995). Actual and perceived threats or enablers to one’s 
sense of current and desired self provide a framework to understand one’s sensemaking 
process. 
Social context. Social context means the implied or even imagined physical and 
psychological influence of others on a person. An individual’s meaning-making process is 
highly influenced by the social context in which it occurs. Although sensemaking is done 
by the individual, ignoring the impact of the social context creates blind spots in 
understanding the sensemaking process (Blumer, 1969). Face-to-face interactions with 
other members of the social context improve the efficiency and effectiveness of action 
and reduce the likelihood of contaminating the sensemaking process (Weick, 1993). 
Retrospect. Retrospect means reflecting on past events. Our ability to make sense 
of the present is limited by our past experiences (Mezirow, 1991, 1997). Sensemaking of 
current events depends on the strength of our memory in terms of time period, quality, 
and quantity (Weick, 2012; Weick et al., 2005). 
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Salient cues. Individuals notice select information from the environment, called a 
‘cue’ (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). The cue becomes an input and influences the meaning 
one retains about a certain event in a specific situation (Weick, 1993, 1995). 
Ongoing events. Individuals experience a continuous flow of events (Mintzberg, 
1973; Weick, 1995). Making sense of any event does not start or end with the specific 
event. Individuals evolve their mindsets and thought processes continuously. Some 
interpretations become out-of-date based on new forms of evidence and lead to newly 
constructed interpretations and worlds. 
Plausibility. Plausibility refers to a solution being socially acceptable within a 
certain context. Rather than looking for accuracy, individuals often search for an 
acceptable answer to an ambiguous situation and move on. Building on Simon’s (1991) 
concept of bounded rationality, Kahneman (2003, p. 699) stated: “People are not 
accustomed to thinking hard and are often content to trust a plausible judgment that 
quickly comes to mind”.  
Enactment. Within the sensemaking perspective, environments are invented rather 
than discovered. One criticism of Weick’s conceptualization of enacted environments is 
they are geared toward idealism, where the outside environment is created by what 
individuals think and do rather than by external factors. (Taylor & Van Every, 2000). 
Accordingly, in his recent work on sensemaking, Weick re-articulated enactment as the 
created environment within the conditions set by externalities (Weick, 2012; Weick et al., 
2005). 
These seven elements affect the way people create meaning from their 
environment which accordingly affects how and what they learn. Figure 2.3 below 
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presents the relationship between enactment, selection, and retention, as well as the 
impact of the seven properties on this sequence. Similar to learning, the process of 
sensemaking is triggered by a disharmony in the social context and on-going events. 
While attempting to restore order caused by the disharmony, people pick up cues shaped 
by their retrospective, accumulated past experience. Through selection, involved 
individuals reduce the number of plausible explanations, and usually retain the 
explanations best aligning with their identity standards. The retained explanations (1) 
become the input material for new enactment into the world, (2) are added to the 
individuals’ accumulated experience, and (3) shape the selection of new plausible 
explanations. This feedback route into enactment is filtered through the identity of the 
individuals.  
 
Figure 2.3: The Seven Properties of Sensemaking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M. & Obstfeld, D. 2005. Organizing and the process of 
sensemaking. Organization Science, 16(4): p. 414. 
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The aim of this research is understanding “how the designation of executives as 
heirs apparent affects their learning during the transition period”. The purpose is not 
simply to describe how heirs apparent learn; it is to describe how the designation as heirs 
apparent affects executives’ learning. In a way, the designation itself creates a 
disharmony in the heirs’ apparent world. To restore harmony in their world, I argue, in 
the next chapter, heirs apparent need to enact in a way preparing them to meet the 
challenges of this designation. I argue that the designation has a direct impact on their 
immediate and future identity and changes the major player in their social context. I also 
argue, while the designation impacts identity and social context, and hence is necessary 
for learning, it is not sufficient. The way the heirs apparent enact their environment is 
what affects their learning outcome during the transition period. 
Table 2.1 below highlights the properties expected to change upon the designation 
of an executive as the heir apparent and the corresponding reason. Designation will have 
an immediate impact on the identity and social context of the heirs apparent. This impact 
will affect the heirs’ apparent selection of salient cues and criteria for plausibility, as well 
as their ability to update their information base continuously. Heirs apparent will make 
sense of their situations retrospectively, using their accumulated experience; however, the 
designation itself is not assumed to impact this property. A detailed description of the 
impact of the change in these properties on the learning process and outcomes for the heir 
apparent is presented in the next chapter. 
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Table 2.1: The impact of the heir apparent designation on sensemaking properties 
Property 
Expected 
Impact of 
Designation 
Reason 
Identity Change 
The designation by itself creates two new identities for 
the executive: (1) an immediate one (the heir apparent 
identity) and (2) an expected one as the future CEO of 
the organization. 
Social 
Context Change 
The designation of an executive as heir apparent draws 
the attention of new stakeholders such as the media, 
shareholders, and the board of directors, hence creating 
a different social context for the executive. 
Enactment Change 
The change in social context introduces new players to 
an executive’s environment once he/she is designated 
as heir apparent. This change affects how an heir 
apparent enacts their environment and hence their 
sensemaking and learning process. 
Salient 
Cues Indirect Change 
The designation as heir apparent may lead an executive 
to notice cues that are (1) more in line with the 
standards of the new identity and expected one and (2) 
based on co-enacting with different social members in 
the newly created environment. 
Plausibility Indirect Change 
Adopting a new identity and co-enacting with new 
members in the newly created environment may change 
the executive’s assessment of what constitutes a 
plausible explanation. Selection criteria that were 
plausible from an “operationally oriented” perspective 
may not be so from a “strategically oriented” 
perspective. 
Ongoing 
Events Indirect Change 
The new identity and new environment for co-
enactment may render a few previous interpretations 
outdated and may provide new interpretations in line 
with the new social context. 
Retrospect No Change 
While the retrospect property may affect an executive’s 
meaning making during the transition period, the 
designation as heir apparent is not expected to 
significantly change the essence of this property. 
 
2.3.2. Summary 
The sensemaking perspective provides a lens allowing us to understand how 
executives make sense of their environment in order to reduce equivocality. It explains 
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how the seven properties affect people’s thoughts and actions.  This perspective helps us 
understand how the heir apparent designation affects executives’ learning process. It also 
examines how the designation impacts six of seven properties, directly and indirectly, that 
executives use to make meaning of their new experience. The next chapter explains these 
mechanisms. 
2.4. Integrating CEO Succession, Learning, and Sensemaking 
Existing research identifies relay succession as the most common form of 
succession in large public organizations (Rowe, 1996; Vancil, 1987). Research on relay 
succession suggests heir apparent learning is key during the transition period (Vancil, 
1987; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004), yet this area remains unstudied. Research on learning 
explains the process between stimuli from the environment and the learner’s response – 
mainly change in behaviour or cognition. Adult learning theories help explain how 
learners evolve new standards in their frame of references and/or adopt new standards 
based on changes in their social status. Hence they help explain how individuals change 
or evolve their identities. While these theories help illuminate some aspects of the 
learning of heirs apparent, they are insufficient to explain the whole process. They ignore 
the impact of important social factors on the learning process. Learning theories explain 
action as an outcome of a learning experience but do not use action as an input by itself in 
the learning process. Sensemaking explains the thought process of the heirs apparent 
within the specific social context or during transition and the impact of their identity on 
the thought process. However, sensemaking is limited in explaining the change or 
evolution in the identity of the heir apparent. My research attempts to integrate learning 
and sensemaking perspectives in order to offer an explanation of the impact of the 
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designation of heirs apparent on executives’ learning processes. Specifically, my research 
examines changes in executives’ learning processes with respect to changes in behaviour, 
cognition, and identity. I explain my theoretical framework in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The previous chapter presented seven properties which may influence how people 
formulate their initial sense of a situation and the potential for developing that sense 
(Weick, 1995) and guiding the learning process in any situation. While these properties 
apply to all sensemaking activities during the transition period, the following theoretical 
framework explains how the designation of executives as heirs apparent directly changes 
their (1) identity, (2) social context, and (3) co-enactment. The expected change in these 
three properties upon the executives’ designation renders them the major building blocks 
of the theoretical framework. The change in these properties affects the executives’ 
retention – selection – enactment process.  It affects the cues they pick up on, their 
interpretations (on-going events), and selection criteria (plausibility), and impacts their 
sensemaking and learning process during the transition period. The change in these 
properties affects how heirs apparent make meaning of a situation, process an event with 
their existing mental models, and affect the outcome of their learning, i.e. a long-term 
change in the cognition, behaviour and being, or identity of heirs apparent. While the 
designation has a potential to directly affect identity, social context, and enactment, the 
change in these properties is expected to impact (1) cues, (2) plausibility, and (3) on-
going events features as I explain in the next sections. 
3.1. Identity 
“Sensemaking unfolds from some standpoint, some frame of reference, some 
identity” (Weick, 2012, p.57). The learners start with who they are – their own identities 
as individuals and/or members in organizations (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 
2013). Human beings see, understand, and interpret a situation they are experiencing 
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according to who they believe themselves to be at the time (Mezirow, 1991, 1997). An 
identity is part of the mental model of an individual (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Weick, 
1979). Mental models represent individuals’ perceptions of how the world operates 
(Craik, 1943) and their place within it, guiding their thought processes, decisions, and 
behaviours (Feynman et al., 1985). 
Each individual has multiple identities such as a gender identity, family-related 
identity (e.g. father, mother, son), and professional/role identity such as COO, heir 
apparent, or CEO. My research focuses on the impact of the heir apparent designation on 
executives’ professional or role identity. Therefore, unless otherwise specified, 
executives’ identity in this research refers exclusively to role identity. Through 
experience, individuals build standards for each identity or a set of meanings which 
defines what it is like to have a certain identity (Burke & Stets, 2009). Burke (2006) and 
Burke and Stets (2009) found that human beings’ identity standards changed when there 
was a major change in their social status such as marriage or parenthood. These 
researchers also inferred that a significant promotion, such as becoming a store manager, 
might also trigger the change of identity standards for the concerned individual/employee. 
Identity standards reflect executives’ understanding of the different components of the 
role they are occupying, such as their understanding of the degree of power, decision-
making ability, or autonomy within a certain role. These standards may change as their 
role changes.  
Individuals continuously attempt to verify/validate their identities. They behave in 
a manner allowing them to establish harmony between the perceived stimuli or cues from 
the environment and their identity standards. Individuals use sensemaking to align 
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perceived input from the environment with established identity standards (Burke & Stets, 
2009; Gioia et al., 2013). The designation of heir apparent presents the potential for the 
executive to develop a new identity – one of a future CEO (Bennett & Miles, 2006a).  
The designation also alters how the designated heir apparent interprets novel situations as 
well as situations which he/she has dealt with based upon his/her previous identity. The 
announcement of the designation provides the executive with a sense of affirmed identity 
vis-à-vis others and requires the executive to build new standards or a set of meanings 
aligning with the new identity. As much as our identity lies within us and in who we think 
we are, it also lies in the hands of others and who they think we are and how they relate to 
us.  The public perception component of identities can strengthen or weaken our identity 
(Weick et al., 2005). Ralph Ellison, a renowned US writer, said, “By and large, the critics 
and readers gave me an affirmed sense of my identity as a writer. You might know this 
within yourself, but to have it affirmed by others is of utmost importance” (Chester & 
Howard, 1955).  
When someone is given power, he/she acts more powerful (Overbeck, Tiedens, & 
Brion, 2006). Social support involves expressing confidence in a person’s ability to 
handle specific situations (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Taylor, Sherman, Kim, Jarcho, Takagi, 
& Dunagan, 2004). McDonald and Westphal (2011) found CEOs with greater social 
support are more likely to engage in significant leadership behaviours and with increased 
frequency, thus increasing their effectiveness as corporate executives. Designating an 
executive as the heir apparent is an expression of confidence by the board of directors and 
the incumbent CEO in the ability of the designated executive to run the company in the 
future.  The executive may consider the designation a form of social support. The new 
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identity will require the creation of a new set of meanings to include in the identity 
standards or mental models of the heir apparent (Burke, 2006). Following the designation 
as heir apparent, the executive identity verification process necessitates the alignment of 
the executive’s behaviour and thought processes with the new set of identity standards 
related to the prospective role of CEO. For example, the executive may believe the heir 
apparent status provides more autonomy and power in affecting decision making 
regarding the organization’s strategic vision than their previous role. The executive may 
also believe the degree of power will increase once he/she is promoted to the role of 
CEO. Hence, my following premise: 
P1: The designation of an executive as an heir apparent (1) evolves a new identity 
along with a new set of identity standards for this executive, (2) affects the way 
he/she interprets the cues in a situation, and (3) shapes his/her cognitive schemas 
and behaviour so they align with the new identity standards. 
Sensemaking helps us describe the impact of a new identity – the heir apparent – 
on the change in behaviour or cognition of the heir apparent to deal with equivocality. It 
fails, however, to explain how the heir apparent builds the new set of identity standards 
which constitute the future identity, or the CEO identity. This limitation of sensemaking 
(Gioia & Mehra, 1996) can be overcome by introducing a learning mechanism. Schwandt 
(2005) suggested managers need to combine learning and sensemaking to advance their 
professional career. The identity standards for the newly assigned role of heir apparent 
consider both the expectations of the members of the social context tied to the position as 
well as the meanings of the role the individual internalizes (Burke, 2006). Burke and Stets 
(2009) argue individuals mainly use social learning (Bandura, 1977) and direct 
socialization to build standards for a newly triggered identity.  
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Along with the designation as an heir apparent comes the prospect for a new role: 
CEO. Individuals usually learn from others, whom they think are similar to them in some 
meaningful ways (Braaksma, Rijlaarsdam, & van den Bergh, 2002; Zimmerman, 2004). 
They also model behaviours they believe have pertinent value to their situation (Bandura, 
2001; Burke & Stets, 2009; Rosenthal & Bandura, 1978). I propose the incumbent CEO 
as the point of reference available to the heirs apparent to build standards for the future 
identity. In order to understand the standards of the new identity, I expect the heir 
apparent to closely emulate/imitate the behaviour and thought processes of the incumbent 
CEO.  
Prior literature highlights major differences between the CEO and other executive 
positions. These differences include, but are not limited to, the external focus of the 
CEO’s job, overarching strategic matters, operational concerns of the firm, and the more 
internal focus of other executives’ jobs (Bennett & Miles, 2006a; Ciampa, 2005; 
Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013; Vancil, 1987). If the 
heir apparent is incapable of evolving the previous identity into the new one, then little 
new learning will occur without corresponding change in cognition, behaviour, or identity 
taking place (Jarvis, 2006). The heir apparent will likely continue to apply the operational 
identity standards (e.g. those of the COO) to the expected CEO identity. Other 
stakeholders will have different expectations from the heir apparent based on their 
expectations of what the CEO’s behaviour should look like (Ciampa, 2005). 
Transformational learning involves a change in the frames of reference of the human 
being creating a different set of identity standards and ultimately a changed being 
(Hargrove, 2008). However, to achieve this level of learning, an heir apparent may need 
 
41 
 
to reach more than a change in behaviour or cognition. This may lead him/her to 
challenge their assumptions of the experience, question the foundations of their mental 
models, and change their internal perspectives (Mezirow, 1991) or identity standards. 
They also need to align these standards with existing ones which are fundamental to the 
other identities of the heir apparent.  The existing standards include ethical and moral 
behaviour standards (Burke, 2006).  If heirs apparent fail to align their new identity 
standards with existing ethical or moral behaviour standards, they may face confusion and 
be forced to deal with equivocality (Weick, 1995). For example, if the heirs apparent 
observe the incumbent CEOs being autocratic in decision-making processes, it is likely 
the heirs apparent will fail as CEOs if they emulate the autocratic behaviours when they 
themselves believe in participative decision making. Therefore, I proceed on the 
following premise: 
P2: The designation of an executive as heir apparent activates a potential identity 
and leads the heir apparent to reflect on the assumptions on which his/her mental 
models are built vs. those of the representative of the future identity or the incumbent 
CEO. The heir apparent hence builds his/her own role identity standards, rather than 
simply adjusting current behaviour or cognition to resolve equivocality. 
3.2. Social Context 
The presence of other people – whether actual, implicit, or presumed – affects the 
meaning individuals make of a certain situation (Weick, 1995). The designation of 
executives as heirs apparent changes their social context and position within the 
established social context. These changes may be accompanied by a physical relocation 
which often brings the heir apparent into closer and/or more frequent contact with the 
incumbent CEO. An example of this situation is illustrated below with respect to the 
appointment of TD Canada Trust bank’s heir apparent. 
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Masrani will move back to Canada to become TD’s chief operating officer starting 
July 1 and then become CEO when Clark retires (Friend & Paddon, 2013). 
Before executives are designated as heirs apparent the CEO monitors their 
performance (Bennett & Miles, 2006b; Ciampa, 2005; Citrin, 2005; Citrin & Ogden, 
2010). However, once executives are designated as heirs apparent, their performance 
becomes the centre of attention of the shareholders, board of directors, the media, other 
executives at the organization, and may extend to other stakeholders of the organization 
(Bennett & Miles, 2006a; Ciampa, 2005). The presence of these people, whether physical, 
implied, or perceived, influences the thought process of the heir apparent (Allport, 1985). 
Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) suggested “for a learning experience to be 
successful and complete it needs to have commitment, capacity, and positive 
expectations” (p. 553). One can argue commitment and capacity may primarily reside at 
the individual level of the heir apparent; however, positive expectations of members of 
the new social context need to be satisfied. Heirs apparent will attempt to align their 
behaviours and cognition in a manner which will gain the endorsement of the newly 
created social context. If heirs apparent do not think or act according to the expectations 
of the new players in the social context, they may risk losing the CEO position (Hall, 
1986). The change in the social context affects the cues which an heir apparent selects.  
Which cues are selected therefore affects what the heir apparent believes he/she needs to 
change in his/her cognition, behaviour, and identity standards in order to meet the 
expectations set by the new social context. Hence, I proceed on the following premise: 
P3: The designation of an executive as an heir apparent changes his/her social 
context, and leads the heir apparent to heed and behave in ways that meet the 
endorsement or perceived expectations of the members of the newly created social 
context. 
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3.3. Co-Enactment 
Weick (2012) argued human beings make sense of and shape their world through 
enacting. Specifically, we shape our world through meanings we attribute to situations 
which help us build our mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1989). The meaning an individual 
attributes to any situation is partly constructed by the actions the individual takes in a 
specific situation (Weick et al., 2005). Actions do not need to be only responses to stimuli 
(i.e. S–R) or observable, measurable behaviours (Blumer, 1969). Actions may also 
include inquiring about a certain event or even making statements to see reactions and 
then adjusting one’s cognition and behaviour in a way which lends itself to the anticipated 
reaction (Weick, 1995). In other words, how and what an heir apparent learns depends on 
how the heir apparent enacts his/her environment. 
If actions help construct meaning, then understanding individuals’ actions helps us 
understand the resulting change in their behaviours, cognitions, and/or identities, which 
constitute their learning processes. Weick (2012) argued it is difficult to observe the 
actions of a single person in a social setting.  Rather, what we are more likely to observe 
are the actions resulting from the interdependence between the individual and his/her 
social environment. Therefore, to understand the impact of the heir apparent designation 
on an executive’s learning, we need to consider the nature of interactions between heirs 
apparent and their environments rather than their actions alone. In describing this process, 
I aim to understand how the learning process itself affects the antecedents (stimuli) and 
outcomes (responses) of learning.  In this way I am combining the learning process, 
which is rarely discussed in previous literature, with two sets of variables extensively 
discussed in the extant learning literature. My research aims to answer a call by Inkpen 
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and Crossan (1995) to enhance our understanding of the learning process alongside the 
outcomes. 
According to Weick (1979), in a social environment such as an organization, there 
are acts, interacts, and double interacts. An act represents any form of behaviour by 
“Individual A”. An interact represents the reaction of “Individual B” to the act of 
“Individual A”. A double interact represents the response of “Individual A” to the 
reaction of “Individual B” to the act of “Individual A”. The following are examples 
illustrating the three types of enactment in an heir apparent context. Acts refer to 
situations where the heirs apparent observed the incumbent CEOs undertaking a certain 
behaviour which they did not understand. Given the circumstances under which the 
behaviour took place, the heirs apparent believed they knew the reason behind the 
behaviour and adjusted, or not, their cognition and/or behaviour accordingly. Under 
interact form of enactment, having observed the behaviour, the heirs apparent would ask 
the incumbent CEOs about their thought processes which led to the behaviour. This 
interact brings the heirs apparent closer to the mental models of the incumbent CEOs, but 
the resulting learning remains the heirs apparent own understanding of the reasoning 
provided by the incumbent CEOs. If the heirs apparent challenged the reasoning provided 
by the incumbent CEOs and discussed their own understanding of the situation in a 
conversational form with other parties, the enactment type would be classified as double 
interact. The result of a double interact would more likely be the creation of shared 
mental models between the two parties. Therefore, among the different types of 
interaction, double interacts are the most likely to reduce ambiguity or equivocality and 
create a collective understanding in a specific situation (Weick, 1995, 2012; Weick & 
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Roberts, 1993). The nature of interaction individuals undertake affects how and what they 
learn from a situation because it explains how they change their behaviours, mental 
models, and identity standards. 
The designation as heir apparent creates a new social environment for co-
enactment for the executive. If, for example, we take the interaction between the heir 
apparent and the incumbent CEO, we can see how the actions taken by the heir apparent 
affect the learning outcome from this co-enactment. The co-enactment between the heir 
apparent and the incumbent CEO is considered to be important for three reasons. First, 
prior research has assumed the heir apparency period provides an heir apparent with time 
to work with and therefore learn from the incumbent CEO (Vancil, 1987; Zhang & 
Rajagopalan, 2004). Second, research on the second-in-command position emphasizes the 
importance of the quality of the relationship between the CEO and the heir apparent as a 
condition for a successful transition (Bennett & Miles, 2006a). Third, human beings learn 
from others who present a functional value related to their situations (Bandura, 2001; 
Rosenthal & Bandura, 1978). Since the incumbent CEO is the “observable” 
representative of the future identity of the heir apparent, the nature of the co-enactment 
between the two becomes important. 
The heir apparent is not an official title. The heir apparent designation is a 
promise to promote the designated executive to the position of CEO assuming no 
unforeseen events. The agency of heirs apparent – in other words, the way heirs apparent 
enact their environment during the transition period – transforms the learning process, its 
antecedents, and outcomes. Below I explain how the different acts, interacts, and double 
interacts undertaken by the heir apparent result in different learning outcomes.  These 
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possible actions range from mere observation (acts) to conversation (interacts) and co-
enactment (double interacts) with the incumbent CEO. 
During the transition period, heirs apparent may resolve equivocality in their 
environment by accepting the current conditions. Argyris and Schön (1992) described this 
process as single-loop learning or Model I. This model occurs when heirs apparent 
resolve equivocality by changing their behaviour or act in accordance with their, or the 
CEO’s, understanding or theory about situations. Learning through Model I may be the 
result of two external factors.  The first is perceived pressure from the environment, i.e. 
“this is how we do things around here”.  The second is consciously adopted (or discarded) 
behaviour imitating the incumbent CEO because either the board of directors is rewarding 
(or punishing) the behaviour or other staff members appreciate (or reject) the behaviour 
(Bandura, 1977). 
Observational learning researchers suggest individuals learn other actors’ skills 
and are capable of inferring their thought processes by observing them at work (Nicolle, 
Symmonds, & Dolan, 2011; Torriero, Oliveri, Koch, Caltagirone, & Petrosini, 2007). 
Hence, an heir’s apparent observations of the incumbent CEO at work and/or imitation of 
an observed behaviour may allow the heir apparent to infer the CEO’s mental models.  
The heir apparent may then adjust his/her cognitive schemas and future behaviours 
accordingly. 
When heirs apparent resolve equivocality by observing and/or emulating CEOs’ 
behaviours, they make judgments about CEOs’ mental processes (Gallese, Keysers, & 
Rizzolatti, 2004). Heirs apparent thus resolve equivocality using their own mental 
models, and infer what they perceive to be the mental processes of the outgoing CEOs. 
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The resultant learning may or may not accurately represent the outgoing CEOs’ mental 
models. Heirs apparent may decide to use double-loop learning to resolve equivocality by 
questioning their existing theories or mental models or interacting and testing their 
theories-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1992). To accomplish this, heirs apparent may resort to 
conversations as a useful mechanism to bring divergent viewpoints closer amongst 
executives (Isaacs, 1999). Heirs apparent may seek the opportunity to create physical, 
temporal, and emotional space for conversation (Baker, Jensen, & Kolb, 2002), and 
secure outgoing CEOs’ commitment to this space. In doing so, heirs apparent enhance the 
learning experience they receive from observing outgoing CEOs and close the gap 
between the inferred and actual mental models of CEOs. 
The two different actions described above (i.e. act and interact) enact different 
environments leading to different learning outcomes. By simply acting, heirs apparent 
infer CEOs’ mental models. By interacting, heirs apparent better understand CEOs’ 
mental models and test their own theories-in-use with CEOs. However, if the heir 
apparent is reluctant about questioning what is being enacted or reluctant about double 
interacting, the collective sense made of the situation will be less robust and the learning 
of all involved decreases. For enhanced learning, all actors involved need to discuss their 
understanding of the situation. If building integrated mental models with the CEO is the 
desired outcome, then observation and conversation alone, while necessary, are 
insufficient (Jeong & Chi, 2007). Acting is directed by one’s own mental models built 
from accumulated knowledge through experience (Johnson-Laird, 1989). Double 
interacting presents the opportunity for the heirs apparent to learn and to create shared 
mental models with the outgoing CEO.  
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To create shared mental models, the heir apparent needs to co-enact or engage in 
double interaction with the outgoing CEO (Weick, 1995). When an heir apparent and a 
CEO engage in making sense of their joint experiences, they benefit from agreement in 
three areas. These areas are: (1) the concepts representing their common experience, (2) 
how these concepts are related, and (3) how these concepts affect them and how they can 
affect the concepts (Weick, 2001, p. 313). Conversation or interacting is mainly about 
thinking and leads to a shared understanding of previous experiences. The process of 
double interacting, on the other hand, is broader than thinking and talking. It includes 
action and leads to the creation of a new collective understanding of the joint experience: 
its requirements, drivers, limitations, resultant outcome, and proposed actions (Weick, 
1995). 
Without double interaction, executives will act based on their understanding of the 
situation and this may result in incoherent action plans.  An example of an incoherent 
action plan is the case of the firefighters in the Mann Gulch disaster (Weick, 1993), where 
each firefighter acted based on his/her understanding of the situation and enacted different 
environments accordingly, which led to the death of many firefighters. By engaging in 
double interact, heirs apparent and outgoing CEOs are more likely to create shared mental 
models (Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Weick et al., 2005) 
which guide future actions. Engaging with the CEO through the process of enactment 
(analyzing raw data from a certain experience), selection (reducing equivocality between 
different alternatives), and retention (storing the agreed-upon enacted environment) 
allows the heir apparent to understand the mental representations of the CEO. It further 
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allows the heir apparent to create “CEO-compatible mental models” that are different 
from the existing mental models of the heir apparent and outgoing CEO. 
In summary, different actions lead to different enacted environments and different 
learning outcomes for the heir apparent. I proceed on the following premise and related 
sub-premises: 
P4: The designation of executives as heirs apparent creates a new environment for 
enactment; however, it is the subsequent actions taken by the heirs apparent, and the 
incumbent CEOs, that affect their learning outcomes. 
P4a: Heirs apparent who double interact with incumbent CEOs are more likely to 
have the opportunity to induce change in their mental models, behaviours, and 
identity standards to prepare for the CEO position. 
P4b: Heirs apparent who are limited to act and/or interact with the incumbent 
CEOs are more likely to miss the opportunities to induce change in their mental 
models, behaviours, and identity standards to prepare for the CEO position. 
Some researchers argue heirs apparent are influenced by their predecessors, feel 
committed socially and psychologically to the ongoing visions and strategies set by 
incumbent CEOs, and find it difficult to change the prevailing courses of action post-
succession (Fondas & Wiersema, 1997; Shen & Cannella, 2002). These researchers 
therefore hypothesize that CEOs selected following a relay succession are less likely to 
induce strategic change compared to their counterparts selected following a horse race or 
outside succession process. The work in this thesis focuses on heir apparent succession, 
and hence I do not compare the ability of heirs apparent to induce strategic change to that 
of other types of successors. I build on the concept of enacted environment, to challenge 
the premises these researchers used to argue heirs apparent are less likely to induce 
strategic change than outside CEOs or CEOs selected following a horse race. 
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To achieve this objective, I propose differences in the level of commitment heirs 
apparent have to the ongoing visions and strategies set by incumbent CEOs and the 
impact of this on their ability to undertake plausible action after assuming the CEO 
position. I develop two competing premises describing the link between the types of 
enactment during the transition period, the commitment of the heir apparent to the 
ongoing vision of the organization, and their ability to take plausible action upon 
assuming the role of CEO. 
Galinsky and his colleagues (2008) showed individuals who are primed for power 
are more likely to produce creative ideas and express attitudes which do not conform to 
the opinions of others. Higher positions provide executives with more power, yet 
Battilana (2011) found higher positions alone are not enough to trigger change. In her 
study, Battilana (2011) found management executives with lower status, e.g. non-doctors 
as opposed to doctors, are less likely to take actions diverging from the existing 
organizational status quo than management executives with higher status, e.g. doctors.  
Consequently, while the designation of executives as heirs apparent primes them for 
power, it does not necessarily equip them with the tools needed, behaviourally and 
cognitively, to take action that changes the existing status quo. Amongst heirs apparent, 
those who double interact with incumbents are more likely to have the opportunity to 
create the mental models, behaviours, and identity standards necessary to prepare them 
for the CEO position than those who merely act/interact with incumbent CEOs. Hence, 
heirs apparent who double interact with the incumbent CEO will have both the power and 
the mental models and will therefore be more likely to take sense-ible action diverging 
from the status quo than heirs apparent who solely act/interact. 
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The double interact with incumbent CEOs is expected to equip the heirs apparent 
with mental models needed to take action to change the course of the current status quo, 
but does not guarantee they will take those actions. Hurst, Rush, and White (1989) 
referred to this dilemma as the tension of renewal, or the ability of management teams to 
respect the core of the organization while continuously updating it. They argued a 
necessary component to achieve organizational renewal is the availability of teams 
equipped with “prospecting and preserving abilities” (p. 97). They defined management 
teams prospecting and preserving abilities based on the classification by Miles and Snow 
(2003) of the strategic orientation of companies. Hurst et al. (1989) described prospecting 
abilities as the willingness to introduce radical innovations and experiment with ideas 
outside the existing scope of the business. They described preserving abilities as the 
tendency to protect the on-going strategy of the organization and even avoiding 
incremental changes. 
Similarly, I argue heirs apparent who engage in double interact with incumbent 
CEOs have more potential than other heirs apparent to build “prospecting and preserving 
abilities”. Outside CEOs may be good at detecting the opportunities and threats facing 
organizations, thus may possess more prospecting abilities. However, they may not be as 
aware of the organization’s internal strengths and weaknesses, hence may lack preserving 
abilities. Heirs apparent who act/interact with the incumbent CEO may not have had the 
chance to build neither prospecting nor preserving abilities and hence may prefer to 
protect the status quo. Heirs apparent who double interact with the incumbent CEO are 
more likely to have the opportunity to create the evolved mental models, behaviours, and 
identity standards necessary to prepare for the CEO position. They are more capable of 
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detecting opportunities and threats while still being aware of the organization’s strengths 
and weaknesses. These CEOs build the confidence to experiment with new ideas while 
being mindful of the importance to protect the core strategy of the organization. Bishop et 
al. (2004) described people with experiential openness and curiosity orientation while 
being mindful of their surroundings as having complex cognitive representations. The 
ability of heirs apparent to differentiate, see new opportunities, and integrate, using the 
organization’s strengths, helps them build cognitive complexity (van Seggelen-Damen, 
2013). 
Engaging in double interacts with incumbent CEOs facilitates the social 
construction of mental models required for the job (Weick, 1993). Incumbent CEOs serve 
as a reliable source of ideas and open up other perspectives for heirs apparent. Double 
interact therefore leads to the nurturing of effective heirs apparent equipped with distinct 
mental models which are different from their prior mental models and CEOs’ mental 
models.  The heirs apparent with double interact exposure are more likely to be ready to 
craft new solutions rather than rely on responses prescribed for past scenarios (Dorner, 
1996). 
While I am not comparing the ability of heirs apparent to induce strategic change 
to other types of successors, I posit there is a difference within the heir apparent group. 
Those who act/interact with incumbent CEOs may miss the opportunity to build either 
preserving or prospecting abilities and therefore have trepidations, emotional and 
psychological, towards changing the ongoing strategy of the organization. Those who 
double interact with incumbent CEOs have the potential to build preserving and 
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prospecting abilities, preserving their strengths and prospecting their opportunities. I 
proceed with the following premise. 
P5a: Heirs apparent who double interact, unlike heirs apparent who act/interact, with 
incumbent CEOs, have more opportunity to build mental models with both 
preserving and prospecting abilities enabling them to take plausible action upon 
assuming the CEO position. 
On the other hand, it is equally plausible to argue heirs apparent who are limited 
to act/interact with the incumbent CEOs are more likely to take action which might 
change the status quo upon assuming the CEO title than heirs apparent who double 
interact with incumbent CEOs. I have argued earlier that CEOs who are limited to 
act/interact with the incumbent CEOs may have lacked the opportunity to build shared 
mental models with these incumbent CEOs. Given their new identity as future CEOs, 
these heirs apparent will interpret strategy discussions differently and will construct their 
own ideas and opinions about the strategic direction of the organization. Without the 
opportunity to double interact with incumbent CEOs, heirs apparent miss the chance to 
understand the incumbent CEOs’ reasons for adopting the current strategies. While these 
heirs apparent might have been involved in the operating side of the ongoing strategy of 
the organization, they were not necessarily actively involved in the corresponding 
strategic decisions. Their emotional or psychological commitment to the ongoing strategy 
of their organization might be limited as they may not have had the opportunity to discuss 
the context behind the strategy.  
The involvement of heirs apparent who act/interact with incumbent CEOs may be 
limited to the operations side of the strategy. They may have low emotional or 
psychological commitment to the ongoing strategy of the organization. Therefore, heirs 
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apparent who act/interact with incumbent CEOs might build more prospecting abilities. 
They may be more willing to take actions to change the current status quo of the 
organization than heirs apparent who double interact with incumbent CEOs. 
Consequently I proceed with the following competing premise: 
P5b: Heirs apparent who act/interact, unlike heirs apparent who double interact, with 
incumbent CEOs, feel less committed to the ongoing strategy of the organization and 
are more likely to build prospecting abilities and to take action to change the status 
quo of the organization upon assuming the CEO position. 
The two above competing premises argue for equally plausible outcomes. In both 
premises, I am arguing against the existing implicit assumption in CEO succession 
literature regarding the cognitive capture between heirs apparent and incumbent CEOs. 
Cognitive capture refers to the immersion of heirs apparent in the world of CEOs leading 
heirs apparent to see the world through the CEOs’ eyes and think like them (Hayes, 
2012). In P5a, I argue heirs apparent who double interact with incumbent CEOs have the 
opportunity to build prospecting and preserving abilities leading to cognitive complexity. 
They are expected to induce change leading to organizational renewal upon assuming the 
CEO role. In P5b, I argue heirs apparent who act/interact with incumbent CEOs do not 
experience any sort of cognitive capture from the incumbent CEOs, they build 
prospecting abilities. They are expected to take innovative action and induce radical 
strategic change. The outcome in both cases may be good for the organization. I will 
leave the answer to whether heirs apparent and boards should prefer double interacting to 
acting/interacting for the results from the fieldwork.   
Figure 3.1 represents the theoretical framework described in this chapter. This 
figure shows the direct impact of designation on the heirs’ apparent identity, social 
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context and enactment, which then affects the learning outcomes of the executives at the 
time of designation. It also reflects the indirect impact of designation on salient cues, 
ongoing events, and plausibility, which then impact the executives’ learning outcomes at 
the time of designation. The impact of designation on sensemaking properties, whether 
direct or indirect, does not affect the executives’ learning just at the time of designation. 
Rather the executives’ learning outcomes will continuously be updated through the 
transition, reflected in the period ad1-n, and until the executives assume the CEO role. 
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Figure 3.1: The Impact of the Heir Apparent Designation on the Executive’s 
Learning Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PS.  (d) means at the time of designation 
 (ad1-n) means from the designation to the promotion to the CEO position. This is an iterative state and 
keeps on evolving, so it does not represent a static state between designation (time 1) and getting the 
CEO position (time n+1) 
 (aa) means after appointment to the position of CEO 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1. Research Strategy 
To explore heir apparent learning during the transition period, I used an interview-
based approach to understand the implicit structure of this learning experience (Sanders, 
1982). I used a qualitative approach – phenomenology – as the research method to help 
accomplish the objective of this study. The study’s research question is “how the 
designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their learning and prepares them to 
become CEOs”. The study aims at exploring and explaining the heirs’ apparent learning 
process during the transition period and hence has two components better served by a 
qualitative approach (Yin, 2009, 2011). 
One of the primary motivations for this study is to fill the existing gap in our 
understanding of the CEO succession transition period and the learning which happens 
during this period (Giambatista et al., 2005). Previous studies on this topic relied heavily 
on large-sample archival data to understand the impact of proxy variables to measure the 
unobserved theoretical construct related to incoming and outgoing CEOs, mainly on 
organizational performance (c.f. Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). These 
quantitative studies described simplified relationships between variables (c.f. 
Antonacopoulou, 2001) and resulted in the process of “learning,” within the CEO 
succession literature, being accepted as “obvious”. The choice of a phenomenological 
approach, based on interviews, comes in response to the call for more qualitative research 
by Giambatista et al. (2005). One aim of this method is to validate some of the 
interpretations of the quantitative studies on CEO succession phenomena and, more 
specifically, in our case, the inference regarding the learning of heirs apparent during the 
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transition period (cf. Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). Alternating between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches enhances our understanding of organizational research 
phenomena (Lee, 1991; Miller, 2005).  
There is no single perfect approach for conducting a study. The choice of the 
appropriate qualitative approach depends on the idiosyncratic features of the study, what 
can and cannot be done in this context, as well as the researcher’s worldview and 
previous experience (Creswell, 2013). Different approaches have different foci and are 
better suited for different types of research topics. The focus of narrative research is to 
capture and investigate the stories or experiences of the life of one individual or a small 
number of individuals (Clandinin, 2007). The focus of the grounded theory approach is 
to build theory from field-collected data or from the perspective of research participants 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Ethnography emphasizes understanding and explaining the 
shared constituents of a specific group belonging to the same culture (Wolcott, 2010). 
The case study approach is more appropriate for research (1) investigating “how” and 
“why” questions, (2) where the researcher has little or no control over the events, and (3) 
studying contemporary events (Yin, 2009, 2012). The phenomenological approach is best 
suited for research seeking new knowledge of human experiences, behaviours, and 
relationships (Moustakas, 1994).  
Choosing a specific approach enhances the rigor of the study by providing a 
structured guideline for conducting the research (Creswell, 2013). In the context of heirs 
apparent, this study aims at understanding their (1) learning experience, (2) social 
context, (3) behaviours, (4) meaning making of encounters, and (5) relationships with 
other parties involved during their transition period. These objectives fit more with a 
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phenomenological approach design than the other qualitative approaches available, as 
explained below. 
Phenomenology seeks to understand human experiences and their meaning-
making process within the complexity of their lifeworld (Giorgi, 2009), which coincides 
with the objectives of the perspectives used in building this thesis’s theoretical 
framework. Both the learning and sensemaking perspectives used to build the theoretical 
framework of this research help us to understand how individuals change their cognition, 
behaviour, and identity based on their meaning-making process. Phenomenology also 
allows for a prior understanding of theoretical underpinnings to direct and limit data-
collection efforts (Moustakas, 1994). This approach allows for the comparison of data 
collected to theory, either to validate or refute the theory, in order to enhance the internal 
soundness of the research. The process of analyzing data using a phenomenological 
approach is presented later in this chapter. 
The fields of psychology and education frequently use the phenomenological 
approach to understand human experiences within the “person-environment fit” 
(Edwards, Cable, Williamson, Lambert, & Shipp, 2006). This approach also holds the 
potential to enhance our understanding of how executives operate within organizations 
(Conklin, 2007; Ehrich, 2005; Heil & Whittaker, 2007; Sanders, 1982).  This is true 
especially in terms of executives’ sensemaking and learning processes – concepts deeply 
rooted in social psychology and education. A phenomenological approach enhances this 
study’s efforts to understand executives’ learning experiences within their organizations, 
triggered by their designation as heirs apparent. This contributes to questioning, 
validating, complementing, and strengthening the current wealth of quantitative research 
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available on CEO succession while providing insight from people with relevant 
experience. 
Since Sanders (1982) saw phenomenology as a “new star” in organizational 
research methodology, several management-related studies used this approach to explore 
their phenomena of interest. Gibson (2004) unraveled the important themes in the 
experience of mentoring relationships of female faculty. Conklin (2012) used the 
phenomenological approach to explore the experience of finding one’s calling and its 
relevance in the organizational world. Chikudate (1999, 2000) explored the type of 
mechanisms blocking change in Japanese communities and the behaviours which lead to 
ethical problems in organizations. Catino and Patriotta (2013) used phenomenological 
interviews to understand how pilots and airline staff members assess errors and learn 
from them. Smerek (2011) used phenomenological interviews to describe the tension new 
presidents experience between “learning and being”, using the sensemaking and 
sensegiving lenses. These studies, and many others, use phenomenology to understand 
strategy and management challenges as processes and practices where the human 
dimension is a strong element.  
Qualitative and quantitative researches were historically associated with inductive 
and deductive reasoning approaches respectively. While these reasoning approaches may 
have different starting points, they both can lead to acquiring new knowledge (Hyde, 
2000). Inductive reasoning, conducted usually by researchers subscribing to a relativist or 
interpretivist paradigm, aims at building theory from observations or data from the 
fieldwork. Deductive reasoning, undertaken usually by researchers subscribing to a 
positivist or post-positivist paradigm, aims at validating whether theories apply in certain 
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circumstances (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011). However, recently qualitative 
researchers have been advocating the use of deductive qualitative research or in other 
words using qualitative research for theory testing in addition to theory building 
(Bitektine, 2008; Hyde, 2000; Yin, 2009, 2011). 
Research on CEO succession has been dominated by quantitative methods 
(Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) using deductive reasoning. The 
extensive use of quantitative research has led to situations where hypotheses are tested 
using only measurable proxies to represent the underlying variables, such as using the 
title of COO or president to identify heirs apparent, or heir apparent tenure to measure 
cognitive capture between the incoming and outgoing CEOs. This reductionist approach 
to theory testing required most researchers to assume some of the processes, such learning 
during the transition period, as acceptable or obvious in their theory building. The lack of 
adequate quantitative measures to understand the dynamics of learning processes during 
CEO transition period can be overcome through the use of theory testing using qualitative 
methods (Bitektine, 2008; Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Yin, 2011). 
Case studies (Shane, 2000; Yin, 2009, 2012), pattern matching (Hyde, 2000), and 
descriptive phenomenology (Creswell, 2013; Giorgi, 2009; Giorgi, 2006) are examples of 
procedures used in theory testing using qualitative research. This research adopts the 
descriptive phenomenology method. It allows me to approach the research question with 
an a-priori lens formulated based on the assumptions adopted in the wealth of quantitative 
research conducted on CEO succession. The structured steps described to analyse the 
lived experience of designate CEOs with learning during the transition period allowed me 
to verify or refute the theoretical arguments used to build the premises. 
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I will use phenomenology in this research because it adds to our understanding of 
organizational research and fills the qualitative gap in CEO succession literature. This 
method allows for a validation, support, or refutation of current interpretations of the 
learning processes of heirs apparent during the transition period as presented in the 
findings chapter.  
4.2. Research Design 
Research design is what links the theoretical framework and the research 
questions to the empirical portion of the research or data collection and data analysis 
strategies (Yin, 2011). The research design “relates back to the question, is developed 
solely to illuminate the question, and provides a portrayal of the phenomenon” 
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 59). A thoughtful research design for qualitative research is flexible 
and requires change as the study progresses. However, providing a research design at the 
beginning of the study enhances the credibility of the research as well as its accuracy 
(Yin, 2011). Qualitative studies are not quickly produced essays following conversations 
with a few respondents. I spent a substantial amount of time designing the empirical 
work, collecting and extensively analyzing large volumes of data (Bogdan & Biklen, 
2007). Sanders (1982) identified three essential components in phenomenological 
research design: (1) sample selection, (2) data collection, and (3) phenomenological data 
analysis. 
4.2.1. Sample Selection 
The most important criterion for building a “participant pool” is to locate potential 
participants who have experienced or lived the phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994; 
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Polkinghorne, 1989). For this study, potential participants were individuals who were 
heirs apparent before becoming CEOs. The purpose of this study was to understand the 
heir’s apparent experience independent of age difference.  I therefore adopted the 
definition of an heir apparent previously discussed in Chapter 2 – that is, any manager in 
a company who was a senior executive, including the COO and/or president, before 
becoming the CEO. This design allowed me to understand how the designation of 
executives as heirs apparent affected their learning journey from designation to assuming 
the CEO role. I continued recruiting participants until I reached sufficient variance in the 
degree of change in the suggested properties of sensemaking among participating heirs 
apparent and namely in the three hypothesized enactment forms. The design helped 
understand the impact of change in these properties on executives’ learning outcomes. It 
also allowed me to document how closely each participant’s experience conformed to the 
sensemaking process and to associate the degree of conformity with the degree of 
“success” of the heir apparent after assuming the CEO role. While this sampling strategy 
allows me to comment on the learning of heirs apparent, it does not allow me to explain 
the link between designation and actual company performance. The interviews I 
conducted were all in large successful organizations. 
In order to build my participants’ pool, I downloaded the names of all of the 
companies headquartered in Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta from the Lexis Nexis 
Corporate Affiliations database. Individual information on each company included (1) 
company name, (2) complete address, (3) phone and fax numbers, (4) website address and 
e-mail, (5) number of employees, (6) sales turnover, (7) industry, and (8) current CEO 
name and e-mail address. To identify whether the current CEO had an heir apparent 
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experience, additional information on whether the current CEO was a senior executive in 
the company before becoming the CEO was gathered from other databases, namely (1) 
Mergent Online – Executive Search, (2) Thomson ONE Banker – Director Search, and 
(3) the Lexis Nexis people directory and subdirectories such as Marquis Who’s Who and 
the Dun and Bradstreet guide. The resulting names constituted my potential participants’ 
pool. 
Canada is an important country for research in this area because it is the ninth 
largest economy in the world based on its gross domestic product (GDP) 
(EconomyWatch, 2010). Following the 2008 crisis, the Canadian economy proved to be 
one of the strongest advanced economies worldwide. I selected the provinces of Ontario, 
Quebec, and Alberta for several reasons, most importantly their economic and financial 
importance in North America and worldwide. Together, these provinces constitute around 
75% of the GDP of Canada, with Ontario contributing around 40%, Quebec 20%, and 
Alberta 15% (Statistics Canada, 2012). Ontario’s GDP alone is higher than the GDPs of 
many major countries such as Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland (Ontario 
Government, 2012). Furthermore, Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta host more than 80% of 
the companies headquartered in Canada. 
Random sampling makes sense in the quantitative realm, where the researcher is 
interested in the generalizability of the research findings to a population (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011).  Random sampling does not make sense in the qualitative realm or when 
adopting the phenomenological approach such as in the case of this research, where the 
purpose is to generalize back to theory (Merriam, 2002; Yin, 2011). Participants in a 
phenomenological study constitute the main data sources for the researcher. The 
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researcher carefully chooses participants based on their ability and willingness to describe 
and share their experiences with the researcher (Polkinghorne, 2005) and their 
accessibility to the researcher (Seidman, 2006). Qualitative research uses sampling 
strategies to provide a better understanding of the research questions at hand and to 
contribute to the existing knowledge of the phenomenon under study (Creswell, 2013). 
The theoretical sampling in this research included heirs apparent who were appointed 
CEOs from within organizations (to control for new learning related to industry or 
organization knowledge) and those who became CEOs not more than eight years ago. I 
limited the years of CEO experience to eight based on a study by Sherlock and Nathan 
(2008) which showed that CEOs can reliably remember their experience if it was within 
this range. CEOs were chosen from large organizations in different industries to control 
for the impact of company size on the quality and quantity of the learning that may take 
place during the transition. 
Though very rare in large organizations, some of the organizations in the 
participants’ pool were family run businesses. Family members were appointed heirs 
apparent and became the CEOs such as in the case of Linamar Corporation where Ms. 
Linda Hasenfratz succeeded her father, Mr. Frank Hasenfratz, as the CEO. These cases 
were excluded from my sample as they may constitute a confounding factor to my ability 
to generalize back to the theoretical framework. 
Even large family businesses are different from other enterprises in many ways 
including family aspects, management, and succession practices (Filser, Kraus, & Märk, 
2013; Lansberg, 1999; Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). Hence the designation of heirs 
apparent in the case of family businesses is a different process. Lambrecht and Lievens 
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(2008) found family businesses prefer to have boards of advisors rather than boards of 
directors since they do not necessarily want to be directed. This dynamic is different for 
large companies where the boards of directors are actively engaged in directing the 
organization and who have CEO succession as their second priority after financial 
performance. 
While succession in family businesses remains an important topic (Filser et al., 
2013; Strike, 2013), these businesses usually seek advice primarily on strategic issues, 
followed by organizational issues and CEO priorities, and last about succession (Strike, 
2013; Ward & Handy, 1988). The leadership in family businesses is different from that in 
publicly held organizations for several reasons (Stewart & Hitt, 2012). First, while leaders 
enjoy long tenure and are entrenched in family businesses, they experience high turnover 
and are subject to market discipline in publicly held organizations (Oswald & Muse, 
2009). Second, successors who are family members are trained on the job and hence 
accumulate different, more personalized, knowledge about the business while successors 
in large organizations are trained in educational institutions only before joining the 
organization (Jorissen, Laveren, Martens, & Reheul, 2005). Third, leaders in family 
businesses are drawn from a limited kinship pool, while successors in large organizations 
are drawn from a large pool (Pérez-González, 2006). Goldberg (1996) found that 
effective successors in family businesses are assured ascension to the top job very early in 
their life, even as early as high school age. Therefore, the designated family members and 
others in the company know they are likely the heirs apparent even before officially 
joining the organization. For the above reasons, I excluded heirs apparent who were 
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family members from the sample as their identity and social context may have existed 
prior to joining the organization. 
Appendix A describes the sampling strategy based on learning needs. It highlights 
the possible origins of the heir apparent as being from within the organization, different 
organization but same industry, or coming from a different organization from a different 
industry. Heirs apparent recruited from different organizations and different industries 
may need to spend their transition period learning about the organization and industry 
specific characteristics. Those recruited from same industry but different organization 
may spend some of their transition period learning about the organization’s specific 
characteristics. In order to focus on learning the requirements of the CEO role as much as 
possible, I only chose participants who were designated as heirs apparent and promoted 
from within their organization (the shaded area in the table). 
Sample size is a similarly important issue (Creswell, 2013). The aim of 
phenomenology is to inform the research question and the phenomenon, rather than to 
generalize the findings to the population (Moustakas, 1994). Attaining large sample sizes 
alone is not the goal. In phenomenology, research sample size has been recommended to 
be between five and twenty-five (Polkinghorne, 1989). I was able to access and interview 
22 participants. Two of my interviewees were female constituting 9% of my sample size. 
While the number is low, the number of female CEOs for large organizations is less than 
5% in the top 1000 public companies in Canada (Eisenschmid, 2010).  The female 
representation in the sample is therefore approximately representative of the national 
representation in Canadian public companies. 
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The sample size of 22 was high compared to the sample sizes in similar previous 
research, which range from 10 to 20 elite participants (Gabarro, 1987; Smerek, 2011; 
Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2002). The large size of my 
sample provided me with theoretical saturation and enough variation based on the 
enactment argument (see Figure 4.1) (Creswell, 2013). The sample size also provided an 
acceptable representation from the three provinces (see Figure 4.2). Almost half of the 
respondents were from the finance and insurance or the oil and gas industries (see Figure 
4.3). All the findings and discussions provided in chapters 5 and 6 respectively should be 
interpreted given the characteristics of this sample especially given that the respondents 
are currently CEOs of large organizations and 21 of the 22 respondents followed 
successful incumbent CEOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.1: Sample Composition by Type of Enactment 
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Figure 4.2: Sample Composition by Province 
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4.2.2. Data Collection 
This study aimed at understanding how the designation of executives as heirs 
apparent affected their learning and prepared them to become CEOs. This process 
involved the meaning making heirs apparent experience during the learning process. 
Jarvis (2006), a renowned researcher in the adult learning field, argued interviews are the 
best available tool to collect data about the participants’ learning process, as we need to 
understand this process from their perspective. Participants know this process better than 
the researcher, who is external to them. Observation would enable the researcher to see 
only the resulting behaviour rather than have access to the thought process. Without 
discussion, any attempt by the researcher to analyze the thought process behind the 
behaviour would reflect the projected thought process of the researcher rather than the 
participant (Gallagher, 2012). 
Consistent with similar previous research I used semi-structured interviews as my 
primary data collection method for this study. One study examined how leaders learn (cf. 
Seijts & Gandz, 2013). The second one explored how partners in a joint venture learn 
from each other (cf. Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). The third one investigated how CEOs of 
non-profit organizations learn (cf. Sherlock & Nathan, 2008). The fourth one studied how 
outside college presidents use sensemaking and sensegiving processes (cf. Smerek, 2011). 
The fifth one researched how individuals make meaning of their own professional calling 
(cf. Conklin, 2012). According to Hopf (2004) “(B)ecause of the possibility of enquiring 
openly about situational meanings or motives for action, or collecting everyday theories 
and self-interpretations in a differentiated and open way, and also because of the 
possibility of discursive understanding through interpretations, open or semi-
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standardized interviews provide important opportunities for an empirical application of 
action-theory ideas in sociology and psychology.” (p. 203). Semi-structured interviews 
allowed me to conduct an open enquiry to understand participants meaning and motives 
for action and self-interpretations of their everyday theories. 
Hence, semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate tool to understand 
the heirs apparent self-interpretations of their identity change, their perceived social 
context, and their motives for interacting with their new environment. Observation on the 
other hand, would have only allowed me to interpret their actions using my own theory of 
mind. Weick and Roberts (1993), for example, relied heavily on data collected from 
interviews when they attempted to describe (1) how the interaction of individuals with 
their environment and (2) how they made sense of the situation led to heedful 
interrelating. Data collection through interviews was also consistent with my theories. I 
argued that observation alone could lead the heir apparent to understand the mental 
models of the CEO using his or her theories of mind, while an interact would help the heir 
apparent to understand the mental models from the CEO’s point of view. Similarly, I 
argue observation allows the researcher to infer the participants’ mental models using 
his/her own mental models. Interactive interviews, on the other hand, bring the researcher 
closer to the participants’ mental models, which is the focus of this research. 
Adopting interviews as the main source of data raised two types of challenges: (1) 
access to elites, in this case the CEOs, and (2) access to adequate data.  I discuss each of 
these challenges below. 
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4.2.2.1. Access to Elites 
Access to elite members of society such as CEOs is difficult because they build 
barriers with the rest of the society (Hertz & Imber, 1993), but this issue may have been 
overstated (Ostrander, 1993). Researchers who have studied corporate elites have 
received acceptable response rates (Welch et al., 2002). For example, Simons (1994) 
received the acceptance of 10 top executives out of 12 asked to participate in his study. 
Thomas (1993) recommended two important factors for getting access to elites – being 
well prepared and having a sponsor.  
Being prepared was highly recommended by scholars who researched elite-related 
questions (e.g. Ostrander, 1993; Thomas, 1993; Useem, 1995). One advantage of 
conducting elite research is that participants are usually highly visible and most of their 
demographic information is publicly available (Thomas, 1993). Preparedness reflects the 
seriousness of the researcher and radiates a positive image (Harvey, 2011). As such, in 
preparing myself, I collected as much information as possible about the executives prior 
to the meeting from different databases such as Lexis Nexis, Mergent Online, and 
Thomson ONE, as well as from various business news sources. I looked for published 
newspaper articles discussing the participants in any way during their transition period. 
The information collected was not used to consciously build preconceived ideas 
about the participant’s learning experience during the transition period, but rather to make 
the best out of the interview and not ask for details about events I could learn about in the 
press. I also allowed a great deal of flexibility in time and location to accommodate the 
participants’ busy schedules in order to increase the response rate (Mikecz, 2012). The 
interviews with CEOs who were promoted from within their organization were conducted 
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over the period extending from October 2013 till May 2014 and distributed as presented 
in Figure 4.4. Most of the interviews (16/22) were conducted at the interviewee’s office. 
The others (6/22) were conducted over the phone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the individualized research, I prepared a customized invitation letter for 
every potential candidate to solicit their participation. The invitation letter introduced the 
research topic to the participants without revealing the theoretical underpinnings of the 
research. Appendix D provides an example of the main content of the letter sent to 
participants. One week after sending the letter, in cases where I did not receive an answer 
from the potential respondents, I followed up with an e-mail informing them of the letter I 
sent and I attached it to the e-mail, and asked them if they would give me one hour of 
Figure 4.4: Interviews Distribution per Month 
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their time. Some participants asked for more details before accepting and others asked to 
see a sample of the interview questions. I prepared the participants who accepted to do the 
interview by telling them the interview revolved around the time they served as heirs 
apparent and that I needed them to recall events or episodes which led them to change or 
affirm the way they think or do business. I asked them to take personal notes, including 
how these experiences changed them for the better or worse. 
Some of the participants were approached directly; others were approached using 
the help of a sponsor. Securing the help of a sponsor had mixed recommendations. Some 
researchers believe that elites are more willing to meet and be more open during 
discussions if you share a connection (e.g. Ostrander, 1993; Thomas, 1993). Other 
researchers believe a sponsor can do more harm than good either because participants do 
not like your sponsor (McDowell, 1998) or because the sponsor may misrepresent your 
research objective (Seidman, 2006). A researcher on leaders’ learning found no difference 
in the openness and acceptance to participate from elites according to whether they were 
approached directly or through a sponsor. To increase the likelihood of my chosen CEOs 
to participate in the study, I secured the assistance of the following people: the incumbent 
dean of Ivey Business School at the time of the research, my thesis supervisor, board 
members from the Canadian Foundation for Governance Research, and members from the 
institute of corporate directors who agreed to introduce me to some of the participants in 
my sampling frame. 
My sponsors helped me reach out to 10 participants, six from Ontario, two from 
Quebec, and one from Alberta. However, previous research suggested that 12 participants 
were usually needed to reach theoretical saturation (Creswell, 2013). To reach my 
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initially proposed sample size of 12 to 15 participants, I sent letters of invitation to 
participants from Quebec (8 invitations) and Alberta (16 invitations).  I did not search for 
more participants in Ontario given that I already had secured 9 participants from the 
province (6 with the help of a sponsor, 3 approached directly). After following up one 
week later through e-mail, I received eight positive answers from participants in Alberta 
and two from participants in Quebec. Figure 4.5 presents the distribution of participants 
per province based on whether they were approached through a sponsor or directly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2.2. Data Collection 
Scheduling an interview with corporate elites does not guarantee the quality of the 
data to be collected. After a review of the literature around the interviewing of elites, 
Figure 4.5: Type of Approach 
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Welch et al. (2002) identified two major issues that may affect the quality of the data 
collected: (1) the power of elite interviewees and (2) the openness of elite interviewees. 
Previous research found CEOs were tempted to be in charge and accustomed to 
directing everyone else around them (Cochrane, 1998; Mikecz, 2012). They were trained 
in communicating and so they might, consciously or not, divert the course of the 
interview to serve their own agendas rather than to adhere to the main objective of the 
researcher (Ostrander, 1993; Thomas, 1993). To balance the power of the elite 
participant, I researched all publicly available information on the participants to be well 
prepared for the interviews. Further, I met with a journalist who reported on CEO 
succession events in large organizations in Canada to obtain insights on specific events 
that might have happened during the transition periods. I found that my participants were 
genuinely interested in the topic and were excited to openly discuss the subject. 
Previous research also found that CEOs were used to representing their 
organizations to third parties such as the government and media (Bennett & Miles, 
2006b), so they would be tempted to give more socially accepted answers in support of a 
positive image of their organizations (Mikecz, 2012). To work around this, Thomas 
(1993) suggested differentiating between the multiple personae of the participant – as an 
individual, as a company’s CEO, and as the company’s spokesperson – and addressing 
the questions accordingly. To avoid getting “journalistic answers”, I formulated my 
questions in a way that addressed the participants as individuals seeking their personal 
insights and understanding of the situation. 
It was not easy for CEOs at first to admit to struggling during the transition 
period, especially at the beginning of the interview. To encourage CEOs to speak openly, 
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at the beginning of the interview I explained to all participants the measures I was taking 
to ensure their confidentiality and informed them about the procedure I would undertake 
to disguise their and their institutions’ identities in the write-up. I also attempted to build 
as much rapport as possible during the interview, and to let them express their feelings 
and thought processes about the transition period as accurately as possible. At any point 
during the interview where I noticed the respondent was speaking using the pronoun 
“we”, I listened carefully and then rephrased the question using his name, for example, I 
would ask: “what did you, Ralph, do when this happened?” I did this in order to 
understand his/her actions and thought processes as opposed to discussing the company as 
a whole. My participants were generally open and honest about their experience and 
recounted stories to which neither the journalist nor the newspapers had access. All 
interviews were audio taped with the participants’ permission. At the end of the 
interview, I asked each participant to sign a copy of the letters of information and consent 
(usually sent to them before the interview) presented in Appendix B and I provided them 
with a signed copy for their records. 
The long-interview format is the most appropriate for a phenomenological 
approach (Moustakas, 1994). It encompasses an interactive process and is based on open-
ended questions and answers or comments, yet retains structure. It is most appropriate for 
a phenomenological study, as it is more concerned with participants’ shared meanings of 
experience (McCracken, 1988), rather than their affective status, which is the main 
concern of the in-depth interview (Seidman, 2006). The long interview is structured 
around areas for discussion in a way which creates a relaxed environment for the 
participant to feel comfortable in and then tackle the topic at hand to minimize wasted 
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time. Long interviews should last one to two hours (McCracken, 1988). An interview 
guide helps the researcher cover all the topics under study in a fairly sequential manner, 
in addition to establishing direction, and maintaining focus on the participant’s stories 
rather than worry about the next step (King & Horrocks, 2010; Mikecz, 2012). 
The aim of this research is to understand the transition experience of heirs 
apparent as it exists in their consciousness. Hence, the suggested interview guide (see 
Appendix C) was framed to detect their experience rather than attain context-free and 
individual-free information about transition periods in absolute terms (Polkinghorne, 
1989). The questions were especially formulated to be theory-neutral and to concentrate 
on the experience rather than the learning the heir apparent had during this period. This 
allowed the support for the proposed theory to emerge from the data instead of from 
imposing a framework on the participants. I avoided questions asking “why” and “what 
happened”. This line of questions generates answers based on the participants’ own 
interpretations of their experience (Polkinghorne, 1989), while my aim was to be able to 
provoke memories of the experience itself as much as possible. When the participant did 
not provide details about the experience, I asked more clarifying questions, such as, 
“What do you mean by … exactly?” “What did you do when … ?” and “How did this 
affect you?” “Who” and “When” questions were also asked when appropriate (King & 
Horrocks, 2010). I opened and closed the interview with open-ended questions in order to 
build confidence and check for information completeness (Mikecz, 2012). I used the 
interview guide to ensure I touched on all of the necessary areas for discussion during the 
interview. The participants did not see the interview guide. When asked, I provided the 
participants with a sample of the general questions before the interview. They were 
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introduced to the subject of the interview in the invitation letter as presented in Appendix 
D. 
Though interviews constituted my main data source, I collected data from various 
archival sources such as company websites and news articles related to the succession 
event published in different business magazines such as The Toronto Star, The Globe and 
Mail, and others. The purpose of collecting and analyzing data from other sources was to 
limit the potential bias associated with the use of an exclusive data source. It was also 
directed at strengthening the validation of theory through the “triangulation” of evidence 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The data collected from websites and 
news articles were used to verify some of the stories told during the interviews. I studied 
all the archival materials related to a specific organization before the interview which 
enabled me to ask more specific questions and delve deeper into the learning and 
sensemaking processes of the heir apparent. The data collected from archival sources 
provided me with insights on how the transition events were communicated to the outside 
world and a basis for comparison with the stories as remembered by the participants. I 
was able to use the general story from the archival sources in my findings but not quote 
any of them as I would risk exposing the identity of my participants or their 
organizations. 
In addition to the 22 interviews I conducted with CEOs who went through the 
experience of designation and a transition period, I interviewed 3 outgoing CEOs, 3 ex-
CEOs, 3 board chairs, 2 board members, and 2 senior executives. These interviews were 
also audiotaped with the permission of interviewees. The purpose of these interviews was 
twofold. First, I intended to understand the context of my phenomenon, or the succession 
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process, from the perspective of main players in the process rather than just the 
designated executives. Second, since the change in social context was a major construct 
in the theoretical model; I wanted to validate the designate CEOs’ interpretation of the 
expectations from their social context with members of this social context. These 
interviews gave me insights into the board’s and incumbent CEOs’ role in the process and 
their contribution or lack of it to the learning process of the designate executives. They 
corroborated and contradicted some of the interpretations made by the designate CEOs 
about the expectations of their social context. I also interviewed one consultant who 
specializes in assisting organizations with the succession process, and one journalist who 
reports frequently on CEO succession events in Canada. The purpose of these interviews 
was gaining knowledge about the succession process in contexts external to the 
organizations I studied as well as validating my findings. 
To check for the learning experiences of heirs apparent during the transition 
period, I tried to identify some executives designated as heirs apparent at the time of the 
fieldwork. The task of identifying current heirs apparent was more challenging than 
expected. These executives’ designation might not have been announced in the media 
until a competition for the CEO role ended. Their transition period was shorter than I 
anticipated based on the existing literature. The transition period was between three to six 
months in most cases. Interviews with current heirs apparent would help provide a check-
in point for the learning experience that CEOs remember as heirs apparent. Given the 
potential insights in terms of comparing the experience of heirs apparent currently 
undergoing their transition versus the meaning making of the experience of CEOs who 
already experienced the learning during the transition period this group was desirable to 
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include in the sample. I was able through a board member and with the approval of the 
incumbent CEO to interview one heir apparent who was expected to assume the position 
of CEO in less than a month from the interview date. There were many shared elements 
in the experience of the heir apparent with the experience of heir apparency as 
remembered by the participants. 
4.2.3. Data Coding and Analysis 
“The data must bear the weight of any interpretation, so the researcher must 
constantly confront his or her own opinions and prejudices with the data” (Conklin, 2007, 
p. 42). The phenomenological approach entails the postponement of all formerly 
embraced judgements until they can be defended based on the findings from the field 
(Creswell, 2013). The unit of analysis in phenomenological research is experience 
(Polkinghorne, 2005). Giorgi’s technique is one of the most well-known and widely used 
techniques in analyzing phenomenological data (King & Horrocks, 2010; Sanders, 1982), 
and organizational studies currently use this method. . His technique is  similar to the 
reductionist technique proposed by McCracken (1988) for analyzing data collected 
through the long interview with  modifications to focus on the essence of experience of 
the participant. 
In coding and analyzing the data I followed Giorgi’s technique as proposed in 
Giorgi (2009). The technique comprises four steps: 
• Step 1: Getting a sense of the whole 
• Step 2: Identifying meaning units 
• Step 3: Transforming the data 
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• Step 4: Describing the structure 
The following subsections provide a description of how I applied these steps to 
the collected data. 
4.2.3.1. Step 1: Getting a Sense of the Whole 
Each interview was audiotaped and transcribed verbatim, mostly within 24 hours 
to 48 hours after the interview, in extreme cases the interviews were transcribed with 72 
hours. A third party transcribed the interviews. When I received the transcript, I listened 
to the recordings and read the transcript to ensure the quality and accuracy of the 
transcription. 
Since the aim of phenomenological research was to provide a holistic perspective 
on the experience of the participant (Giorgi, 2006), I read each transcript in its entirety 
multiple times. The first time was to understand the participants’ experience and the main 
players in their social context. After the first reading but before the second reading I 
replaced the names of the participants and the major players in their experience with 
pseudonyms. In addition to my promise of confidentiality to the participants 
confidentiality, another purpose for replacing the names with pseudonyms early on in the 
process, as suggested by Bazeley and Jackson (2013), was to familiarize myself with 
pseudonyms and focus on the experience of the participants. In doing so, the real names 
of the participants faded away with time and I reduced the impact of conscious or 
unconscious interpretation of the experiences based on my impression of the organization 
or the person at the time of the interview. I kept a journal as a checklist for each 
participant before the interview and after the interview in order to keep my biases in 
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check as presented in Appendix E. I only referred to the related list when I had doubts 
about my own biases interfering in the interpretation of the data. 
I adopted a strategy for choosing pseudonyms to avoid any conscious or 
unconscious choice of names for the different participants and the major players in their 
social context. Since most of my participants were born in the 1950s and 1960s, I used a 
website listing the most common names in North America during the two decades. I 
systematically replaced the names of my participants with the names listed on the website 
according to their sex. Where derivatives of previously listed names appeared, I excluded 
them and continued on the list. Also given the status of my interviewees, I avoided using 
juvenile names such as Bobby or Billy and used Bob and Bill instead. I also replaced all 
organization names with “the company” and eliminated any reference to the industry to 
which the organization belonged. 
4.2.3.2. Step 2: Identifying Meaning Units 
Meaning units are usually statements which mark a turning point in the meaning 
as perceived by the researcher taking the phenomenon under study into account (Giorgi, 
2009). There are no strict instructions on how to identify meaning units (King & 
Horrocks, 2010). The importance of these units resides in their contribution to identifying 
general themes and shared elements in the experiences of the participants. 
I completed the identification of meaning units described above as soon as 
possible following every interview. I then transferred the interviews to NVivo, computer 
software widely used for the analysis of qualitative data. This software allowed me to 
organize, analyze, and model qualitative data. I then created an initial list of meaning 
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units reflecting the constructs presented in the theoretical model proposed in chapter 3 
including identity, social context, and enactment style. Enactment style included sub-
meaning units reflecting the different styles of act, interact, and double interact. Meaning 
units were coded under “nodes”. I started the analysis early on rather than waiting for the 
complete data collection phase to end, as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
In doing so, I was able to think about the existing data and create “nodes” or meaning 
units not solely based on my theoretical model, leading to the generation of additional 
interview questions in the following interviews to explore newly discovered concepts. 
NVivo allowed for great flexibility in coding the data. I began coding by reading 
and re-reading each interview transcript and listening to the corresponding recording. I 
divided the interview texts sentence by sentence, and then re-read the sentences to 
identify where there was a shift in the meaning. For example, the participant might talk 
about the impact of the designation on his/her identity, and then in the same text shift to 
the changes he/she felt in the social context. The text referring to the impact on identity 
was coded under the node “identity” while the other text was coded under “social 
context”. I was able to code texts from the interview into more than one meaning unit. I 
also was able to check and re-check my coding by looking at the whole interview in 
parallel with the coded text under each meaning unit and the overlap of the meaning units. 
I created subcategories for the meaning units (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) proposed 
by the theoretical model. I also created additional nodes for the themes which emerged 
from the data and were not specified in the model. Once a node was added, I re-read the 
previously coded transcripts to see if there was any reference to the new node. This 
process of interplay between concepts and empirical data is a cognitive process allowing 
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for a “process of discovery rather than only a logic of validation” (Van Maanen, 
Sørensen, & Mitchell, 2007, p. 1146). I discovered many concepts during the data 
collection and data coding for this work, however, this thesis presents only some of my 
findings and I may use the others in future research. After completing the identification of 
meaning units for the interview, I proceeded to perform higher levels of data 
transformation.  
4.2.3.3. Step 3: Transforming the Data 
NVivo allowed for the clustering of the interview text from one respondent coded 
under a meaning unit or its subcategory to be presented in one place. This enabled me to 
read the entire participant’s comments regarding the change in his/her identity 
irrespective of where the comments occurred in the interview. I followed Giorgi (2009)’s 
recommendation and added another column to the data entitled third person. In this 
column I included the text interview related to every meaning unit and its subcategories 
replacing the first person with the third person, for example I replaced “I” with “she or 
he”. This process allowed me to focus on the participant and understand his/her 
experience rather than project my own experience onto the participant which could 
happen if I read their experiences with the pronoun “I” (Englander, 2012). Transforming 
the data to the third person also helped me achieve higher levels of abstraction (King & 
Horrocks, 2010). 
During this step, I tried to answer the question “what does this mean?” for each 
meaning unit in the context of learning during the transition period (Giorgi, 2009). I 
summarized the texts under the same meaning unit several times until I believed I had 
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reached the highest possible level of transformation. The number of transformations 
needed was different for different meaning units and was different across participants. 
4.2.3.4. Step 4: Describing the Structure 
While the other steps were specific to each transcript or participant’s experience, 
this step relates to the description of the event in more general terms, transcending the 
specifics of each experience (Giorgi, 2006). The aim of this step was to produce a unique 
structure to describe the participants’ experience generally with respect to the concepts in 
the theoretical model. 
In order to describe the participants’ collective experience with respect to each of 
the constructs in the theoretical model, I clustered all relevant data from each participant 
relating to one construct or meaning unit. NVivo allowed me to aggregate the sub-
meaning units and the overall meaning units for all the participants. Examining the 
participants’ collective experience, such as the impact of designation on their identity, I 
was able to uncover all of the shared elements and produce a structure that described the 
experience in general terms. This structure was presented in the findings chapter for every 
concept. For the enactment construct, three structures emerged; one related to each type 
of enactment namely act, interact, and double interact. These structures were reported 
separately and similarities and differences across the structures were highlighted. 
4.3. Reflexivity Statement 
Unlike in the practice of quantitative research where the researcher is distant from 
the research subject, the researcher is the main instrument in qualitative research (Yin, 
2011). Thus, in order to conduct a trustworthy and reliable phenomenological study, it is 
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recommended that the researcher be aware of his or her own potential biases and 
preconceived ideas and try as much as possible to set them aside while conducting data 
analysis (Moustakas, 1994). The purpose of this study is to understand the heir apparent 
experience from the perspective of the participants rather than imposing my own 
framework on their descriptions. In the following paragraphs, I first present my own 
beliefs that may have shaped the design of the study and then reflect on my previous 
experience as a management consultant and the skills I have gathered which may help in 
achieving the goal of this study. 
The use of a post-positivist approach to phenomenology is not arbitrary. I tend to 
subscribe to the post-positivist belief system and I was educated in an environment which 
considered hard sciences such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology superior 
to other fields. My experience in the educational system was that only one truth exists and 
that it is found in the external world. This has been reflected in my school, undergraduate, 
and MBA programs. Even during my PhD, my elective courses were advanced statistics 
which demonstrates my tendency towards this mindset. Many qualitative books I read 
suggest that some researchers choose qualitative research because they do not feel 
comfortable with statistics, but this is not the case for me. The choice of qualitative 
research in general and of the phenomenological approach in particular has been guided 
by the nature of my research questions rather than by an aversion to statistics. However, 
the application of the post-positivist worldview to the phenomenological approach has 
been influenced by my own belief system. This is reflected in the structure found in this 
proposal, which uses problem definition, formulations of research questions, literature 
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review, proposing a theoretical lens, and crafting a methodology section – a structure 
different from proposals done reflecting other worldviews. 
My choice of a phenomenological approach to conduct my research was not 
random. Retrospectively, I believe I have used this approach in the past in my 
professional career as a management consultant. I first realized that individuals have 
different perspectives and that what applies in one context may not apply in another when 
I attended a sales seminar my organization presented to the salespeople of one of our 
corporate clients. Although I was amazed by the effectiveness of the techniques taught, I 
was surprised to discover the participants did not share my opinion. I took the opportunity 
to talk to individual participants over break time in order to understand their viewpoints. I 
discovered that many of the participants believed these techniques could not be applied in 
their context. After several discussions, I came to understand their perspectives and 
reported my findings to my supervisor. Since then, the company has adopted the practice 
of asking participants about their needs before preparing seminar materials. 
Though my academic experience with qualitative research remains relatively 
limited, my professional experience as a management consultant helped me acquire 
several skills which assisted me in pursuing this research. Throughout my consulting 
career, I met with business owners, managers, and employees. I was mainly assigned to 
perform and write quick diagnostic reports for potential clients. Business owners or CEOs 
would approach our company, sometimes with a general concern about the performance 
of their organizations and other times with their own assessments of where the problems 
lay. They would ask our company to prepare a diagnosis and assess the situation in two to 
four weeks. My job was to attend at an organization, meet with relevant managers, try to 
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either support or reject the CEO’s hypothesis, and report what I believed to be the 
problem. The ability to listen to participants, to have a fresh look at the data despite a 
suggested proposition (e.g. the CEO’s own proposition of the problem), and to read 
between the lines are important skills in conducting qualitative research (Yin, 2011). 
Fortunately, these were skills I acquired during my consulting career. 
During my 12 years as a management consultant, I dealt with many issues 
including planning CEO succession. However, I have not looked into the experience of an 
heir apparent. Hence, I do not have any conscious preconceived ideas about this process. I 
also believe that my move from Lebanon to Canada challenged many of my beliefs and 
taught me to look at things from different perspectives and accept new ideas and modes 
of operation. The context I worked in as a management consultant is quite different from 
the Canadian environment. This helped me to pay more attention to the experiences of the 
participants and challenge what they believe to be the norm. 
By laying down my beliefs and previous experiences, I am not claiming to 
completely set aside my personal experiences and potential biases with the research topic, 
but rather am informing readers about them so that they can judge for themselves my 
level of involvement in the data analysis process (Creswell, 2013; Morgan & Smircich, 
1980). 
4.4. Establishing Trustworthiness 
To ensure the good quality of the qualitative research, issues related to 
trustworthiness were addressed throughout the study from inception to completion (Yin, 
2011). To enhance the trustworthiness of a research study, it is advisable to identify and 
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follow the analytic steps of a specific approach to qualitative research (Creswell, 2013, p. 
53). This study followed the structure proposed by Giorgi (2009), a well-known 
researcher who developed a detailed description of the phenomenological approach. The 
steps taken to collect data were provided in detail. In addition, all gathered material was 
scanned and included in the NVivo database along with the interview transcriptions and 
field notes taken, in order to provide a reliable audit trail (Given, 2008). Steps taken to 
analyze data and move from participants’ statements to higher levels of abstraction were 
described in as much detail as necessary. 
The other issues of trustworthiness researchers face in phenomenological studies 
are whether the findings echo the truthful experiences of the participants (Creswell, 2013) 
and whether they constitute a solid ground on which policies can be generated 
(Polkinghorne, 1989). I used several tools to minimize the chances of attributing to the 
participants what I expected to find rather than what the participant is expressing (Gilbert, 
1998; Jones, Kanhouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 1972; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; 
Jones, 1977). It is advised that the researcher bracket his/her biases in order to be able to 
minimize personal interference in reporting the findings or in this case the respondents’ 
experience. To insure a proper bracketing of my biases to the best of my ability, I 
prepared a checklist of my biases toward this research, as provided in Appendix E. I kept 
this list and filled it out before and after every interview. I referred to it when I attempted 
to analyse the interview data. The aim of this list was to keep my biases in check and 
improve my ability to analyse the findings from the participants’ perspective. I updated 
this list after every interview if and when necessary. In addition to the biases, I found that 
my worries played a major role before the interview and later during data analysis 
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(Barley, 1995). In order to be conscious of my state of mind before every interview, I 
recorded my worries, feelings and anticipated outcome as close as possible to before and 
after every interview. I listened to these recording after I coded the interviews to check 
for any possible influence on my coding. 
I also used member checking to ensure the structural description relevant to the 
participants actually represented the participants’ views of their own behaviours and 
experiences rather than my interpreted views. Each research participant was asked to 
carefully review the final draft of the structural description representing his/her 
experience and to suggest comments to add or delete in order to strengthen the description 
to better represent the experience (Moustakas, 1994). To improve the trustworthiness of 
my findings I used data from 22 participants to move from a single participant’s 
experience to the description of the phenomenon itself. The recurring themes provided a 
more trusted basis for structure building than less recurring ones (Polkinghorne, 2005). 
Also, to improve the trustworthiness of the research, I collected data from other sources 
such as published material and interviews with board members, other senior executives in 
the organization, outgoing and ex-CEOs, consultants, heirs apparent, and journalists 
involved in the succession process whenever possible. 
4.5. Ethical Considerations 
Ethical issues should be tackled at several stages of the research process 
(Creswell, 2013). During the planning stage, I submitted an ethics proposal and secured 
the approval of the UWO non-medical research board before the start of the data 
collection. Appendix F presents the ethics approval notice I received from the board. 
Once the proposal was accepted, I began contacting the selected participants, informing 
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them about the research topic and necessary time commitment for the interview, setting 
the interview, and asking them to sign an informed consent form. I notified the 
participants their participation was voluntary, they could refuse to answer any specific 
question, and they could choose to stop at any point during the interview. 
During the data collection stage, no manipulation of any sort of the participants’ 
or the locations was made. I reminded participants of their right to refrain from answering 
any question or stop the interview at any time. I also notified them that the interview 
would be audiotaped and informed them of the confidentiality measures I would take to 
safeguard their identities. I also explained to participants how I would use the data. All 
participants were asked to sign a letter of information providing details about all 
confidentiality measures and a consent form of their permission to audiotape the 
interviews. I avoided leading questions throughout the interview.  
I maintained all data during data analysis, reporting, and presentation with the 
utmost care and saved only in electronic password-secured formats. Pseudonyms were 
assigned to participants early in the process. The list containing the correspondence 
between the pseudo and actual names was password-secured, saved on my own laptop, 
and accessed only by myself. Multiple perspectives and contrary findings were genuinely 
reported. I was transparent in my coding and I provided detailed descriptions about the 
process used to move from the specific transcription to more abstract themes. 
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CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS 
The model developed in this dissertation hypothesizes that the designation of 
executives as heirs apparent for their organization has a direct effect on their identity, 
social context, and the way they enact their environment, thereby affecting their learning 
during the transition period. Previous research on CEO succession, namely relay 
succession, assumed heirs apparent learn during the transition period and outperform 
other types of successors regarding post succession organizational performance. In this 
research, I explore the learning process heirs apparent experience during their transition 
period and examine the enablers and barriers affecting their learning during the heir 
apparency period. This chapter provides an overview of the research findings. The data 
are presented to support, enhance, and/or question the premises constituting the 
theoretical model and to explain the various constructs and relationships with empirical 
examples (Lawrence, 1999). 
This research adopted the phenomenological approach. The aim from the 
phenomenological approach was to understand the learning experience of executives from 
the time they were designated as heirs apparent until they have formally assumed the role 
of CEO. Following the common practice in the descriptive phenomenological method as 
suggested by Giorgi (2009), I present my findings below with respect to each of the five 
premises developed in the theoretical model. Unlike narrative studies that analysed the 
life of a single individual, the phenomenological studies attempted to describe the shared 
meaning of the individuals’ experience. I therefore briefly describe the argument 
developed theoretically for each premise and then present shared elements in the 
participants’ experience. To validate my argument, I chose the experience of some of the 
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participants and interpreted their experience to provide a clearer idea of the process I used 
to interpret the experiences of the respondents. I then presented, in a table form, examples 
from the experiences of other participants using their own words. At the end of every 
section, I identified and presented the shared elements in the experience of most of the 
participants. 
The aim of this research is to understand the impact of the heir apparent 
designation on the learning experience of the participants. Hence, the heir apparent 
designation by itself becomes a critical element in interpreting the findings. The 
theoretical model developed an explanation of the impact of the heir apparent designation 
on the learning experience of the participants. The theoretical model was built based on 
the way heir apparent designation was presented and defined in the CEO succession 
literature, with some adjustments to fit the nature of this work. However, the fieldwork 
showed the participants experienced a different reality from the heir apparent designation 
compared to the literature descriptions. Hence, I start the findings chapter by presenting 
the heir apparent designation process as experienced by this set of participants. The aim is 
to clarify some of the assumptions presented in the literature review chapter and to 
understand the impact of the heir apparent designation on the participants’ learning 
experience. This will provide a better understanding of the process from the perspective 
of how and when the participants felt they were designated which varies from what the 
literature had portrayed using the COO/president proxy as described later. 
5.1. Heir Apparent Designation Process 
As described in the CEO succession literature, relay succession involves 
identifying a CEO successor, whom Vancil (1987) referred to as the heir apparent, a few 
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years before the actual succession event takes place. Given that heir apparent is not an 
official title in any organization, researchers studying relay succession based on archival 
datasets identified heirs apparent as officers who were named COOs and/or presidents of 
their organization before receiving a promotion to the role of CEO (Cannella & Shen, 
2001). Prior literature widely accepted Vancil (1987)’s classification of CEO succession 
practices as either, relay, horse race, or outside successions. Finkelstein, Hambrick, and 
Cannella (2009) expected the designation of heirs apparent following a horse race. 
However, they still accepted the prevailing assumption these heirs apparent were 
designated several years before the actual transition event. Data from the interviews 
showed the boundaries between the two inside succession practices, namely relay and 
horse race, were blurred. Most of the CEOs I interviewed were designated the CEO-to-be 
following a competition with other executives from inside the organization and in rare 
cases the competition also involved candidates from outside the organization. 
All of the interviewees including: current and previous CEOs, board members, 
senior executives in the firm, and consultants agreed the CEO succession process and 
namely the selection of the CEO is the responsibility of the board of directors. The 
incumbent CEO was always involved in nominating and providing evaluations on 
possible candidates. The board of directors in some cases also sought help from executive 
search firms or consultants to nominate candidates. None of the CEOs I interviewed were 
designated the heir apparent and/or were designated years before the actual succession 
event. Executives were designated for a period ranging from three weeks to a maximum 
of one year before assuming the CEO position. Competition for the CEO role was the 
most common experience the participants shared. Only three of the 22 executives were 
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not part of a competition before being designated by the board as the CEO-to-be. One of 
them was asked if he wanted to be the CEO only a few months before he assumed the 
role. In the two other cases, the executives were appointed COOs and the incumbent CEO 
told them covertly they were the designated heirs apparent. The transition lasted longer 
than expected and the executives lost confidence in the process and needed a stronger 
affirmation for the job. One of these executives asked the board to take action to ensure 
his ascension or he would leave the organization. In one of the 19 cases, the executive 
was explicitly promised by the incumbent CEO to be the only possible successor for the 
position very early on. He found two years before the passing of the baton that the board 
of directors was considering another internal candidate for the position. The board would 
also conduct an evaluation at the end of the selection process to announce the next CEO. 
While heir apparent is not an official title, the way it is identified in previous 
research on heir apparent or relay succession studies is when an executive is the only one 
appointed as the COO and/or president of the organization (Cannella & Shen, 2001; 
Giambatista et al., 2005). In anticipation that this definition had been adopted in the 
previous research due to the dominant quantitative nature of the research, I broadened the 
definition to include any executive who was in a senior position before assuming the CEO 
position. The fieldwork confirmed the appropriateness of the use of the adjusted 
definition rather than the one in the literature and required the addition of a necessary 
condition: the explicit designation by the board. The common story among all the 
respondents was that they knew they would be the next CEO when they were explicitly 
told so by the board. Some of the respondents were already COOs or presidents and the 
board still required them to compete to be designated the CEO-to-be. Those who were 
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COOs felt the title did not accurately reflect to the organization or the industry that they 
were the designated heirs apparent. They felt the title of president would have sent a 
better signal that they were the future leader of the organization. On the other hand, 
executives who had the title of president felt the title of COO would send a clearer signal 
to the industry they were the next CEO.  The executives felt they were the “heirs 
apparent” upon the board’s explicit announcement of their designation as the CEOs-to-be. 
For example, Martin explained1 how he felt about being secretly told he was the 
future leader: 
I think he (incumbent CEO) sort of made a call; well he did make a call that he was 
going to elevate one person as a sort of a potential successor. I am not sure that is 
necessarily the best idea because he elevated somebody (referring to himself) but he 
only elevated them half way. I am not sure I would do that again. My gut feel is when 
you elevate somebody and you really want to be clear that they are the second in the 
command; you should be pretty clear on that. And Ron (incumbent CEO), he was 
clear with me but he was not very clear with the organization. The situation started 
to improve overtime but I think providing clarity would be helpful. The current CEO 
of our competitor had a clear path to the top job. He became instead of Chief 
Operating Officer, an EVP then even the president and so it was very clear he was 
going to be the guy. For us we never made that choice. We never went to that next 
level of Martin is the president and the president, in most people’s nomenclature is: 
‘oh, there you go, you have been named’. 
Designate CEO Charles explained the doubt surrounding the secret processes with 
some humour: 
I’ll give you a little insight here, under the leadership of Thomas (the ex-CEO) they 
had a room, and for that room there were only three people who had a key, the CEO, 
the president, and the head of HR. And you go in that room and there’s nothing but 
chalkboards with positions and who the likely people would be. And they were the 
only ones that had access and the joke was, it was always chalk, because that could 
be erased. 
1 All quotes used in this research are verbatim, as said by the participants. Very minimal editing was 
performed on these quotes. 
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From the meetings with the executives it became clear none of them had really 
experienced an “heir apparent” designation the way it was presented in the literature. 
Most of them were designated as heirs apparent few months before the transition event. 
Figure 5.1 shows the frequency distribution of the designation tenure per month for all 22 
interviewed participants. The two who were given the title of COO, along with the 
promise of the CEO title, lost their confidence in the promise along the way and had to 
secure an overt designation a few months before the transition. 
 
Figure 5.1: CEO-D Designation Tenure Per Month  
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I believe referring to the respondents as heirs apparent does not accurately reflect 
their experience. Hence, from this point forward in the dissertation I will refer to the 
executives as designate CEOs or CEO-Ds from the time the board selected them and 
informed them they would be the next CEO. Incumbent CEOs would be referred to as 
CEO-Is thereafter. I will only use the terminology of “heir apparent” from here onward if 
referring to the existing CEO succession literature. I will also present the premises 
developed in the theoretical model at the beginning of each section using the CEO-D 
terminology instead of heir apparent. I have also broadened the definition of “heir 
apparent” I started with to identify my participants to become the CEO-D definition as 
such: any manager in the company who was a senior executive, including being the COO 
and/or president, and officially designated by the board as the future leader of the 
organization, before assuming the CEO role. 
In addition to avoiding the heir apparent terminology, I will also  avoid using the 
“horse race” terminology. Though most of the respondents went through a competition 
for the CEO title before being designated, I cannot refer to the competition as a horse 
race. The literature defines a horse race as a competition among senior executives in the 
organization for the CEO role (Giambatista et al., 2005; Rowe, 1996; Vancil, 1987). This 
competition is usually public and leads to the exit of the losing horses in the race from the 
organization (Lehmberg et al., 2009). However, in most of the succession events I studied 
the competition was not public and the other candidates stayed in the organization. 
Therefore, I will refer to the race for the CEO position as the competition and not as a 
 
100 
 
“horse race”. I will only use the terminology of horse race when referring to the CEO 
succession literature.  
Nineteen of the 22 respondents were designated after a competition for the title of 
CEO. The number of candidates competing for the CEO position was different between 
companies. In most cases there were three, in fewer cases two, and in one case the 
competition started with 12 candidates and ended up with three finalists before the board 
chose a candidate. None of candidates experienced adversarial relationships with the 
other candidates but they all felt the process was time consuming and psychologically 
demanding.  
In some companies, the candidates were known to each other and to the staff 
members in the organization as described by CEO-D Philip: 
The process was very open. There was me, there was the CFO, and there was the 
woman who was made head of operations so we didn’t call it Chief Operating 
Officer for her but it was. So what happened the three were identified, two were 
identified before me. …  We knew each other. We knew who we were competing 
against and I honestly say and I think if you ask the other two, they would say we 
never competed against each other. We just competed for the role and there was a 
huge difference-huge. And the only testimonial I can give you about the difference is 
they are still here today. So this wasn’t a blood in the streets, violent competition. It 
was competing on your own merits in your portfolio but not against each other, just 
for the role. 
In other companies, the identity of the candidates was known only to the CEO-I 
and the board of directors as stated by CEO-D Frank: 
They came to me; Scott (CEO-I) and the Chair of the board and said we would like 
you to participate in this process. I didn’t know whether there were lots of candidates 
or a few candidates. I was told at the very beginning it will be an international, 
external search as well as internal but would I participate…. in the very last bit of 
period of time, like, you know, before the announcement, I knew that the process had 
gone almost all internal. But I would say if the process was 2, 2 and a half years, I 
knew that it had probably gone internal about 10 months remaining in the process so 
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there was a good year, year and a quarter that I had no knowledge of whether 
internal/external what was happening. There were lots of potential candidates 
running around. So I didn’t know. No idea. I didn’t want to know either because 
what was going to happen was going to happen. And worrying about who were the 
other candidates was not going to be helpful to my psyche. It wasn’t going to be 
helpful to me completing the process … 
Most of the CEO-Ds said they underwent psychometric tests as part of their 
assessment through the succession process. When the number of candidates was limited 
to two or three, all candidates completed the whole process, however, when the number 
of candidates was six or more, the board retained three for the final selection. Some of 
these processes were short, lasting around six months from candidate nomination until the 
announcement of the next CEO; some were lengthy, lasting two to three years. The board 
asked all finalists to prepare a presentation explaining their strategic vision for the 
organization. The CEO-Is were supposedly neutral and acted as a support for all of the 
candidates in the competition. They did not give advice or participated in the decision 
making process unless the CEO-D sought their help; however, their evaluations of the 
candidates were taken seriously by the board. The candidates during this period 
concentrated on doing their job and completing their assignments as requested and to the 
best of their abilities, as well as equipping themselves with the tools they thought would 
improve their chances, as described by CEO-D Carl: 
Kathy (CEO-I) made it very clear I was her choice but it wasn’t her choice to make. 
Clearly, her recommendation would carry a lot of weight but it was never a given 
that it was me. So I didn’t presume that the job is mine. I knew there were some 
hurdles and I also knew that there was a lot of time for me to make mistakes and 
maybe get myself out of the race. I really thought I have to up my game. I needed to 
be a lot better at certain things that I didn’t do on a daily basis and that is why the 
MBA was so important to me to try to get a broader perspective on business in 
general. 
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CEO-D Carl emphasized that his aim was not to compete with the other candidate 
but rather to concentrate on equipping himself with all the necessary tools. Had he been 
officially designated, he stated he would have spent his time focusing on preparing 
himself to be ready for the CEO role rather than to be selected the CEO-D. He said: 
Before I knew about the competition, I was certainly much more tuned to watching 
Kathy, understanding, listening to her on the investor calls and understanding how 
she took the questions and how she presented to the board. Watched a lot more 
keenly around putting myself in that role and then discussing things with her, just 
trying to tell myself: ‘I may have to do this at some point so pay attention’. So it (the 
competition) changed that certainly for me, I had to postpone this sort of learning. 
Most of the executives felt the immediate change when they were designated the 
CEO elect. CEO-D Frank described this moment as follows: 
When she (the chair of the board) told me, it was on a Friday. It was here in this 
room. I walked in. She was staring out the window almost philosophically off in 
another space and she turned to me and said: ‘you know we were supposed to 
announce this later but the board has reached this decision already. And there is no 
sense waiting. So we are going to get it going’. So that put into gear, a rollout 
strategy that followed, everything started happening sooner. It was a bit of a blur. 
This was a train that was leaving the station. She told me on a Friday and she said 
we will get started next week Monday. So think about it over the weekend and sign 
the letter. You know (addressing me) there is an offer letter. And, I was probably 
floored is the right word, not in a negative way. It actually hit me that it had arrived 
and I was conscious that this was a new trajectory in my career and in my life that it 
just happened and I had to digest that over the weekend. And then I think it was the 
next week or the following week, the rollout started. The rolling out of who you tell 
and when you tell and the senior management teams and where and how and 
scripting of it, rolling out to the newspapers, informing the shareholders, the whole 
bit and I now am the one selected to be the next CEO. That is it. It was just a 
machine that had started rolling. 
CEO-D Frank immediately felt the end of an era and the start of a new situation, a 
change that impacted his career and life right away. He immediately started thinking of 
the new social context he had to deal with both internally (i.e., the senior management 
team) and externally (i.e., the shareholders) given his new identity: “I now am the one …” 
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Having presented a brief description on what the succession process was like for 
the participants and identified when and how they received the designation, I will 
hereafter present my findings with respect to each of the premises formulated in the 
theoretical model. 
5.2. Premise One: Immediate Identity 
P1: The designation of an executive as the CEO-D evolves a new identity along with 
a new set of identity standards for this executive affects the way he/she interprets the 
cues in a situation and affects his/her cognitive schemas and behaviour so that they 
align with the new identity standards. 
In premise one of the theoretical model I argued the designation of an executive as 
the CEO-D triggers the creation of a new identity for the executive. I also argued the 
designation as CEO-D affirms the identity of the executive as the organization’s next 
leader (Bennett & Miles, 2006a). The designation provides the executives social 
recognition from the board of directors, and in some cases the CEO-Is, for their new 
identity. I also argued the designated executives would work on aligning their future 
behaviours and processes with the new set of identity standards as perceived by the CEO-
Ds. 
 The period before the appointment activated an identity search process by the 
executives, the identity as the CEO-D. However, the designation, with an offer for the 
CEO position, motivated the CEO-Ds to align their behaviours and thought processes 
with the new identity standards. This designation as CEO-Ds led the executives to reflect 
upon who they were as well as who the others perceived them to be.  Nineteen of the 22 
CEOs interviewed mentioned feeling honored to participate in the competition for the 
CEO position. However, with this honour came doubts as to whether the board saw them 
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as the future CEOs, whether they would become the CEO, and whether they would be 
able to bring value to the organization. Hence, the search for who they would be as CEOs 
started the moment they were asked to participate as a CEO candidate. 
For example, CEO-D Cheryl expresses this as: 
Like I wasn’t convinced that they (the CEO-I and the board) saw me as a CEO, you 
know when you are a very strong number two; you are not necessarily seen as a 
great number one. And so I wasn’t sure that even if I threw my name in the hat that I 
would get it. And I think both of them (the CEO-I and the chair of the board) made it 
very clear to me that they did see me not only as a number two but as a potentially 
very good number one. I knew I had to decide not after they offered it to me because 
they wouldn’t offer it to me if I hadn’t really sold them on me. You know there were 
12 people on the hiring committee. So, I knew I had to make a strong impression and 
I think I knew before I went in that I was resolved and that I would get it, that I would 
put everything I had into it and then I would get it… I really wanted it and I thought 
there is nobody else who is better for it and then I really believed that. You know I 
have days where I don’t believe it anymore. But that day I believed it. 
CEO-D Cheryl needed affirmation from the CEO-I and the chair of the board that 
she had what it took to be the next CEO. She needed to see herself in the role and to 
change her mental models to the new potential identity first before expecting the hiring 
committee to give her the role. It was only when the board asked Cheryl to throw her 
name in “the hat” that Cheryl began considering her new identity leading her to believe 
she needed herself she wanted the position to be able to convince the board to give her the 
title. CEO-D Cheryl’s experience with doubt and need for affirmation during the 
competition period was not the exception; it was more the rule. Appendix G provides 
representative examples of the executives describing their thought processes upon being 
asked to present their candidature for the CEO title. 
In the 19 cases where there was a competition three of the executives participated 
twice. Meaning they participated in the competition one round earlier and lost that round. 
 
105 
 
All three of them knew that they would not get the job in the first round, due to age 
constraints, lack of enough exposure, and mainly because the winning candidate was 
better suited for the organization’s needs at the time. During the first round, they felt 
honoured to have been even considered as candidates. All three of them, however, said 
they felt they were the best candidate for the second round and would have left the 
company if they did not get the job. CEO-D Henry said reflecting on his first time 
participating in competition: “I mean I was honored at the time to have even been 
considered for the job. It gave me enough confidence to sort of hang out the next nine 
years with the existing CEO.” 
The request to participate in the competition for the CEO title activated not only 
the potential identity of the CEO-D, it also activated the potential identity of the “NOT 
CEO-D”. After the feeling of “being honoured” to be asked to participate, the executives 
gave deep consideration as to who they would be if they were not selected as the CEO-D. 
The common question they asked themselves was whether they would stay at the 
organization or leave. The sample included only executives who got the title, but their 
thought processes and their espoused theories as to what they would have done were 
wide-ranging. Eight of my 22 respondents admitted they would have left had they lost the 
competition. Six of the eight were able to retain the other candidates when they were 
selected the CEO-D. Seven of my respondents said they had to manage their expectations 
during the competition because they actually liked the company and were not considering 
leaving if they did not get the job. One of the seven executives had to fire of one of two of 
the other candidates who ran against him in the competition. Another executive had to let 
go of the only other candidate in the competition after assuming the CEO role. Four said 
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they could not make up their minds during the competition and they did not know what 
they would have done had the board not chosen them. One of my respondents had never 
gone through any kind of competition; he was directly asked if he would like to be the 
CEO. The other two were covertly told they were the CEO-D a long time before, and only 
overtly announced few months before the actual transition, so they had no competitors for 
the job. 
CEO-D Frank, one of the executives who decided to stay if not selected the next 
CEO, described his thoughts when he was considering presenting his candidature to the 
CEO role: 
I always made the assumption that while I had a shot at it, if I didn’t get it, which 
was part of the thinking, if you didn’t get it, what was your response going to feel like 
and because I started out from the perspective that I want the best thing for the 
organization, I want the board to make the best choice they can and I had comfort 
that they would make the best choice. I knew ahead of time that if I was not the 
successful candidate, that would be okay because the board would have made the 
right choice and the consolation prize, being a Senior Vice President in investments 
and controlling several billions of dollars’ worth of assets globally isn’t such a bad 
spot to be either. And so I was very comfortable that if I didn’t get it, I was not going 
to: A) have to storm out the door and leave the organization which is typically the 
model in the banks, B) that I was not going to be crushed because somehow I had an 
imperfection that the board saw that I didn’t, that why was I not chosen as the next 
leader. My ego does not work like that. 
CEO-D Henry, one of the CEOs who decided to leave if not offered the job said: 
If I wouldn’t have been offered the CEO role here, I would have taken one elsewhere 
and I think that, you know, the company is fully conscious of that as much as I am. So 
it’s, you know, both sides, the equation have to be as open as it can be. 
Participating in the competition for the CEO position drove the executives to think 
about who they would be if they were selected or not selected. The board’s overt 
announcement of their designation activated the identity of the future leader of the 
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organization. For the executives, the board overtly announcing their designation meant 
having an offer letter and informing the internal and external stakeholders of the 
organization. The offer letter activated the executives’ identity as the “future leader of the 
organization” and allowed them to start aligning their thought processes accordingly. 
The appointment of the executives as COOs was interpreted differently than their 
appointment as the CEO-D. CEO-D Robert explained the difference: 
It didn't change one bit the way I did what I did (his appointment as COO). I mean, 
I've always operated at full speed. I was not waiting for something or a signal to start 
going beyond expectations or trying to go beyond expectations or learn about 
different things, read about different things and read about leadership. I think it was 
more obvious to the outside world or my peers who were probably more sensitive to 
it than I was myself. Because I don't think it really changed anything. It definitely 
changed something when I heard that I would be the CEO in a few months. 
Twenty-one out of the 22 respondents acknowledged they could not start aligning 
their behaviours until the announcement was made public. To establish themselves as the 
future leader and start making changes such as preparing their own executive teams, they 
needed legitimacy. Table 5.1 provides support for the immediate impact of the 
designation on the executives’ identity and the changes in mental models and behaviours 
the executives undertook in order to establish and affirm their new identity. 
 
Table 5.1:  Representative quotations illustrating the immediate impact of the 
designation on identity 
CEO-D Impact of the designation on the 
executive’s identity 
Alignment of behaviours and thought processes 
with the new identity standards 
Allen As soon as I knew I was appointed 
president and knew that the handover is 
going to happen within 6 months, I felt 
I needed to be ready. 
I am going to start to manage the process as we go 
forward and I need to start putting my team in place. 
Bill I entered the competition because all I had to ask Jeffrey (CEO-I) to leave the leadership 
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CEO-D Impact of the designation on the 
executive’s identity 
Alignment of behaviours and thought processes 
with the new identity standards 
the other executives did, and then I got 
the job. I believe I was a safe choice, 
but I had a big challenge. Jeffrey 
(CEO-I) was an iconic CEO, I am not 
like that. 
meeting. I had to bring the organization along that 
his leadership style is not mine and that the 
leadership team has to step-up. 
I had to make sure everybody understood that I am 
not replacing Jeffrey (CEO-I); I am replacing the 
CEO role. 
Cheryl I asked Janet (CEO-I) and the director 
of communications to stay after the 
meeting. Then I said, you are not going 
to believe this, I got the job! … and 
then I said what do I do? I was quite 
naïve. What do I do now? 
I think when I had a broader mandate; I took on 
more of an organizational scope. So whereas I had 
always been a real advocate for my own department 
and for the work that we were doing, I felt like I was 
the voice of other stakeholders in the organization 
and I really had to drive their interests. 
I wanted to meet with the leaders in the industry, 
clients and suppliers, and establish myself as the 
new CEO. They were all welcoming. I don’t think 
anyone will say no to the CEO of a large 
organization. 
I had to do my own hiring and firing and establish 
myself as the new leader of the organization. 
Frank It actually hit me that it had arrived and 
I was conscious that this was a new 
trajectory in my career and in my life 
that it just happened and I had to digest 
that over the weekend. 
I moved to the executive floor, not that it meant to 
me, but it meant to the organization that I am on my 
way to be the CEO. 
I have met with the senior management team one on 
one, sometimes for hours. Some of them I already 
knew in my previous position, but I needed to meet 
with them as the CEO-Elect and understand their 
expectations and concerns. 
I also met with the board members one-on-one, they 
knew me, they have selected me after all, but I 
needed to know them. 
Randall I felt honoured and a little bit 
intimidated 
There is pressure when the growth pattern and 
metrics we have been able to produce have always 
been very strong. No question there is definitely a 
legacy (the CEO-I’s) that one needs to never forget. 
I am also confident that my prior department played 
a big part of how the company has grown and that I 
have been a big part of the growth and the strategy 
we have going forward. 
You are always going to look over your shoulder, 
but you have to be focused on the road ahead and 
make sure that you have the right people and 
strategy in place. I believe we do, so I am confident 
looking forward. 
John I was almost sure I will get it. How do I - in a way you’ve got to be authentic to 
who you are but also adjust your behaviour to bring 
 
109 
 
CEO-D Impact of the designation on the 
executive’s identity 
Alignment of behaviours and thought processes 
with the new identity standards 
people on - because I think as a leader one of your 
most important characteristics is how do you inspire 
other people, and if you can’t inspire other people to 
follow, then you’ve got a problem. 
I mean I think it’s a phenomenal job so I think the 
ability to interact with high quality people in the 
business community and also internally is 
phenomenal. 
Margaret I felt happy and I felt overwhelmed. I was a woman in a man’s world so it was a big 
thing in many ways but I just thought, okay, how are 
we going to do this?  
Robert I was VP of Finance, and all of a 
sudden I was there. 
I think what’s really critical is this sort of credibility 
you establish with the people that operate at your 
level. I think when you sense that there is credibility 
there, then you sense that you’re being given a lot of 
opportunities. It’s natural that this is how things 
happen if you want my opinion. If the team around 
feels like following you and you have a decent CEO-
I and a decent board, I think people get that and it’s 
natural. But, this process of sensing credibility and 
support and sensing that people see you as the 
upcoming leader is the purest signal. 
I then, ran a big portion of the integration process 
and so on. I think at that time, people saw a lot of 
confidence. Out of circumstances, it would not have 
happened like that had the CEO succession had not 
taken place. I think these guys trusted me and we did 
a fantastic deal and this was life-changing, certainly 
for me but for the organization as well. 
 
The designated executives were in control of aligning their thought processes, 
however, their ability to align their behaviours was enabled or restricted by the behaviour 
and thought processes of the CEO-I. I met three outgoing CEOs and three ex-CEOs 
during the fieldwork. These CEOs had different understandings as to how the transition 
should happen. Those who were looking forward to their retirement were more willing to 
immediately withdraw and let the CEO-D take the reins of the organization starting the 
day of the announcement. They were available for consultation on issues related to setting 
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up the new executive team, the future strategy and vision of the organization, the budget, 
and providing background history as to why certain rules or systems existed. Their 
intention was to help the CEO-D build a better understanding rather than to drive the 
decision their own way. CEO-Ds during this period had the opportunity to discuss their 
strategic vision, build their executive team, and attend many meetings with outside 
stakeholders with support from the CEO-Is. The freedom to act along with the debates to 
understand why things were done in a certain way enabled the CEO-Ds to adjust their 
thought processes and behaviours and prepare to assume the job. The CEO status and 
hence identity transition in these cases happened along the way. The CEO-D gradually 
acquired the CEO status as time got closer to the set transition date. 
Other CEO-Is believed they need to remain the effective CEOs until the last day 
of their tenure as the CEO-D needed time to settle in. These CEOs had a planning session 
with the designated executive and mapped the different responsibilities each one of them 
should handle. They also put together the time-line for each responsibility to be handed 
over from the incumbent to the CEO-D. The CEO-Ds appreciated the opportunity to meet 
members of their new social context and understand their perceptions and expectations. 
The invitation to participate in major strategic meetings enabled them to understand the 
decision as well as the decision making process improving their ability to make strategic 
decision upon assuming the CEO role. The CEO identity transition in this scenario 
happened all at once. While the CEO-D learned along the way, he/she acquired the CEO 
status on the set transition date. 
There were some extreme cases (5 out of 22) where the CEO-Is were unwilling to 
leave and did not want to relinquish power to the CEO-Ds.  These CEO-Is refused to 
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recognize the legitimacy of the successor even after the board’s announcement. This fact 
did not go unnoticed by the CEO-Ds. They felt the lack of space to act as the future 
leaders. 
For example CEO-D Allen preferred to have his new identity affirmed by the 
CEO-I, but CEO-I Curtis was unwilling to do that. Allen described his experience as 
follows: 
I think of a handover like, you know, I (referring to Curtis) am going to take you to 
see these politicians or these colleagues or these parts of the supply chain or these 
big customers or these big owners. No, zero. As CEO, Curtis couldn’t handle the fact 
that he will no more be the CEO, and I don’t think I ever saw him say, “Here is 
Allen; my successor.” He never said that other than in front of the cameras and it 
was carefully scripted and quick. This restricted my ability to do things I needed to 
do in preparation for my time as the leader. 
CEO-D Bill had the same experience with the CEO-I Jeffrey, who also did not 
want to let go, but had to, upon request from the board. CEO-D Bill described his 
experience as: 
I went on two trips with him (Jeffrey) on investor relations where you go meet with 
investors there, one hour meetings and you do about, in two or three days, you do 20 
or 30 little meetings so very intense. We did them in the US West, US East, and in 
Europe and not in one of those meetings did he introduce me as the CEO, coming in. 
Both CEO-Ds sought affirmation of their new identity from a different authority. 
Both asked the board of directors for the permission to take actions to help them establish 
their new identity and provide them with the legitimate power to prepare their 
organizations. 
In summary, I argued in premise one the designation of executives as the CEO-D 
creates the potential for a new identity for these executives. The CEO-Ds then align their 
behaviours and thought processes with the new identity standards. The fieldwork showed 
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in most cases the ascension to the CEO-D position usually happened after a competition 
rather than a simple appointment to the position. The thought process for the new identity 
started upon the acceptance to submit one’s candidature for the job. This acceptance 
however also triggered thoughts about the identity of the “not CEO-D” in case they lost 
the competition. The fieldwork confirmed the activation of the new identity as the CEO-D 
happened upon the board’s overt designation, by informing the internal and external 
stakeholders, of the executive as the future leader.  The executive started the alignment of 
necessary mental models and behaviours at the time of designation but this alignment was 
either enriched or constrained by the behaviours and mental models of the CEO-Is. 
5.3. Premise Two: Potential Identity 
P2: The designation of an executive as heir apparent activates a potential identity 
and leads the heir apparent to reflect on the assumptions on which his/her mental 
models are built vs. those of the representative of the future identity or the incumbent 
CEO. The heir apparent hence builds his/her own role identity standards, rather than 
simply adjusting current behaviour or cognition to resolve equivocality. 
Practice oriented research on relay succession showed that acquiring the identity 
of the heir apparent was not enough for the executive to build the identity of a successful 
CEO (Bennett & Miles, 2006a; Ciampa, 2005; Miles, 2011). Identity researchers found  
individuals built identity standards for a new position, in this case CEO-D, taking into 
consideration the expectations of the members of their new social environment and the 
meanings they assigned to the role (Burke, 2006). To build the new set of standards for 
the expected CEO position, CEO-Ds may use social learning (Bandura, 1977) and/or 
direct socialization (Burke & Stets, 2009).  
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In premise two I tried to explain the process through which CEO-Ds build their 
new identity and its related standards. As suggested by identity researchers, I used 
learning theories namely social and transformational learning theories to explain the 
process. There are two major components included in premise two of my theoretical 
model. First, I argued CEO-Ds, once aware of their new status as the future CEO, reflect 
on the necessary standards corresponding to the new identity. Based on social learning 
theory, I argued  they look at the values, beliefs, and behaviours exhibited by the CEO-I 
as their base case (Bandura, 2001). Second, using learning theory, I hypothesized that 
rather than simply emulating the standards of the CEO-Is, CEO-Ds undergo a deep 
thinking process. CEO-Ds evaluate the standards of the CEO-Is. They check whether 
these standards fit with their overall personality including their other co-existing 
identities, before building their new identity standards (Mezirow, 2012). In the following 
paragraphs I present how my fieldwork shows support or lack of it to these sub 
components of premise two. 
Executives, once designated, embarked on the journey to become the CEO. In line 
with Bandura (2001)’s argument that individuals consider behaviours they believe have 
functional value relevant to their situation, all the respondents described the CEO-I’s 
values and behaviours. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the first thing they thought 
about when designated was whether they could have the same leadership and 
communication styles as the CEO-Is. Irrespective of whether they liked, respected, 
trusted, or were on good terms with the CEO-I, they started describing how the CEO-I 
handled most of these activities. The main activities, they referred to, included their 
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leadership style, communication style, handling of the outside stakeholders, and running 
board meetings. 
After elaborating on the values, beliefs, and behaviours of the CEO-Is, the next 
step CEO-Ds took was asking themselves whether they could become like the CEO-Is. To 
arrive at an answer, CEO-Ds went through a reflective learning process. The most 
common process among my respondents was a self-dialogue around these standards. 
They spent a significant amount of time thinking about whether they could or could not 
adopt the CEO-Is’ standards, including behaviours and communication and leadership 
styles. This process was intense. They attempted to determine what they would be like as 
CEOs given their observations of the CEO-Is and the impact of CEO-Is behaviour and 
attitude on their surroundings. Most of the respondents sought out someone who could 
serve as a sounding board, not necessarily for direction, but for constructive dialogues. 
For some of the CEO-Ds, the sounding board was (1) a consultant hired by the board, (2) 
a mentor they chose themselves (usually a CEO or an ex-CEO from outside the 
organization), (3) a family member who was or still is a CEO, and (4) for others they 
went to the CEO-I. Some of the CEO-Ds used only one sounding board; others used a 
combination of people. Most of the CEO-Ds found value in their discussions with 
someone who had an experience as a CEO. They believed this person had more 
understanding of their concerns than those who did not have such an experience. 
All respondents went through a self-reflection process. Table 5.2 provides 
examples of some representative quotations from CEO-Ds describing their thought 
process and the premises for reflection. 
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Table 5.2:  Representative quotations illustrating the reflection process and some of 
the premises for building identity standards for the executives’ new CEO identity 
CEO-D Thought Process Premises for Reflection 
Bill I had many thinking sessions 
by myself, nobody helped 
me through. 
I really had no plan when I got into my role, to replace 
Jeffrey. Because I saw Jeffrey is just an individual that I 
can never do any dent to, no chance. 
It is just the way his leadership style is. I am just not that 
type of person. I don’t like limelight. I don’t like speaking. 
I don’t like being at the front of the room. That is just not 
my style. I have never enjoyed it. It’s tough for me to do. 
So I just felt that that is not me, I enjoyed being behind the 
scenes. I enjoyed doing a senior leadership role but not the 
senior leadership role. 
I am not replacing Jeffrey. I can never replace Jeffrey so 
don’t put me in that position because I’ll fail and if you are 
actually believing that we are going to tell staff Bill is now 
replacing Jeffrey, no you are wrong, I am replacing the 
role of CEO and we need to define that differently. 
Bill, you have a hard time making decisions. You continue 
to walk away from stuff. Yeah I know. I am very open 
about it but that is why I will make sure I have got people 
beside, me they will push me and we will all make the 
decisions together so but I did have a lot of discussions 
with the board about that and the board still fights me on 
that. 
Cheryl I had many debates with 
myself, Janet, and my 
husband 
I am never going to be like her (CEO-I) but I actually have 
different strengths and that was part of what she kept 
saying to me. 
I think she is very sure, when she decides something is 
right, she is very sure whereas I tend to be, well let me 
hear what the opposition has to say. 
We don’t have the same leadership style at all and even 
that was in conflict sometimes and so I would say to her I 
appreciate that. That is who you are, that is not who I am. 
Frank I went through a deep soul 
searching process. 
I had many debates with the 
consultant. 
I am who I am. I lead the way I lead. I am always open to 
learning. That is one of the things that define me as I love 
learning; I always have. I am a bit of a closet analytical 
academic person reading papers all the time. Having said 
that, I have got to be who I am going to be and I don’t 
want to get into this under false pretences. 
They (the board members) said to me the ex-CEO was 
known for that, the CEO-I is known for this, what will be 
your thing? I said, I do not know yet, I need to think about 
it. 
Henry I observed a lot, and I did 
workshops at Harvard. 
I tend to involve all people in the end decisions and 
sometimes those clash. I want sort of consensus before we 
move forward. He (CEO-I) was willing to move forward 
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CEO-D Thought Process Premises for Reflection 
without consensus and sometimes that resulted in a better 
outcome and sometimes it resulted in a worse outcome. So 
both styles have their end of pros and cons and there is no 
perfect one. 
If you have got people that are open minded enough to 
listen at the view points and at the end of the day the buck 
stops and the CEO is going to make a decision, so I mean 
he is going to make it with his style or her style. And you 
need to be comfortable with your own.  
John I watched David (CEO-I) 
and I could feel the reaction 
of others to his style. 
David (CEO-I) did not like to take direct questions during 
town hall meetings, he liked to know the questions ahead 
of time and prepare his answers. I believe people knew 
that, they always felt that the questions are scripted and 
inserted. I like to take direct questions, even if they are 
challenging. 
He liked to read and re-read e-mails he was very 
concerned with formalities, I am not. I believe I am more 
concerned about contents.  
Margaret I discussed it with myself 
which I do a lot. 
So when you get a job like that as a CEO, you can actually 
do whatever you want. If you want to spend 80% of your 
time outside, you can do that. If you want to spend 80% of 
your time inside on the floor and doing things, you can do 
that. You actually design your days exactly, exactly as you 
want. And, but to me, the role of the CEO, the 
fundamental role of the CEO was to make sense between 
the outside and the inside. You need to talk to the outside 
to explain everything great that you do and you need to 
talk to the inside of what is happening outside, the threats 
and opportunities and your job, because if you don’t do it, 
not many people will do it in the organization. The way 
you do this interaction between the outside and inside, it’s 
yours and Russell did that in a very different way. 
Philip I admired Ralph (CEO-I). I 
had many discussions with 
him and with one of our 
board members. 
I learned so much from Ralph. The most important thing I 
learned is: “don’t change”. So be who you are. Ralph is 
the same guy he was before. He was a sales guy for 30 
years. It is unbelievable. I always told Ralph he doesn’t 
know he is a CEO because I have worked for other CEOs 
and they change and Ralph said: ‘look, you are who you 
are. You are a good leader, you are approachable, and you 
are a regular person. Just be that person still. Don’t try to 
be what you think the board wants you to be. Don’t try to 
be what you think your other stakeholders want you to be. 
Just be who you are. That is what got you here.’ 
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The fieldwork shows CEO-Ds took time during the transition period and 
experienced a deep thinking and learning process to reflect upon their identity standards 
as the future CEO. They started by evaluating the behaviours and leadership styles of the 
CEO-Is. They compared these behaviours with their own understanding of what the job 
was as well as their current standards. They thought about which standards to internalize 
and which ones do not align with their own beliefs and values and standards of their other 
identities. To help them through the process, most of the CEO-Ds turned to other people 
as sounding boards to help them determine these standards. What is evident from the 
interviews is that they did not try to blindly adopt or emulate the identity standards of the 
CEO-I. 
5.4. Premise Three: Social Context 
P3: The designation of an executive as the CEO-D changes his/her social context, 
and leads the CEO-D to heed and behave in ways that meet the endorsement or 
perceived expectations of the members of the newly created social context. 
I argued in premise three that the designation of executives as the future leader 
changes their social context and hence affects the cues that they select. Therefore, they 
will need to change their cognition, behaviour, and identity standards in order to meet the 
expectations of their new social context. My data showed the CEO-Is were aware of this 
change as they had experienced this previously. In many situations, the CEO-Is took the 
responsibility to socialize the CEO-Ds to their new social context. They introduced them 
to the outside world and pushed them to understand the internal environment of the 
organization from the perspective of a CEO. Outgoing CEO Steven, for example, made 
sure his successor took the time during the transition period to meet with the executive 
team members, the board members, and members from the outside community. 
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My advice to Donald (CEO-D) is: ‘in the 6 years span that you are CEO that is the 
team that is going to be there for you, so take your time to know them and understand 
what their expectations are’. He (CEO-D) has been going through a process of really 
getting to know all the players so right now, he is having a two hour meeting with 
one of the directors and he had done that with all of the directors. And then he had 
two hours sessions with all of the members of the executive team so that they would 
explain to him how they are working in a formal setting as the CEO-to-be. He, right 
from the very beginning, was included in every meeting with government people. 
Other CEO-Is had a different perspective on how to handle the change in social 
contexts. They knew there would be a change in the relationship dynamics once the 
announcement of the successor was made. So instead of staying and socializing the CEO-
Ds, they left and let the successor establish his new status. They also wanted to save 
themselves from dealing with the emotions related to the loss of power. Outgoing CEO 
Howard described his experience as such: 
When you have been the CEO of a powerful organization of $6 billion and around 
15000 people, power is everything. You lose it when you say you are leaving and you 
are giving your power away at the same time. The dynamics in the office change. 
People will look at the new one. And it’s very difficult for someone who was on top 
like that to hand over and say: ‘it’s done’ and still stay around. It makes no sense 
because nobody would want to talk to you. Right now, I have someone who is helping 
me out of this thing and that is the first thing he told me: ‘once the next one is 
announced, you have to quit, fast, because it makes no sense to stay around.’ He 
(CEO-D) does not need me around. 
The change in social context was a major change CEO-Ds faced when designated. 
Only one of the 22 CEOs I interviewed said she did not feel the change in her internal 
social context. For her, it was a continuation of her previous experience. She said: 
They (the staff members) didn’t change because I didn’t change. And, actually the 
leader of the union came to me and he said: ‘Margaret, make sure that nobody ever 
calls you Madame’. That was the best lesson ever: You are Margaret, you stay 
Margaret, and I remember it. Just make sure nobody calls you Madame. If I met the 
brand new employees, they call me Madame because they don’t know me, right? But 
the people who were there before I was appointed, they called me Margaret. 
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However, though she did not feel the change internally, she felt it from the 
outside. Suddenly, CEOs at other companies would not refuse her requests for a meeting. 
She also instantaneously became the person the community activists invited to 
fundraising dinners or asked for sponsorships.  
All of the other CEOs I interviewed felt immediate change in their social contexts 
effective the moment of the announcement. Some of the change was only their perception 
about how the social context recognized their new status while part of the change was 
based on actual experience. Executives distinguished amongst three social contexts in 
which they felt the most change: (1) their staff members – peers and others; (2) the 
important outside stakeholders of the organization – government representatives, 
suppliers, or customers; and (3) the most frequently mentioned social context was the 
board of directors. In the following subsections, I present a brief summary on the 
collective experience of the executives about the change they felt in each of these social 
contexts. 
Upon designation, the executives felt the increased impact their behaviours, 
emotions, and words suddenly had on their immediate context, such as their peers and 
staff members. There was a major shift from being a member of the executive committee, 
and perceived as a peer, to becoming the CEO-D, the future boss. They felt their words 
gained different meanings and they were viewed very seriously; they knew they could not 
tell jokes anymore “they (the jokes) will come back and haunt us somewhere”. They also 
noticed how their emotions were suddenly interpreted in terms of how the company was 
performing rather than them being happy or sad. Most of them also noticed how their 
presence in the executive meetings suddenly made everybody cautious in choosing their 
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words or even stopped ongoing discussion. Most of the CEO-Ds admitted they had to be 
mindful about the words they chose to address people, their attitude – be it positive or 
negative, and the impact of their presence on the people. This meant adjusting their 
behaviours and mental attitudes to manage the perception of their team. Christopher said 
“I keep forgetting sometimes that it’s not that I am any different a person. It’s just that I 
have a different title”.  
In addition to the change in their immediate social context, they also felt the 
change in the outside community. They immediately became the new face of the 
organization which had a major impact on them. They were surprised at the difference in 
how outside stakeholders suddenly treated them. CEO-D Philip said: “if I am meeting 
another CEO as a VP, it’s like: fine, the guy could be. There is a big difference between 
that and: ‘he is or he will be’ and that relationship changes at the time of the 
announcement.” Their words gained more credibility and they chose them more carefully. 
Their personal opinions became the opinions of the organization. The level of people they 
interacted with changed and they knew they needed to adjust their messages accordingly. 
CEO-D Frank said: “It is just the same thing but different messaging”. They suddenly 
belonged to a different social class which required different behaviours and mental 
models. They needed to adjust to meet these requirements gradually during the transition 
period.  
The third social context in which they noticed change with the most impact on 
their cognition and behaviour was the board of directors. Actual or perceived, all of the 
CEOs felt the pressure presented by the fact that the board members became their bosses. 
All of the designated CEOs, previously exposed or not to the board of directors, 
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mentioned how important for them it was to meet with the board members in order to 
understand their expectations. All CEO-Ds felt the pressure to show to the board 
members they did not make a mistake by designating them as CEO-Ds. On the other side 
of this relationship, the five board members I interviewed, confirmed the CEO-Ds’ 
opinions that the board looked and listened to the designated executive with more interest 
once the decision was made. Board members gave CEO-Ds the same attention, if not 
more, than they gave to the CEO-I during the board meetings. Louis, the chair of the 
board, said: 
Once chosen to be the next CEO, you start listening more carefully to what they say 
because their words will reflect in the company’s performance. Not only you listen 
more carefully, we have a saying in Quebec “tu tournes ta langue sept fois dans ta 
bouche avant de parler” which means you think more than twice before you speak 
with them since the announcement. It is totally different when they are attending the 
board meeting as COO or VP. At that time you listen to them but then immediately 
turn to the CEO and say: ‘what is your opinion?’. 
 Table 5.3 provides further examples from representative quotations from CEO-Ds 
describing how they felt the change in their social contexts and the change in their 
cognition and behaviour needed to meet the expectations of the newly created social 
context. 
 
Table 5.3: Examples of change in the social context 
CEO-D Change In Social Context and Managing Expectations Resulting Change in CEO-D’s 
Behaviour and Cognition 
Bob The one thing that is probably the most obvious is people 
are somewhat more careful about what they may say. So I 
don’t know if that is a surprise, but it’s a reality. You have 
to be aware of that, and you need to know how to get the 
story. 
Well, it’s just, if you are part of the team, and you work in 
the trenches every day, there is this different level of 
communication that might be if you are the, like when 
you are the next CEO, what people say something to you 
Bob expected that people would 
become more careful in dealing 
with him, but to deal with the 
reality of this recognition, he 
knew he had to change the way 
he dealt with them to encourage 
them to tell him the true story 
rather than they though he 
wanted to hear. 
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knowing you are the next CEO, I mean they have to be 
cognoscente, mindful about what they say, you know, so 
things like office politics for example probably don’t get 
mentioned unless it’s a serious problem. And that is bad. 
Carl Well it certainly changed the way I thought about my 
career and what I needed to do in the business. I started to 
think about my executive presence about how I dealt with 
my colleagues. I don’t think they are inherently yes 
people. I think they kind of fell into that certainly in the 
last couple of years under Kathy. I want to open that up a 
bit. I don’t want to leave any good thoughts or ideas off 
the table because they are too afraid to speak up. So I 
want to give them that sort of power back to feel 
comfortable in challenging things and I think that is going 
to be very healthy for us as a leadership team. I had to 
work for this. When it came time for me to be the CEO, I 
was talking with Christina, one of my previous reports, 
and I said, you know, I want to have open discussions. I 
think leadership in general needs to understand that I am 
open to that and she said you know Carl when you first 
told me that, I kind of thought oh yes, yeah I am sure, you 
know but not so much. And she said but you totally 
walked the walk and I was, within six months, I bought in 
and you never wavered from that and you are very 
genuine about that. 
Carl realized, as soon as he was 
designated that he needed to 
win the trust of his new 
executive team. He knew he had 
to think harder and act in a way 
that would entice his staff 
members to challenge him, 
especially that the CEO-I was 
not that open to incompatible 
ideas. 
Charles The designation changed the dynamics. So I needed to 
convince the board that I am the right one. The board is 
the body who appointed you, right? So you need them to 
know that they did not do wrong. No doubt about it, the 
CEO played a very important role too. He could have 
provided a veto, okay? You need to understand their 
expectations. I always tried to be honest and I guess it 
worked. I tell the story: “I went to the board and told them 
that at the beginning of the year I said we were going to 
make 20 million dollars in this project, at the end of the 
year we had to write off 600 million dollars, and a year 
later they made me CEO.” 
As you get up people tend to become yes sir, I agree with 
you, and all that kind of stuff, they are not telling you the 
other thing, I’ve never ever believed in that. And this gets 
into collaboration and understanding how your staff 
members think. So I always say if you’ve got a problem 
it’s got to surface quickly because if it surfaces quickly 
maybe we can collectively do something about it. So if 
you asked me, especially during a crisis, Friday 
afternoons was my time of the week. 
Charles had to act according to 
what he believed the board 
expected from him, like being 
honest and admitting mistakes 
no matter how costly they were. 
Charles tried to also establish 
this as a culture in the company 
where he had to understand 
“how your staff members 
think”. He had to come up with 
a system to make his staff 
members come forward with 
problems. 
Cheryl Suddenly you are it and that really, you can theorize about 
it but I was struck even on every level. First of all the 
buck stops at you, especially that Janet made herself 
Cheryl felt the immediate shift 
in her colleagues’ attitudes 
towards her. They started 
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scarce at the organization, so anything that is going to go 
wrong, it’s yours. You own it. 
But it’s much more than that. I was struck by how my 
colleagues immediately shifted to their deference like that 
just blew me away how quickly they shifted to well 
‘Cheryl what do you want?’ I was like ‘really?’ 
I was struck by just the way people and across the 
organization, staff that had always been very comfortable 
to just stop by my office stopped. You need to learn to 
overcome this and establish new lines of communication. 
I was struck by the invitations that came into the 
organization only for me. You know there is a dinner, 
there is a …, just everything. You need to know when and 
how to say yes or no. 
looking at her for directions 
rather than recommendations. 
She knew she had to learn how 
to overcome barriers and get 
people to “establish new lines of 
communication”. 
Christopher Well managing people I knew was going to be tough but 
it’s tough. John did, my coach told me but even you learn 
at business school and business in general, everyone says 
when you get into a role like this you lose touch because 
you are removed now. And I said no! That is not going to 
happen to me. But you know what, unless you really force 
yourself to go out there and talk to people, you are 
removed because no one will come in here and talk to you 
unless it’s one of my direct reports. Very few people just 
walked down the hall and come in and want to have a chat 
because, look at the office. It’s remarkable actually 
(referring to how intimidating the office is with all the 
expensive furniture and decorations). So you are in a bit 
of isolation and you have to be careful. You can lose sight 
of what’s going on if you are not very careful. 
People take what you say literally. Like to the point where 
I have to catch myself because sometimes I will just say 
something half-jokingly and they will take it the wrong 
way and because now it’s out of President’s mouth, you 
know it’s it. I keep forgetting sometimes that it’s not 
that I am any different a person. It’s just that I have a 
different title. Even now once in a while I forget that and 
I say something and I know that is going to haunt me 
somewhere.  
Once I was told I was getting the job, then, what we did is 
we arranged dinners in Paris. So me and two directors, I 
don’t know six dinners, whatever. So I had a chance to 
talk with them ... It was for me to hear from them where 
they thought the company was. I think it meant more to 
give me some input to help me formulate a vision than it 
was for them to give me a vision of what they want. They 
wanted to hear from me but they were trying to give me 
as much information as they could to help put the vision 
together. 
Though warned before about 
the change that would happen in 
his social context upon 
designation, Christopher was 
still surprised by magnitude of 
the change. 
He learned the impact his office 
had on the people, his actions 
and words had on the people, 
and he learned to really consider 
what he should say before 
telling any” jokes”. 
He also learned to listen to his 
new bosses, or board of 
directors, understand their 
expectations in order to put his 
vision for the organization 
together. 
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Frank It was a six months transition. It took me three months to 
get out of my old position. During the first three months, 
it changed in small ways. People in the elevator would 
smile and say hello. But when I was sitting in meetings 
with my colleagues, there was not an all of a sudden they 
would stop talking when I walked in the room kind of 
thing. What I have noticed, the biggest move is, when I 
left the previous floor, and came up to the executive floor, 
now when I came into meetings, I have to be much more 
aware of the impact my presence has. I have to make 
people feel comfortable that it’s still me. I am the same 
person so let’s have a conversation. There is a different 
dynamic and I work real hard to not have that dynamics 
slow things down. I don’t want to be shutting down 
conversations. So I am very sensitive to that issue in terms 
of when I am now in the elevator, I try to convey the 
message: “it’s still me. It’s okay.” 
I needed to understand my executive team. I have spent 
three hours with every single one of them going in their 
offices, going through all the nuts and bolts of their 
department. So that was part of the transition process - 
very useful. 
They (the board members) know me a little bit but they 
don’t know me well. But I need to understand what their 
issues are. I spent three hours with every board member 
during the transition period. I need to understand who 
they are. I need to understand what their biases are. I need 
to understand what they think could be done better. If you 
found out that seven out of the nine board members 
believed that we were on the wrong strategic trajectory, I 
want to know that, going in. I also believe that you have 
to build up a personal rapport. Very important to 
understand where your board is coming from. They are 
your boss at the end of the day.  
The expectations from the board were about more like 
Frank, you are going to be out there public speaking all 
the time. And, I did that anyway. So these were not big 
things to me. The one thing is, well I did it globally. It did 
not bother me. But it’s one thing to be speaking at an 
industry level globally, it’s another thing to be speaking 
to, Kathleen Wynne and Tim Hudak and Jim Flaherty and 
talking to central bank governors. I wasn’t quite sure what 
that transitional gap would be. I have come to realize it’s 
the same thing just different messaging actually. 
Frank noticed the change in his 
colleagues attitudes as soon as 
he was designated CEO-D, but 
he also noticed that this change 
became more obvious when he 
physically moved offices to the 
executive floor. 
He had to understand the impact 
his presence had on even the 
executive team. He had to think 
and act in ways that relays the 
message “it is still me. It is Ok.” 
Frank also had to understand the 
expectations of his executive 
team members and the board 
members in order to be prepared 
cognitively for the CEO 
position.  
Henry Get yourself acclimatized to the job first because there is 
just a big shock from where you were before to this job 
and if you hadn’t done it before, you got to acclimatize 
the staff, the capital markets, and suppliers all to this 
notion. So that is what I did for that year (transition 
period). We have supplier symposium where all of our 
Henry took the transition period 
as an opportunity to learn about 
his social context and mainly 
his internal social context. 
Though he knew them before 
but the designation added 
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contractors come in. I would be the guy for all of those 
folks. You are getting to know the CEO.  
Harold (CEO-I) handed over to me our internal town halls 
like we get all the employees together twice a year so my 
job to talk to all the employees so it was getting the 
organization ready for transition. So everybody knew 
what was coming. Now he is running the organization 
The external shareholder market was something that I had 
a really good handle on and probably spent more time 
than he did. That wasn’t his (the CEO) forte to deal with 
shareholders. So I would say those (the board) were, the 
primary ones were around organization and around the 
particularly prickly personalities at the board. I mean they 
are all individuals and all need to be sort of managed as 
individuals as opposed to collectively called the board 
because once you are in the job, you actually are dealing 
with them one on one as much as you are dealing with 
them as a whole board. 
another dimension to his 
relationship and understanding 
of the social context. He also 
felt the need to let his social 
context get to know him in his 
new status. 
He realized he was not dealing 
with the board as a collective 
but also as individuals “one on 
one”. 
John Everybody hangs on every word that you say so you have 
to watch what you say, how you say it and you’ve got to 
be very consistent in how you say things, because 
otherwise they’ll be thinking you’ve got seventeen 
different messages. 
Some people treat you differently after the announcement, 
for sure and I think because they respect the position 
partly, they respect hierarchy. 
I think you need to always have a positive attitude - like if 
I walk out that door and have a frown on my face people 
are looking at me saying what’s the problem? Right. … It 
starts the moment you are announced to be the next CEO. 
The impact that you can have by being positive on 
everybody else around you and how they look at things is 
actually quite significant. 
I developed a different relationship with the board than 
there was there before and I look at, everybody looks at 
things different ways, my view is anybody that can help 
me be more successful then I should tap into it. So I don’t 
look at the board as a nuisance if that’s the way to put it, 
or somebody who questions me, etc. but it’s good for me 
to be aware of their expectations and then I want to know 
if there’s a problem out there that I need to manage. 
John noticed the impact his 
words had on his environment. 
He learned to watch what he 
said and how he said it. He also 
learned to watch his attitude. 
He changed the way he dealt 
with the board in order to win 
them as  a resource helping him 
to identify problems that he was 
not aware of. 
Margaret And it’s not a matter of being friends with the senior 
executive team. I don’t invite, I don’t go out in couples, 
with my VPs. I don’t invite them home. I don’t buy them 
drinks. I don’t do that. We go drink with the unions and 
everything but I don’t have a personal relationship, 
absolutely not. You need to keep some professional 
distance. 
Margaret learned to keep a 
professional distance with her 
colleagues/subordinates. 
 
126 
 
CEO-D Change In Social Context and Managing Expectations Resulting Change in CEO-D’s 
Behaviour and Cognition 
Martin Ron (CEO-I) and I had a lot of time to talk and our 
relationship maybe changed a little, not too much because 
there were things that I would be able to start doing, and 
things I wasn’t able to do in public. Neither one of us 
really appreciated how much, within a minute of the 
announcement, I thought there, within a week of the 
announcement Ron’s phone didn’t ring and people elected 
me for everything and so the relationship stayed strong 
and I kept trying to go and say hi to Ron, and it was really 
clear that although he had the actual responsibility for 
stuff, he didn’t have any practical responsibility for 
anything and so it went from boss/employee to former 
boss/employee within a minute.  
So for me it first started with people not strategy. Our 
strategy was rounded typically well. It changed the 
dynamic with the board, in that the chairman and I, 
elected at the time but not yet the CEO, spent a lot more 
time together. Suddenly for me, it was me and the entire 
board. It was a lot of change. 
There were lots of things relative to being the face of the 
company, officially the face of the company which is sort 
of bizarre that also changed public perceptions. A lot of 
change occurred then.  
Martin was surprised by how 
fast the public, internal and 
external, perception changed 
upon designation. He was 
careful even in dealing with the 
CEO-I because most members 
of the social context wanted to 
deal with Martin. 
He started understanding the 
board’s dynamics from a 
different perspective. The chair 
of the board wanted to talk to 
him on one on one 
conversations. 
He also learned to become the 
face of the organization and to 
manage the perceptions of the 
external environment. 
Mike I would like to think that I haven’t changed. My wife 
might tell you a little bit different but she reminds me 
often that I don’t work for you; she doesn’t work for me 
so. So I do believe here is one of the nuances about being 
promoted from within is that you, transition from peer 
relationships to subordinate relationships. Call it whatever 
you want, that is what they are. The challenge you have is 
how you transition that relationship: how you treat people, 
how you engage people, and how you include them in the 
transition and your new vision, just the new vision and 
strategic goals for their company. 
One of the challenges Mike 
dealt with during his transition 
period was how you smooth the 
transition in own status from 
colleague to boss. He learned to 
engage people in the 
organization’s new vision and 
goals. 
Philip Because through the race, Ralph (CEO-I) would equally 
socialize us to the world. But it’s a huge difference 
between here is Philip, he is our EVP. Ralph would never 
say he is in the race. I think a lot of people would know 
that and so if I am meeting another CEO, it’s like: fine, 
the guy could be. There is a big difference between that 
and he is or he will be and that relationship changes at the 
time of the announcement.  
Look, there are two things that happen when you are 
announced. You immediately become taller and better 
looking. Ralph is obviously thinking: well, I don’t want to 
make a big change here if Philip is going to be in the chair 
in a month or two months. So what happens as soon as I 
was announced, people said to me what about me now. 
My career was put on hold or my opportunities were put 
Ralph learned during the 
transition about many things. 
He learned how people changed 
their perception between he 
may be the next CEO, during 
the competition, to he will be 
the next CEO. 
Ralph noticed how internally 
start looking at you different 
“you become taller and better 
looking”. He noticed how the 
designation made him the go-to 
person for major decisions 
regarding people’s careers. 
Also, he noticed how people 
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on hold because of the CEO race. I want to talk about my 
career. 
But the other thing that happens is you are the last to 
know on a lot of things and many things that are put in 
front of you after your announcement are well scripted, 
well reviewed and well documented and so your 
information channels inside the company slow down a 
little bit and that was very visible to me. 
Ralph has helped me with how to manage a board. One of 
my biggest learnings now that I am in the chair is just the 
time requirement and the amount of CEO time is taken by 
managing the board. The board became much more open, 
less formal, very prepared to say we liked this, we didn’t 
like that. We would like you to fix this; we would like you 
to fix that. Never heard any of that until I was announced.  
prepared reports differently. 
He also changed the way he 
dealt with board, because board 
members become more open 
with him and he needed to learn 
to cope with that. 
Randall The transition from being a peer to being the boss requires 
preparation and immediately after being selected I read 
different things about that. The relationship does change 
and while I would not treat anybody differently, people 
treat me differently. 
I think the conversation then changes from a conversation 
to more of a recommendation to me, because the key 
difference is when you become the designate CEO, you 
are the one that has to make that final decision. So that is 
where the conversation you had before as a peer now 
becomes a different conversation, because what you say is 
what turns in action as opposed to just discussing 
possibilities. 
I also needed to understand the board from a different 
perspective. I had a board interview as well at a dinner 
without the CEO. We had a “get to know you” 
conversation, lots of questions. Even though they had 
known the “credit side” of me, they wanted to see the full 
person as opposed to just the business side.  
Though Randall did not feel like 
he changed the way he treated 
people, he noticed people 
changing the way they treated 
him. The conversation changed 
because what he said suddenly 
started turning into action 
instead of being interpreted as a 
suggestion and he learned to 
understand the change. 
He also learned to deal with the 
board in the absence of the 
CEO-I. He noticed the board 
was trying to know him as the 
full package as opposed to just 
his technical side. 
Robert The reality is that I knew the investors’ base very well. I 
knew the asset side pretty well. I was comfortable with 
the asset side, investments. I knew the operations cold. I 
knew finance, capital management and so on very well. I 
had been involved in building the team. I had been 
involved in building the strategy, so I understood how this 
organization worked. I got into this period in 2008 with a 
fair bit of confidence that I knew the business very well. 
My big challenge was the board. Financial crisis, 36-year-
old candidate for the CEO job...is that the right timing 
here? A bit of skepticism, you know? Living with 
skepticism. 
I had never spent time thinking about what their role was. 
I had never spent time thinking about how you build 
Robert’s main concern upon his 
designation was the board. He 
felt the board was skeptical 
about his ability to lead the 
company forward during crisis. 
He needed to learn a lot about 
the board during the transition 
period from the CEO-I and he 
was relieved knowing the CEO-
I would stay as the chair of the 
board. 
His biggest insight was 
understanding that the board 
was an oversight body and his 
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relationships with 13 different people. I had not spent 
time realizing that I was the boss and they were an 
oversight body, they were not the boss. You go from you 
have a relationship with one individual. You understand 
roughly what their expectations are and you operate with 
that in mind. When you get to deal with the board, there’s 
no such thing. There’s no one relationship. The board is 
13 different individuals who express a point of view and a 
perspective involved in governance. And this skepticism 
was intimidating to me. It took some time, because again, 
I think people were nervous. It was the financial crisis. 
Our majority shareholder was in bad shape and I needed 
to find a solution. 
boss. He learned to deal with 
board members accordingly and 
learned to convince them of his 
abilities. 
Rodney The board at the time thought: Rodney is smart enough, 
he can be the CEO of this company if only he can learn 
operation but has he got the package? Is he able to, they 
would have said, you know, and by the time they chose 
me, I think I still surprised them. Because you grow in the 
role and all of a sudden you got the chair. But I think by 
the time, through that journey over the years, they had 
enough chances. I was named CFO of the year and I had 
become a board member for another company as opposed 
to just an executive here. I developed a persona; I showed 
them I had the full package if I can call it that.  
Rodney knew the board had 
confidence in his technical 
skills but doubted his 
management and operational 
skills, He took several actions to 
build the board’s trust such as 
becoming a board member to 
acquire management skills. He 
worked on his persona or his 
full package to satisfy the board 
expectations. 
Stanley It gave time to get our investors comfortable with it. In 
February, we went on a weeklong investor relations tour.  
So there had to be some fences mended if you will or 
some understandings built with executive team. 
It surprises me and sometimes disappoints me that people 
look up to the CEO or CEO to be and they want to tell 
them what they believe this CEO wants to hear rather than 
say what they think. 
Alex (the CEO-I) told me, when you say something as a 
CEO, it is so much louder, heard more than somebody 
else and so your actions, your comments, how you 
approach things you need to be very thoughtful about. 
I was a board member for a long time before I ran for the 
CEO job, you know, I know them. I extracted myself 
from the board of directors during the competition for the 
job. One thing that really taught me is: I need to manage 
the expectations of the board and that was when I made 
my presentation as a potential CEO. I thought the board 
was looking for a 45 minute interview with me and I 
thought it was more of a one on one interview. My 
approach was be prepared for the question, have the 
details but answer in an informal useful manner. My note 
was handwritten. Others who presented had dressed up in 
suits and ties. They had power point presentations. Mine 
was more of a narrative: “You want to hear what I think 
Stanley appreciated the time the 
transition period availed to him 
to understand the expectations 
of his executive team and to 
learn how to deal with his 
people especially those who 
prefer to tell the CEO or CEO-
D what they think the CEOs 
like to hear. 
He also saw how his words had 
stronger impact and how he 
needed to be mindful of what he 
said. 
Though Stanley, unlike other 
CEO-Ds I met, was a board 
member before running for the 
CEO role, he was surprised how 
the expectations of the board 
changed once they decided to 
designate him as CEO-D. they 
had expectations as to his 
physical look and the aesthetics 
of his presentations rather than 
just the content. He learned then 
that he needed to exceed their 
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of being CEO, here it is” … After the meeting, the 
consultant, I know him well, came to me and said: “I have 
one question for you that the board asked me to ask and it 
is do you really want this role? One of the board members 
said everyone else came prepared; you did not have the 
same level of preparation.” It was interesting to me how 
perceptions of tactical part of the presentation could affect 
people rather than the actual presentation. Since then, 
whenever I am presenting to the board, I make sure that I 
am prepared beyond what I think personally about what 
they expect. 
expectations every time. 
 
To conclude, the designation of the executives as the CEO-D created a new social 
environment for them. First, though they came from within the organization and knew the 
employees, the designation gave their behaviours and opinions more impact than prior to 
the designation. Accordingly the CEO-Ds adjusted their mental models and behaviours to 
be mindful of the powerful impact of their words and behaviours on their new context, 
such as foregoing jokes and negative attitudes both inside and outside the organization. 
Second, despite the fact that most of CEO-Ds were senior executives and dealt with 
stakeholders outside the organization, the new status as the next leader of the organization 
gave their opinions a more powerful level of meaning. They learned the new social 
context interpreted their words as reflecting the position of the organization. They were 
mindful their behaviours and words were binding to the organization. Third, the board of 
directors also changed from the social environment they knew, even if the executive had 
previous dealings with them. After the designation, the board members gave the CEO-Ds’ 
behaviours and visions more consideration. CEO-Ds realized the board members were not 
looking only for suggestions. Rather, board members wanted to hear ideas with a 
potential to become beneficial actions for the organization. 
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5.5. Premise Four: Co-Enactment 
P4: The designation of executives as CEO-Ds creates a new environment for 
enactment; however, it is the subsequent actions taken by the CEO-Ds and the CEO-
Is that affect their learning outcomes. 
P4a: CEO-Ds who double interact with CEO-Is are more likely to have the 
opportunity to induce the change in their mental models, behaviours, and identity 
standards and prepare them for the CEO position. 
P4b: CEO-Ds who are limited to act and/or interact with the CEO-Is are more 
likely to miss the opportunities to induce the change in their mental models, 
behaviours, and identity standards to prepare for the CEO position. 
Information from the fieldwork showed how CEO-Ds who adopted different 
enactment modes in their environment had different learning outcomes. Experiences of 
CEO-D participants ranged from those who had many opportunities to create physical, 
temporal, and emotional environments for enactment  and to secure the CEO-Is’ 
commitment to this environment to others who had almost no opportunities to benefit 
from such interactions. CEO-Ds who had greater opportunities for double interact with 
the CEO-Is learned more about the CEO role by changing their mental models, their 
behaviours and identities as described in the next subsections. In contrast, those who had 
fewer double interact opportunities acquired the relevant knowledge and adjusted their 
mental models mainly after they assumed the role of CEO. During the interviews, I rarely 
found a CEO-D who was limited to one type of enactment, whether act, interact, or 
double interact; however, in many instances one of these types dominated. In the 
following sections I present examples on all three different enactment styles and how the 
dominating style affected the learning outcomes. 
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5.5.1. Act 
Acts are a mode of enacting one’s social context by relying on his/her mental 
models. They usually result in single-loop learning as described in chapter 3. Among 
different types of interaction, acts are the least likely to reduce ambiguity or equivocality 
and create a collective understanding in a specific situation (Weick, 1995, 2012; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993). Some of the interviewees learned through act during the transition period. 
In certain situations, they resorted to acts because it was the only available mode, while in 
other cases they deliberately chose “act” because they wanted to distance themselves 
from the CEO-I. 
CEO-D Bill’s experience during the transition period is an example of a CEO-D 
who resorted to act as his enactment mode due to the unavailability of other modes. CEO-
D Bill found himself left alone after being selected to be the next CEO. He knew he had a 
lot to learn especially because CEO-I, Jeffery, chose not to involve or expose CEO-D Bill 
to many of CEO-I Jeffery’s activities. This was because CEO-I Jeffery enjoyed his job 
and wanted to perform his activities alone. The organization defined CEO-I Jeffery and 
the realization of his imminent exit as CEO led him to withdraw himself totally from the 
transition process, leaving CEO-D Bill on his own as described below: 
At the time they selected me. Then about a week later, I had a meeting with Jeffery 
and it took a month to meet with him because he was busy. I met with him in 
December and we talked about what the transition would be and he said: ‘you got to 
do your own thing. I can’t help you.’ I went on two trips with him for investor 
relations because as part of a public company, that is something that he did himself 
100%. He wouldn’t take anybody along. He would meet with the investment 
community. He would make between a 100 and 200 meetings a year. He loved it. He 
enjoyed it. He also enjoyed doing acquisitions. He would do anywhere from three to 
ten acquisitions a year. Jeffery did all of them himself, all of them, right from the first 
meeting to the last negotiation, because he loved doing that. That is what really 
turned him on, was doing a deal. The negotiation associated with the deal, the 
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discussions, and the personality. So I had no experience in acquisitions2. I had no 
experience in investor relations. I went on two trips with him on investor relations 
where you go meet with investors there, one hour meetings, and you do about, in two 
or three days, you do 20 or 30 little meetings, so very intense. We did them in the US 
West, US East, and in Europe and not in one of those meetings did he introduce me 
as the CEO, coming in.  
CEO-I Jeffery could not accept he would no longer be the CEO and CEO-D Bill 
had been selected as the next CEO. CEO-I Jeffery refused to help CEO-D Bill establish 
his new identity as the incoming CEO and declined to introduce CEO-D Bill to the new 
social context Bill entered of which the investment community is a major part: “not in 
one of those meetings did he introduce me as the CEO, coming in”. CEO-D Bill sensed 
CEO-I Jeffery was unhappy with the reality of leaving the organization. Bill knew Jeffery 
was not going to be helpful or even involved in passing the baton to him and he had to act 
on his own to determine what he needed to learn during this period. 
He was not willing to let go. …. That’s Jeffery’s style. I accepted it and I didn’t 
expect anything different but the clock was ticking and there was no real 
preparation. In February, I sat down with the leadership team and we had our 
meeting in preparation for the board meeting and that is when I said: ‘Jeffery, I 
would like to lead the leadership by myself’. So I had Jeffery in the room. We talked 
about what he had achieved in the ten years and where we are today and then said: 
‘Thanks very much. You leave now and the leadership team is going to talk’, and my 
message to them was the world has changed.  
Instead of using the transition period to learn about the CEO role and develop the 
necessary behaviours, mental models, and identity standards, CEO-D Bill spent his 
transition period trying to establish his status and sending signals to the organization that 
the leadership changed in terms of both the person and style.  CEO-I Jeffery set a very 
optimistic vision for the organization 10 years earlier when he became the CEO and he 
achieved it. He became a driving force and led the company on his own. At the end of his 
2 Numbers in circles represent the previous statements. These numbers are then included in the summary 
tables at the end of every mode of enactment to refer the reader back to the underlying statement. 
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tenure, CEO-I Jeffrey refused to interact with CEO-D Bill or discuss a vision for the 
organization going forward. 
 CEO-D Bill was nevertheless able to learn from CEO-I Jeffrey through 
observation. Bill realized he was interpreting CEO-I Jeffery’s behaviour using his own 
mental models: “what I think I saw …”, but he did not have the opportunity to actually 
understand any of the CEO-I’s behaviours and evaluate their efficiency. Bill had to act 
based on what he thought the company needed and was in its best interest. 
Certainly I worked with him (Jeffrey). Like he hired me. I worked for him in a 
number of different ways. I would not say shadowed him in anyway. Nobody 
shadowed Jeffery. Jeffery was very independent, very strong but I never mimicked 
him because I am not that way. I just don’t have that personality. So I certainly 
learnt from him but I would have to say I also learned what not to do because I saw 
that we needed him at the time. If we didn’t need to be questioned, we needed that 
singular leadership that was just going to drag us to success and he did it. He just 
dragged us kicking and screaming to success but that had a timeframe to it. You 
couldn’t continue that type of leadership. We got to the point where we were so big; 
you needed a change to take us to the next level. ….. I would say yeah, I learned from 
watching him and seeing what worked and didn’t work. That gave me a very good 
sense of okay, what do I need to do differently and what do I need to focus on. And 
what I think I saw very clearly is we needed to focus on getting more people (leaders) 
to the table.  
Although CEO-D Bill’s mindset changed and he realized what he needed to do 
differently and adopted the new behaviours, the organization was not ready to accept 
these behaviours due to external and internal factors. By all financial and market 
measures the organization was successful under CEO-I Jeffery’s leadership. Any sudden 
change in direction and strategy would have affected the confidence of stakeholders in the 
organization. When Bill took control of the organization the economic downturn severely 
affected most industries. Despite any preparation during the transition period, Bill had to 
act. Supported by the board of directors, after becoming CEO, he cut CEO-I Jeffery’s 
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influence immediately. Bill then began familiarizing himself with the senior management 
inside the organization, establishing a new identity and a course of action for the 
organization. 
It came out to the AGM in May. That is when the torch was going to be handed over 
to me and I asked Jeffery before that: ‘what’s going to happen after. So the day after 
that happens, what’s your opinion’ and his was maybe let’s give me about a week or 
two to clean my office up and maybe by the end of May, I will find me another office 
in the building, a spare office down the corner, I will move down there and I will still 
help you in acquisitions and I would like to do that because I am very focused on 
acquisitions.’ I said: ‘well we have a problem, because from my perspective there 
needs to be a clean break since you are such a strong personality, you are such a 
strong leader that every day you walk in the office, people are going to continue to 
look at you and to say, okay, what should we do and that’s going to be a struggle for 
me. I got to do this on my own so no office, no involvement.’ He became a board 
member right away. So he was on the board and I said: ‘you got to be board 
member. No longer can you be a CEO. You have to be a board member and there has 
to be a total split so no phone, no office, no involvement with management in the 
company and we will see you at every board meeting’ and I was supported by the 
board. The board said that is what we feel should happen. So I told him the board 
basically is, that is what they wanted to have in as well. He was very upset but he 
agreed. ‘Fine that is it, alright, no problem. I will just wash my hands and I will walk 
away.’ 
During the first couple of years in his role as the CEO, Bill had to learn how 
senior management members think and had to acclimatize them to his leadership style 
which resulted in firing some key people from the organization. He never had the chance 
to discover why CEO-I Jeffery adopted a forceful leadership style nor did he understand 
why people followed this style. Bill reasoned Jeffery’s style was appropriate for the 
period and he needed to change it for the best interest of the organization. 
We have an internal magazine and the last one they did was Jeffery standing up on 
stage at the AGM. We have a very strong marketing team here and our marketing 
communications team had the next edition of the magazine. They had me standing up 
on the stage and I said I don’t want that and I said we need to change it, and they 
disagreed. They said no, you need to make people aware there is a new leader. You 
have to make people aware of who you are. So this edition is going to be about you, 
who you are, what you did to get in the role and what you are doing to replace 
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Jeffery. I said first mistake, I am not replacing Jeffery. I can never replace Jeffery so 
don’t put me in that position because I’ll fail … no, I am replacing the role of CEO 
and we need to define that differently. So I said on the magazine cover, I want the 12 
leaders so I want all of us in there and standing in the room, and they took that 
picture and did it. The head of the marketing said: ‘you don’t get it Bill’. I said: ‘no, 
you don’t get it’. I actually had to terminate this person.  
After surviving the economic downturn, CEO-D Bill learned the soft side of the 
organization. He tried to discover the organization’s strengths and weaknesses to better 
prepare for what he believed to be better economic conditions. He also realized the 
organization had lost its identity after ex-CEO Jeffery left. Bill had to figure out how he 
would lead the organization and in which direction. To conclude, Bill was restricted to 
“act” as his enactment form during the transition, given the attitude of the CEO-I. He 
tried his best to learn during the transition about the organization and the skills necessary 
for a CEO such as how to structure M&As. He started establishing his identity and 
leadership style during the transition period by sending messages to the leadership team 
to take more initiative and stop expecting one man based decisions. He continued to 
establish his identity after becoming CEO and fired some of the executive team who felt 
uncomfortable with his participative decision making approach. However, most of the 
changes in his behaviour and mental models occurred after the transition, which affected 
his performance for the first couple of years after assuming the role of CEO. He changed 
not only his mental models; he also had to motivate change amongst the employees to 
improve the organization’s performance. 
It was the economy that hit everybody else so let’s get through this, find out who we 
are and find out what we do well and let’s make sure that we are doing the right 
things. When we came up 2010 and into 2011, I realized, okay, now it’s time to do 
something to take advantage of what we felt was going to be an improving economy. 
And we hired some consultants to assist us in repositioning ourselves because we had 
lost our identity. We had this identity, the Jeffery’s identity we were going to be a 
billion dollar company, 10000 people. So when you achieve that, then what’s next? 
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There wasn’t what’s next. … It wasn’t about just being the size anymore and that is 
what was… we grew the company through acquisitions. …  The big firms are getting 
bigger … everything was about being bigger. Not at all being better. 
 Table 5.4 shows representative quotes from a selection of interviewees to provide 
additional examples on how adopting the “act” style of enacting their social environment 
during the transition period limits or delays CEO-Ds’ learning outcomes. 
 
Table 5.4: Examples of act style during the transition period and the resulting 
learning outcome 
CEO-D Act Learning Outcome 
Christopher He (CEO-I) just trusted me and let me run and I can’t think of 
anything I wanted to do where he said no. He just let me go. 
It was an odd relationship. Very odd. Very odd, like very little 
feedback. Not adversarial. 
I mean Dale (CEO-I) was an operations guy from his training. 
He was never a development and numbers guy so a lot of what 
I did was sort of over his head a little bit. In hindsight he 
shouldn’t have got that job but they were so determined to have 
somebody from within, take on that role when Craig left that he 
kind of got it as by default. 
I am not sure, but I believe that after a while the board wanted 
him to leave, he did not like that, I believe. But he was 
courteous, he did not give me a hard time, he did not interfere. 
He took me to a quick meeting with the developers and 
introduced me, but that was it.  
Well managing people I knew was going to be tough but it’s 
tough. 
I belong to an organization called the Canadian Council of 
Chief Executives it’s about 120 people, CEOs of banks, oil 
companies, big manufacturers from across Canada, like the 
who is who. And I sat on a panel; we have about 3 to 4 
meetings a year. They always have one in January which they 
just had last week and they asked me for the first time to sit on 
a panel and there was four of us to talk about business 
conditions for the coming year. So I sat there with all these 
guys talking about business conditions. At first I was not, now I 
am confident enough and comfortable enough to be able to 
mingle, to be able to mingle with a crowd like that and feel 
good about it and project a certain image. And there are lots of 
people who freeze in those kinds of situations.  
He was a nice guy, he did not like firing people and we never 
had proper evaluations during his tenure. So I had to start that 
Due to the lack of 
interaction with the CEO-
I, there was no or little 
change in the CEO-D 
behaviour or mental 
model.  
Christopher was surprised 
how tough it was to 
manage people as the 
CEO. 
It took Christopher some 
time to feel comfortable 
meeting with other CEOs 
in the Canadian Council 
for CEOs. 
He had to evaluate the 
employees and let go of a 
significant number 
Had to refocus the strategy 
of the organization on 
different key areas. 
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CEO-D Act Learning Outcome 
when I got the job.  
Leonard Even the chairman of the board, after the appointment almost 
recused himself of naming me. I said: ‘that is not the way to do 
things but that is what he did’. He was very keen to designate 
me but after he did that, he had a lot of pressure from the other 
stakeholders. He felt like maybe it was a mistake but at the end, 
nobody regretted.  
Small stakeholders were strongly for me, they trusted me. Their 
general manager didn’t trust me. He always said: ‘oh, he (CEO-
D Leonard) has no business skill and all that. The other 
candidate was a lot better. So the first six months there was a 
struggle between the small stakeholders and the general 
manager.  
I was on my own for 6 to 12 months, I took the road and I met 
them (the stakeholders) one after the other and make meetings 
and create the dream and so I was on my own again. The other 
candidate hung on for a year, expecting me to fail. He left a 
couple of years later.  
I did not have the background of the stakeholders. But I went: 
‘here is the dream that we should do together so it worked that 
way so what was challenging is that the staff not very kind to 
me but after 1 year I knew I got them so internally I was very 
skillful and having a good team with me, going on never in 
fighting. For the last few years, I never got a fight inside. We 
were always loyal so that helped me a lot but the most 
challenging thing was to convince people that I could do the 
job.  
The CEO-I left as soon as 
CEO-D Leonard was 
appointed. There was 
basically no interaction 
with the CEO-I. 
Though, Leonard was an 
internal candidate, the lack 
of interaction with the 
CEO-I left him in the dark 
on many sides of the 
business. He had to do all 
the preparation during his 
first year as a CEO. Many 
people expected him to 
fail. 
Change in his behaviour or 
mental models started after 
getting the job.  Instead of 
being ready to go upon 
getting the job, he needed 
6 to 12 months to finish 
firefighting and start 
performing. 
 
The CEO-Ds (4/22) who enacted their environment mainly through “act” during 
the transition period experienced minimal cognitive, behavioural, and identity learning 
opportunities. Table 5.5 connects the minimal learning to the statements provided by 
CEO-Ds above. These CEO-Ds were unable to change their mental models and set of 
behaviours to prepare to become the CEO because they did not have the opportunity to 
interact with the CEO-I. They acted based on what they believed to be the best course of 
action for the organization. Most of their learning commenced when the board officially 
appointed them as CEO. They selected their leadership team and redefined the role of 
CEO according to their comfort level. They faced resistance from people who preferred 
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the previous leadership style so, in certain cases, they fired those employees. Their 
organizations were originally strong, faced the economic downturn in certain cases and a 
change in leadership so their company’s stock decreased after their appointment. 
However, after the CEOs learned about the organization and made changes based on their 
learning, the company’s stock price rebounded to a higher price than prior to their 
appointment. The next section presents cases where the CEO-D and CEO-I interacted and 
the learning outcomes from the transition period increased compared to the cases where 
CEO-D and CEO-I engaged in act alone. 
 
Table 5.5: Connecting learning from act to CEOs Statements 
 Minimal Learning Statements 
CEO-D Cognitive Behaviour Identity 
Bill      
Christopher      
Leonard     
 
5.5.2. Interact 
While act refers to the CEO-D taking action based on his/her own understanding 
of the CEO-I’s behaviour, interact refers to the CEO-D seeking clarification of the 
observed behaviour before taking action (Weick, 2012). Interact happens when the CEO-
Is and the CEO-Ds have different perspectives and where the CEO-D feels comfortable 
debating with the CEO-I. In these cases, CEO-Ds sought the CEO-Is’ input or challenged 
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the CEO-Is’ opinions to understand their behaviour and thought processes rather than to 
build shared mental models.  
CEO-D John had a good relationship with CEO-I David at the time he was 
announced the CEO-D. Previously John felt CEO-I David favoured him over the other 
candidate in the competition and was grooming him to become the next CEO. John 
believed the other candidate was in the competition merely to satisfy the board members 
and provide a choice. CEO-D John was one of the few people who would challenge CEO-
I David during a meeting. John felt comfortable having debates with David which made 
“interact” a possible way to enact his environment during transition. 
We (CEO-I and John) had a great relationship and if you have two people that are 
strong personalities the chances of them agreeing on everything are zero. Zero, 
right? Hopefully there is fairly strong alignment on a number of things because I 
think you need some level of alignment in order to work effectively as a team, and 
that’s important. Having said that, you need people to push you so I was the person 
more than anybody else that pushed David, and I would debate and challenge him - 
not many people like to do that.  
Feeling comfortable debating with a partner helps one to understand the mental 
models and reasons behind the other person’s actions. It also helps the CEO-D learn how 
to work with the partner throughout the transition period for an increased likelihood of a 
smooth transition. Understanding the differences in style and how the CEO-Is perceived a 
task helped the CEO-Ds adapt their behaviour in order to deal with the situation.  Note 
that this process did not affect the CEO-Ds’ cognitive maps. CEO-Ds’ change in 
behaviour would not hold after assuming the CEO position. This case is very similar to 
the “forced learning” category described by Inkpen and Crossan (1995) when the change 
in behaviour is not followed by a change in cognition making learning a short lived 
experience. CEO-D John described how he realized CEO-I David was concerned about 
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being accurate and correct in his communication with staff members at the company, 
whereas John was much more concerned about the information inside the e-mail rather 
than its aesthetics. CEO-D John acknowledged neither style was “good or bad”, but rather 
merely different. While CEO-D John did not want to change any of CEO-Is styles, he 
learned how to communicate John’s way given that the e-mails had his signature. John 
managed to keep a good relationship with CEO-I David and to seeking David’s advice on 
major issues including “fatal flaws”. 
We would have regular debates and we had different styles. I communicated 
differently, so when I first came in the role, he would re-write some of my messages 
and stuff that I would send to people, right, and then I said, well this is ridiculous, I 
don’t write that way - we just communicate differently, not good or bad, and then I’d 
tell him: ‘I’m sending out a note and he’d say where is it, and I’d say I’m not giving 
it to you because I’m not interested in you re-writing it. And trust me, it’s dealt with’ 
and drive on. So I adapted my – I figured out how to manage him. I wouldn’t give 
him a week in advance because if I did, he would re-read it, he’d re-write it, that’s 
who he was. He liked to do that. I go: ‘well that’s ridiculous, bad use of time and I 
don’t like it because my style is not your style, and my name’s on the bottom.’ I want 
it to be the John style of communicating and so then I learned, I said: ‘okay, how do I 
fix that?’ I started giving it to him the morning of, and he can tell me whether there 
are any fatal flaws but he would not have time to re-write it. So to me you just adapt 
to the people that you deal with. 
CEO-D John observed CEO-I David at work and discussed with him several 
important criteria for CEO success. The most relevant thing he learned from CEO-I David 
was to listen to people rather than forcing a solution. He learned how important it was to 
engage people in decision making rather than enforcing his decision. CEO-D John 
changed his cognitive schemas; he understood “the process of reaching the decision is as 
important as the decision”. He also changed his behaviour, he started doing a “lot more 
listening” and letting “the people getting us there” as compared to him making the 
decision. Though the decision might end up being the same, he believed the new process 
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resulted in increased engagement from most of the team players and an enhanced culture 
and environment inside the organization. 
I think my pre-disposition when I entered the executive team was I’ve got the answer, 
I know what it is, let’s do it, let’s drive on next versus let’s have a conversation 
around why you think that’s the right way to do it, etc., made me be even more 
probing on questions. So I do a lot more listening today than I did when I first came 
in - and that’s probably the biggest difference for me and we might end up in many 
cases in the same spot or similar spot, but it’s the people getting us there, the team 
getting us there, versus me making a quick decision and saying let’s go. And so it’s 
about understanding that the process of communicative decisions is actually 
sometimes as important as the decision because it can have a huge impact on the 
engagement of the people. And that was probably the style of communication; the 
way you interact with people has a huge impact on the culture of the organization... 
David (CEO-I) was good at this, and he gave me this advice, and I believe it was a 
good one. 
CEO-D John observed and interacted with CEO-I David on many occasions 
during the transition period. John and CEO-I David worked closely together before 
John’s appointment as CEO when John was one of the three top executives in the 
company. The executive team included David (the CEO-I), John (a senior executive at the 
time), and another senior executive (the candidate who was in the competition for the 
CEO role). 
CEO-D John thought the executive committee was too small and increasing the 
number of executives would add value to the company. However, he did not voice his 
opinion with CEO-I David until immediately before becoming the CEO. He appreciated 
CEO-I David’s opinion and asked for his perspective. Despite the fact that CEO-I David 
found the idea to be dangerous, CEO-D John implemented the change upon assuming the 
CEO role. John believed it was better than the current arrangement. CEO-D John believed 
CEO-I David was more comfortable with a smaller executive committee because he 
worried about handling increased diversity in decisions. John commented he considered 
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CEO-I David’s opinions when he thought they aligned with John’s mindset. This scenario 
highlights that CEO-D John analyzed CEO-I David’s opinions and decisions and judged 
them based on his own mental models. After John became the CEO, he increased the 
number of participants in the executive’s committee; however, two years into his role he 
was considering reducing this number. 
Right before I became CEO, like I told him, I said: ‘I’m going to change the structure 
and this is what I’m going to do’ and he said: ‘well I don’t really think that’s a very 
smart thing to do’. I said: ‘that’s good, you had your day’. And like I’m going to be 
the CEO, so I didn’t need his approval, I asked for his perspective because I 
respected his perspective, and if he’d brought other things to bear that I thought 
were important, I would have considered them. 
 Table 5.6 below provides examples of the interact style some CEO-Ds adopted 
during the transition period. 
 
Table 5.6: Examples of interact style during the transition period and the resulting 
learning outcome 
CEO-D INTERACT Learning Outcome 
Frank I effectively had three months of transition period. The first 
three months I used them to set up my department and appoint 
my successor.  
During these months I had to absorb a lot of information. It was 
helpful having Scott (CEO-I) as the CEO in charge. I had time 
to get to know my executive team, the members on my board of 
directors and their expectations. Scott remained in charge till the 
day he left. I would go to him ask for his advice and opinion 
about many issues regarding the executive team, government 
related issues and some of the restructuring I am thinking about 
doing. So the transition period was really important for me.  
Frank fairly interacted 
with CEO-I Scott during 
the transition period. 
He asked for advice and 
background information 
on many of the issues, 
but he made his own 
mind on his strategy 
going forward. 
Henry And so the way we sorted out differences in opinion, I mean he 
(CEO-I) is the boss so at the end of the day, I would raise my 
concerns. But he makes the decision.  
He (CEO-I) did not feel he needed to have everybody on board 
with this has to be his call to say that is okay, I am okay with 
that. And he would make his decision. But he was fine with me 
raising the issues which are what you expect your people to do. 
CEO-D Henry and CEO-
I Harold had a good 
relationship 
professionally. 
They had different 
perspectives on things, 
but Henry accepted the 
fact that Harold was the 
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CEO-D INTERACT Learning Outcome 
 
We do things differently. We look at the world differently but 
we are open enough with each other to agree that we do look at 
the world differently but there is a positive in having different 
viewpoints on the table. He was the boss. In my world as long 
as he is boss then he is the boss and that is, my job is to support 
him, make him look good and make sure that the company is 
successful and was not to fight with him. I don’t have any time 
for internal politics and all those kinds of things.  
Harold (CEO-I) was helpful because there wasn’t that many 
folks you go talk to about it. You are going to have your own 
ideas but you know, he would say what about this person, what 
about this person. You have managed this person for this long. 
Here is my view of them. A lot of times you would be 
consistent or he provides an insight. So I would say that was 
very useful in coming through to what you thought, probably 
more in terms of your assessment of your management team 
which is an important piece. You are getting his feedback.  
boss and he needed to 
support him. 
CEO-D Henry sought 
the incumbent’s CEO’s 
advice many times and 
he admitted the he 
provided him with 
insights on many things. 
But Henry had his own 
ideas about issues and he 
might adjust them based 
on the feedback he got. 
The change in Henry’s 
mental models was 
based on Henry’s 
judgement. 
Mike I do believe that if I would have been pushed off the dock (i.e. 
no transition period) and told to go swim, I think I would have 
reached out to the board and we have got some ex-CEOs on our 
board of directors. And I would have used resources to help get 
through those times of challenge.  
But as it turns out, I had the ability to be mentored (by the CEO-
I) into that role that was great. The thing I learned most from the 
(incumbent) CEO that left was just really around 
communication  and I think it probably goes back to a big part 
to my management style and it’s just about ensuring that you 
have credibility and that crosses the boundaries and whether it’s 
credibility with your employees, with your customers or the 
capital market. So your investors’ analysts, that whole capital 
market community. You need to be, not transparent, but you 
need to be clear and concise, believable and say what you do 
and do what you say. And, I think that transfers through all of 
the facets of your organization and the impacts that you have as 
a leader. 
CEO-D Mike felt 
fortunate to have had the 
opportunity to have 
CEO-I Doug around 
during the transition 
period. 
CEO-I Doug taught 
CEO-D Mike the most 
about communication; 
however, Mike believed 
it was his management 
style and the credibility 
he had with the staff 
members that helped him 
through the transition 
period. 
Rodney We (CEO-D Rodney and CEO-I Barry) had a great relationship 
all the way till when he left. His genius was in the operations 
side of the business. So I learned from him about that.  
CEO-I Barry still wanted to stay. I wanted to make it clear that 
we have a process and I wanted to recruit my successor and I 
wanted to get things going. So most companies would not do it 
this way but I thought in the circumstances, I thought it was best 
to get the cat out of the bag and make it public after the decision 
was made. No coming back, we are all clear.  
Once it’s public , then I can recruit the CFO and everybody 
understands why because it’s public. Otherwise, how do you do 
that and so that gave us (CEO-D Rodney and CEO-I Barry) a 
head start. Though Barry was reluctant, to get the CFO in place, 
CEO-D Rodney and 
CEO-I Barry worked 
together to put a CFO in 
place after the 
announcement. They 
worked together in 
planning the transition 
period. So CEO-I Barry 
was running the 
organization, while 
CEO-D Rodney went to 
understand the 
operations and worked 
with operators for that 
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gave us a head start to get the other guy (the other candidate) to 
decide whether he wanted to stay or not. He decided to leave.  
So already you are in motion. So new CFO, new Chief 
Marketing Officer which I made the decision shortly after I 
became CEO. I waited for Barry to leave to do the other 
changes I needed to do.  
period. 
Yet, Rodney did not 
share all his future 
strategies with CEO-I 
Barry. 
 
In summary, there are many common elements in the experience of CEO-Ds 
whose dominant style of responding to their environment during the transition period was 
“Interact”. They all had “good” relationships with the CEO-Is which created the 
opportunity to ask for clarification and challenge some of the CEO-Is’ behaviours and 
opinions. Most of these CEO-Ds respected the CEO-Is’ perspective on several things and 
learned from them.  These CEO-Ds also analysed the CEO-Is explanations using their 
own mental models and retained what they believed to be good and rejected what they 
deemed unsuitable for the organization or their own style and identity. Compared to 
CEO-Ds who were limited to act, CEO-Ds who had the opportunity to interact with CEO-
Is learned new behaviours and understood some key factors to prepare for the CEO 
position from the CEO-Is. However, CEO-Ds who interacted with the CEO-Is did not 
probe for background information on the current practices of the CEO-Is nor did they test 
their own plans and future visions with the CEO-Is. After assuming the CEO position, 
most CEO-Ds implemented many of the decisions they made during the transition period 
without involving the CEO-Is in their thought processes. 
 Table 5.7 connects learning from interact to the CEOs’ statements provided 
above. 
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Table 5.7: Connecting learning from interact to CEOs’ Statements 
 Learning From Interact Supporting Statements 
CEO-D Cognitive Behaviour Identity 
John      
Frank    
Henry      
Mike    
Rodney     
 
5.5.3. Double Interact 
According to Weick and his colleagues, among the different types of interaction, 
double interacts are the most likely to reduce equivocality while creating a shared 
understanding in a specific situation (Weick, 1995, 2012; Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
Similarly, I argue in the theoretical model that double interact helps CEO-Ds to create the 
mental models, behaviours, and skillsets necessary to become a CEO. In its simplest 
form, a theoretical double interact in a transition period is when the CEO-Ds observe a 
behaviour by the CEO-Is without the CEO-Ds understanding the reasoning for the action. 
If the CEO-Ds believe they would have acted differently, they would firstly ask the CEO-
Is for the reasons behind their behaviour.  The CEO-Ds would secondly also explain their 
thoughts (Argyris & Schön, 1992), regarding what the behaviour should have been. The 
resulting learning is not a new behaviour or a new theory (cognition) based on their 
existing mental models, which is the case in “interact”. The learning is a change in 
behaviour or cognition based on an analysis conducted by the mental models of the CEO-
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Ds and CEO-Is and resulting in the creation of shared mental models between the two 
CEOs. 
CEO-D Cheryl believed CEO-I Janet forced her to learn the set of skills needed to 
become the next CEO. CEO-I Janet involved CEO-D Cheryl in many aspects of her job, 
especially in the strategic planning for the organization. CEO-I Janet always raised the 
issue of CEO succession telling Cheryl explicitly that she wanted Cheryl to be the next 
CEO and she was convinced that Cheryl would be a good one. Though Cheryl was not 
eager to take the job, her interaction with CEO-I Janet helped her to more fully 
understand the job and the expectations of a CEO. 
The strategic plan was the big thing because that really was a year-long initiative. 
And every time we would have a discussion about succession planning or anything 
like that, she would always come back to it and I would always say actually Janet, 
don’t waste your time. She (CEO-I) really pulled me into some of these other things 
where I had – I was kind of forced to learn. She was really persistent.  
Though CEO-I Janet did not designate Cheryl as her CEO-D officially (since it 
was the board’s decision and not Janet’s), Janet treated Cheryl as the CEO-D and 
prepared Cheryl as her only successor from inside the organization. CEO-I Janet took 
Cheryl out of her comfort zone and involved her in many of the organizations’ activities. 
CEO-I Janet asked Cheryl to be involved in departments Cheryl had not worked with and 
on projects for which she was not normally/otherwise responsible. CEO-I Janet tried to 
expose Cheryl to the organization as a whole rather than merely providing more 
responsibility to CEO-D Cheryl in Cheryl’s own department and comfort zone. 
She looked for opportunities to engage me and force me to work outside of my 
department. She involved me in many of the major projects that our organization was 
doing.  
 
147 
 
As CEO-I Janet’s set retirement date neared, Janet created a new position in the 
company for Cheryl: the Chief Development Officer. CEO-I Janet required all senior VPs 
to report to Cheryl. This act extracted Cheryl from her collegial status with other senior 
management team members to become their boss, in preparation for her to be the boss. 
The position also helped CEO-D Cheryl gain a broader view of the organization, assist in 
long term strategic plans, and acquire a more complete sense of what the CEO role might 
be like, despite her resistance. 
I think Janet felt that it was very important to acknowledge it was a new title. I didn’t 
really. But because I then had Vice Presidents reporting into me, I needed to have a 
title other than Vice President … but I would say it helped me take on a more 
organizational scope so whereas I had always been a real advocate for my own 
department and for the work that we were doing, I felt like I was the voice of other 
stakeholders in the organization and I think when I had a broader mandate, I also 
took on more of an organizational scope and that was very much what Janet was 
pushing for. … She put me in charge of the strategic planning process. She said I 
want you to lead this process. I want you to help me build the vision and she was 
really pushing me to have organizational scope and at that point, she had spoken to 
me about succeeding her as CEO and I didn’t want to and I said you know, you could 
get someone else to lead the strategic plan. I am not really that hungry and I don’t 
want to be the next CEO so if this is an opportunity for you to build somebody else, 
feel free. But she was quite insistent and she felt it would be good for me and for the 
organization and so I did it. But that I think helped me see the organization 
differently. I really took on a broader scope and a keener interest in what was 
happening across the organization. 
CEO-D Cheryl’s resistance to being considered for the CEO position stemmed 
from her espoused theory on what the CEO’s identity standards and skill set should be. 
Her work with CEO-I Janet and her own understanding as to what made CEO-I Janet a 
successful CEO led her to believe that a CEO needs a specific set of skills to be 
successful such as a strong legal understanding and an outgoing personality to talk to 
other CEOs in the city. She discussed her beliefs with CEO-I Janet and they had several 
discussions about what leadership was. CEO-I Janet did not stop encouraging Cheryl, 
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“she kept on me about this”. Janet explained to her that being a CEO does not mean 
having to know and do everything. Janet also explained to Cheryl that the reason the 
organization grew and became successful was not because of CEO-I Janet alone, but 
because of Cheryl too. This type of conversation was not a one way conversation; both 
were willing to test their theories, whether espoused or in use. The results of these debates 
were shared mental models where CEO-D Cheryl understood what the CEO needed to be 
successful:  
And she just kept on me about this. Leadership is not about being able to do 
everything. Leadership is about being able to surround yourself with people who can 
help you get it done. I knew that from my own job. I mean, we have done a great job 
but I didn’t do it all; I had great people around me. And so I learned that nobody 
does it alone, that you have to have people around you who are good at the things 
you are not good at. So she really pushed me to accept that great CEOs cannot be 
good at everything.  
CEO-D Cheryl and CEO-I Janet have different leadership styles and did not agree 
on all issues: “there were times when we agreed to disagree”. However, the two debated 
most of the time. The most important factor in their debates was that they were honest 
with each other: “it is always better for me anyways to know where I stand”. They would 
say what they thought and why they thought as such. The process through which they 
reached the decision was as important for them as was the final decision. They double 
interacted through most of their relationship and more so after CEO-I Janet decided to 
name CEO-D Cheryl for the CEO position. CEO-D Cheryl acknowledged this style of 
interaction was challenging but it helped each of them feel comfortable to raise their 
concerns and explain their theories during the transition time.  
We don’t have the same leadership style at all and even that was in conflict 
sometimes and so I would say to her: ‘I appreciate that. That is who you are, that is 
not who I am and you would have to trust that my way will work’ and she would say 
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the same things: ‘I know you don’t agree with this but this is how I want to do it’. So 
there were times when we convinced each other and there were times when we 
agreed to disagree. But we were, I would say 98% of the time, we were very 
forthright and honest with each other. So there was no kind of issues or unspoken 
things. And that is sometimes really hard. I find it hard now with some of my 
colleagues but it’s always better for me anyways to know exactly where I stand.  
Closer to the handover date, CEO-D Cheryl prepared herself more intensely to 
take over from CEO-I Janet. Cheryl had many sessions with CEO-I Janet to discuss issues 
related to who should be on her team, who should do the hiring and firing during the 
transition period and why, as well as how she should establish herself as the new leader of 
the organization. This was in an intensive learning period for Cheryl where she said:  “I 
called it my period of immersion”. Double interacting with CEO-I Janet helped Cheryl 
build her standards, behaviours, and skill set necessary for her to “sort of be in place” as 
the CEO from day one. 
There were three changes at the executive level that I felt needed to be made and that 
was going to be a very difficult thing. She knew that they needed to be made and we 
talked about whether should she make them before she leaves or should she leave 
that to me. I really would have loved it if she made them before she left but she felt it 
was an important mark of a new leader to make those decisions yourself and to make 
the hires yourself. But we talked a lot over the summer about what would my new 
team look like, how would I manage that process…. what did I need to do to sort of 
be in place. She also really encouraged me to get out and to talk to everybody in the 
city, like all the leaders like city leaders, municipal, provincial, corporate leaders, all 
the important people across our city and so I started setting up, I called it my period 
of immersion and I just immersed myself in all of the CEO issues .... It was a very big 
learning curve for me… 
  Table 5.8 below provides examples of the double interact style some CEO-Ds 
adopted during the transition period. 
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 Table 5.8: Examples of double interact style during the transition period and the 
resulting learning outcome 
CEO-D DOUBLE INTERACT Learning Outcome 
Carl One of the things I didn’t agree with is there was a great deal of 
cost cutting in order to make the quarter or to make the year and 
I thought it was short-sighted. I thought we had a much more 
competitive environment right now and it was not the time to 
back off. It was time to push forward even if we had to tell the 
board, look, we are going to have to invest over these years. 
This is not the time to back away. I would talk to her (CEO-I 
Kathy) about it and say you know, look, I really think we need 
to invest more here. She would explain: ‘you know look, it’s 
important to make this quarter. We don’t want to signal to the 
market that we are in some sort of decline because of the 
competition’. So we didn’t want to deal from a standpoint of 
weakness and if people were to see that our income was trailing 
off, that you know maybe they would have that perception. I 
think that was her mindset to a great degree which I understood. 
I tried to put myself in her shoes. I didn’t agree with it but I 
certainly understood that she was looking at it from a different 
lens than I was.  
She was pretty good, especially near the end, I think 
understanding that I would potentially take her position, I think 
she let me go a little bit more, we would debate decisions, but 
she let me sort of, if you really feel that is the right way to go 
about it, then go ahead and do that.  
So it was overall good relationship. You have your fights but at 
the end of the day, everything turns out okay. So I think it was 
short but good.  
CEO-D Carl and CEO-I 
Kathy would debate 
many strategic decisions 
related to the 
organization. Though, in 
respect to increasing the 
investment at the 
expense of reporting 
lower income, CEO-D 
Carl did not agree with 
the mindset CEO-I 
Kathy was adopting, but 
he was able to 
understand her position 
and reasoning as the 
CEO. 
Closer to the handover 
date, CEO-I Kathy 
would discuss things 
with CEO-D Carl, but 
would also let him have 
the opportunity to test 
his ideas/theories under 
her leadership. 
Charles One of the strengths that I think about that is, if there is a lot of 
opposition we usually didn’t do it. Again, this is where I know 
the importance of CEO’s, but this is where also if a CEO thinks, 
he doesn’t have a good relation with his successor, or he is 
taking too much of one person’s advice, or he is only taking his 
own advice, I think that’s when big corporations get themselves 
into trouble. So again, now, obviously if you fight all the time 
with your designate CEO, if Richard (CEO-I) and I were in 
constant battle, and I am not talking about intellectual battles 
where you can go a little further, I mean, you know, we always 
got to point out the weaknesses of our ideas and then up them to 
strengths at anything you do.  
But I would say that we were more on side than our side and the 
few times we were off, you know, you deal with it. There was 
one or two times where we really disagreed, so I walked around 
the block, cooled myself off and I came back. You (referring to 
the CEO-I) can have debates with your reports and then he can 
be very strong-willed, as they can. But it’s never personal.  
So we debate rigorously but then we think about it a little bit. 
And that’s why we met daily. So when we have a fight, Richard 
and I, but first of all let me make it clear that we agreed much 
CEO-D Charles makes 
the distinction between 
battles and being 
continuously in 
disagreement. 
Double interacting with 
the CEO-I does not 
necessarily mean being 
in constant battle or 
always agreeing. It 
means having the 
opportunity to discuss 
your opinion and being 
open to expose 
weaknesses and then “up 
them to strengths”. 
It is more about the 
learning that happens 
during the process of 
debating than about the 
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more than we disagreed. When we disagreed there were a few 
times he said, I don’t care, this is the way we are doing it 
because he’s got the broader picture. And there were one or two 
bigger decisions that most of them involved customers, so this 
is where he said: ‘we should do this deal’ and I think: ‘you are 
crazy’, or I wanted to do the deal, alright. I remember there was 
a very large project and that I said: ‘we shouldn’t do the deal’. 
And then he got very upset because he thought very much that 
he should do the deal and we knew all the people involved after 
a big debate we did the deal, and I am glad in retrospect that we 
did.  
decision itself.  
Robert I've learned very specific things. He (CEO-I) is quite different 
from me. He's a guy who is very comfortable in the grey zone, 
not from a governance point of view but more from the fact that 
the world is not black and white. There are lots of nuances to 
what you hear, what you read, what you interpret, what the 
market tells you and so on. James (CEO-I) was very good at 
deciphering the direction of the grey. So, very thoughtful. I 
raised the issue with him after a meeting with government 
officials, his behaviour seemed so compassionate and I could 
not understand why, so I asked him. He was very generous, in 
that he was willing to discuss why he acted the way he did. I 
was not used to being in grey areas and he taught how to think 
and to be better at managing those situations.  
I recall all the debates we had on strategy on what target we 
should go after and so on. And how multi-dimensional his 
thought process would be in the discussion and debate which we 
would have together, and learned a lot from that.  
The other thing that he was really good at which I've learned 
from is that he had this incredible empathy. In other words, 
putting himself in other people's shoes and thinking about 
situations and negotiations and so on from the other people's 
perspective. These were two real big strengths that I learned 
from James. I've seen that in negotiations. I've seen that in 
negotiations with the government where you would think, "Why 
would we bother with what they want?" Well, here's why and 
here's how they might feel and here's the way to-- so, empathy 
was a big strength. 
And, he was a very good strategist, thinking two or three moves 
ahead.  
CEO-D Robert believed 
he was fortunate to learn 
from CEO-I James. The 
attitude of James was 
also helpful. James was 
willing to discuss his 
behaviours and thought 
processes which helped 
CEO-D Robert learn 
how to be comfortable in 
grey zones and how to 
think of other 
stakeholders from their 
perspective. 
Stanley Jim (CEO-I) and I went and visited all major investors across 
Canada. It’s not a big number by the way but we did an investor 
relations tour and hit any significant institutional shareholders. 
 
There was time for us to figure out the transition plan. There 
was time for digestion of the fact that I was the designate CEO. 
We had time to debate what our understandings of what the 
CEO job was. This was really helpful.  
I had the opportunity, during the transition period, to talk to the 
CEO-D Stanley had not 
thought about what it 
was like once he 
becomes CEO. However, 
the transition period 
gave him time to build 
his mental models and 
take actions that he 
debated several times 
with CEO-I Jim to be 
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executive team, the senior management team and to formulate a 
plan for leading the team and going forward. So it gave me time 
to evolve my strategy with Jim (CEO-I) because I hadn’t 
thought of the strategy of being CEO.  
CEO ready. 
Wayne I have spent time debating with founder and CEO-I Dan, we 
worked and still do as partners. I think over time, Dan and I, we 
have built a very deep trust in each other and we also built a 
personal friendship and a relationship. We keep very connected 
probably three four days a week, we have breakfast together. I 
have learned from him a lot about being a CEO. I was 
fascinated how differently a CEO founder thinks from a CEO. 
 
Founders have a real, not only a sense of ownership, they have 
ownership. So they are not playing with anybody else’s money 
so therefore, your decisions are very value oriented. People 
always say how you get along so well with the founder because 
lot of times that is difficult, but I keep saying it’s very simple, 
the founder is focused on value. So if you are a person who is 
not focused on value, for sure you are going to have a problem. 
But I am focused on value so I have no problem. The only 
discussions Dan and I have, if we have a difference - and we 
don’t have many - it’s not about creating value. It’s what the 
best way is. So those are very good discussions because no 
matter which way you go, it’s designed to create value. So my 
relationship obviously strengthened throughout that period and I 
think he got a clear sense of my ability to deliver results.  
I don’t care about my office what it looks like or where it is. 
This goes back to what I say, you see, I have learned through 
my close relationship with Dan that the shareholders don’t care 
about that. This is why you get in situations where people take 
on all the trappings of it but when analysts call, they never ask 
me about any of that stuff, they ask did you deliver.  
CEO-D Wayne is the 
only one amongst the 
interviewed CEO-Ds 
who did not have to go 
through a competition or 
was overtly told he 
would be the next CEO. 
He was the only 
executive asked if he 
wanted to be the next 
CEO, few months before 
he took the job. 
CEO-D Wayne was able 
to create shared mental 
models with founder and 
CEO-I Dan. He was able 
to understand business 
from an entrepreneurial 
perspective where value 
creation is the purpose 
rather than big egos or 
office spaces. 
CEO-D Wayne had to 
change his previous 
mental models about 
what the CEO role was 
about given that he had 
already been a CEO at a 
subsidiary before he 
joined the company. 
 
In brief, there were many common elements to the experiences of CEO-Ds who 
had the opportunity to double interact with the CEO-Is. Most of the CEO-Ds had a 
different leadership style from the CEO-Is, but this did not prevent double interacting. 
CEO-Ds were able to communicate openly with CEO-Is, discuss issues with them and 
test their understanding of the situations throughout the transition period. The most 
common point the CEO-Ds stressed during the interviews was their debates consistently 
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focused on the best interest of the organization rather than style or preferences. CEO-Ds 
valued the learning gained during the debates more than the decision reached. The 
debates allowed the CEO-Ds to create shared mental models with the CEO-Is. This 
enabled the CEO-Ds to learn and build the necessary skill set to be operational 
immediately after their appointment as CEO. The CEO-Is also helped to make this period 
a productive one, maybe because they accepted the idea they would leave the job soon. 
Table 5.9 connects learning from double interact to the CEOs’ statements provided above. 
 
 Table 5.9: Connecting learning from double interact to CEOs’ Statements 
 Learning From Double Interact Supporting Statements 
CEO-D Cognitive Behaviour Identity 
Cheryl                
Carl       
Charles       
Robert         
Stanley      
Wayne       
 
When reading the summary tables above (Table 5.5, Table 5.7, and Table 5.9), it 
is important not to misinterpret identity as having resulted in little change. Previous 
sections covered statements reflecting change in identity. However, it is important to note 
the increase in change mental models (cognitive) and behaviour from act, to interact, to 
double interact. These tables also provide support for the argument CEO-Ds who double 
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interacted with CEO-Is were able to achieve more cognitive complexity during the 
transition period than other CEO-Ds. 
5.5.4. Double Interact turning into Act 
Based on data from the fieldwork, I presented in the previous sections the 
differences in the learning outcomes amongst the three categories of enactment types: (1) 
act, (2) interact, and (3) double interact. I conducted the comparison based on the specific 
experience of interviewed CEOs. Each CEO’s idiosyncrasies might have contributed to 
the difference in learning outcomes during the transition period along with the type of 
enactment. A particularly interesting case (1/22) arose in the research where the 
relationship between the CEO-D and the CEO-I started as a double interact and evolved 
into act. Though it was one case, it provided insight into the two types of enactment and 
their impact on learning outcomes on one individual. 
Double interact during the transition period requires both the CEO-D and the 
CEO-I to be willing and able to work together. If one of them does not commit the time, 
physical and emotional environment for this interaction, double interact fails (Baker et al., 
2002). The experience of CEO-D Allen revealed a case starting with a double interact at 
the time CEO-I Curtis informed Allen he was the successor.  The relationship turned into 
act as the transition date neared. CEO-I Curtis selected CEO-D Allen as his successor 
even though the board was considering three of Curtis’ inner circle as candidates for the 
CEO role.  
When I joined the company, I had the ambition to become the CEO. But at the time, 
the incumbent CEO had his own executive committee and I always felt an outsider to 
that group. When discussions about CEO succession started in the company, I was 
considered with three other executives, who were close friends to Curtis (CEO-I) as 
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candidates for the CEO position. After that, Curtis told me that I was the heir 
apparent, and the chairman spoke to me soon after that just to make it formal. My 
understanding and I believe everybody else’s understanding was that the transition 
will happen within two years. 
When Curtis appointed CEO-D Allen as COO, CEO-I Curtis introduced Allen to 
the shareholders and to the important industry members, sending a signal the company 
was transitioning. Allen and Curtis started working together on important projects 
affecting the future of the organization as well as drafting the future strategy for the 
organization. CEO-D Allen discussed with CEO-I Curtis major issues and Allen had a 
solid understanding of the industry. CEO-D Allen particularly benefited from CEO-I 
Curtis’ experience leading a small company on the verge of bankruptcy and turning it into 
a 20 to 30 billion dollar company. 
Since I was appointed the COO, Curtis (CEO-I) introduced me to the shareholders. 
… There were one or two very big industry committees where the two of us would go 
so it was a relatively clear signal to the industry that there was a transition in place. 
That happened like three or four years before the final handover. I already had all of 
the contacts by the time we got to the final transition. So all of the industry contacts, 
all of the political contacts, and that had been with CEO-I Curtis’s help. 
Two years into what CEO-D Allen thought was a sufficient transition period, he 
and CEO-I Curtis engineered a major acquisition. The acquisition was successful and the 
company grew. CEO-D Allen noticed CEO-I Curtis became reluctant about leaving and 
started avoiding any open discussion with him regarding the timeline for the transition. 
The board communicated to CEO-D Allen that since the company had recently undergone 
a major acquisition maybe it was for the best interest of the organization to let CEO-I 
Curtis stay  2 to 3 years longer until the organization fully integrated the acquired 
company. CEO-D Allen accepted even though he played a major role in the acquisition 
and did not believe CEO-I Curtis’s stay was necessary. He noticed thereafter his 
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relationship with CEO-I Curtis changed. Every time CEO-D Allen attempted a structural 
change within the organization, CEO-I Curtis would oppose. The board of directors 
supported CEO-I Curtis, as if “they were indebted to him”, Allen noted. 
Three years after the acquisition, when discussion began regarding how the 
transition would occur at the next AGM, CEO-D Allen became eager to start preparing to 
be operational as soon as he became CEO.  Allen’s attempts were thwarted because CEO-
I Curtis blocked most of his proposals for change. The board gave CEO-D Allen more 
power and appointed him president nine months prior to the next AGM, the time for the 
handover. When the board appointed CEO-D Allen as the President, CEO-I Curtis 
stopped talking to him completely. So CEO-D Allen was forced to act alone and get his 
team together in preparation for being the CEO.  
CEO-D Allen, as the president, went on to prepare the company the way he 
believed was in the stakeholders’ best interest. He co-ordinated his executive team, and 
set his own vision for the organization. However, on the other side of the organization, 
CEO-I Curtis was closing long term strategic deals.  The board approved the deals. CEO-
D Allen did not have a significant say about the deals although they included long term 
commitments of the corporate resources.  He later ended up spending significant time and 
money to end those deals when he became CEO. 
I think the management of that process was bad, primarily because of the way it was 
managed by the board, only the board can take responsibility for that in the end. The 
CEO (CEO-I) tried to set the strategy for the next ten years just before he left. So he 
put out a ten year plan within a year of leaving. He did a large joint venture with 
another corporation. And the board approved it. I didn’t have much of a say because 
of the way we worked, the CEO was the only guy who had the real say. The future 
team was largely disregarded.  When I got the job, the first thing I had to do was to 
say “I think we need a different strategy”. 
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To summarize, the case of CEO-D Allen presented support that enactment type 
affected the learning outcomes even within the experience of the same person and not just 
amongst experiences of different people. During the double interact era of his transition 
period, CEO-D Allen worked closely with CEO-I Curtis and learned a lot about the 
CEO’s job. Allen was able to connect with major shareholders and industry members and 
was involved in building the strategy of the organization. This period of CEO-D Allen’s 
experience had a lot of common elements with the experience of CEO-Ds who double 
interacted with their CEO-Is including the creation of shared mental models, the 
participation in shaping and executing the strategy of the organization. However, for 
reasons related to power and self-interest, CEO-I Curtis did not want to let go when the 
time came to hand over the reins of the organization: “he did not want to become a sitting 
duck and he did not want to lose some of his pension”. Cannella and Shen (2001) also 
found that in high performing organizations, the more powerful the CEO, in this case 
Curtis, the less likely the successor would ascend to the CEO role. Despite the learning 
during the previous period, CEO-D Allen suffered from lack of knowledge during the 
period closer to appointment as CEO because CEO-I Curtis did not want to interact with 
him. The board and CEO-I Curtis excluded Allen from major decisions committing the 
organization’s resources for ten years, nine of which would have been under Allen’s 
tenure as CEO. As a result, CEO Allen spent money to end some of those commitments 
and to drive the organization in a new direction. The later period of CEO-D Allen’s 
shared many common elements with the experience of CEO-Ds whose enactment mode 
of interaction was limited to act with their CEO-Is. Those elements included adversarial 
relationships, inability to proceed with desired changes, and seclusion from the 
participation in the organization’s strategy. 
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5.6. Premise Five: Sense-ible Strategic Change 
P5a: CEO-Ds who double interact, unlike CEO-Ds who act/interact, with CEO-Is, 
have more opportunity to build mental models with both preserving and prospecting 
abilities enabling them to take plausible action upon assuming the CEO position. 
P5b: CEO-Ds who act/interact, unlike CEO-Ds who double interact, with CEO-Is, 
feel less committed to the ongoing strategy of the organization and are more likely to 
build prospecting abilities and to take action to change the status quo of the 
organization upon assuming the CEO position. 
In the last part of the theoretical model, I argued two competing premises. The 
first proposed that CEO-Ds who double interact with the CEO-Is are more capable of 
taking plausible action to change the status quo of the organization than CEO-Ds who 
act/interact with CEO-Is. The second proposed that CEO-Ds who act/interact with CEO-
Is are more capable to take action to change the status-quo of the organization than their 
counterparts who double interact with CEO-Is. Though competing, both premises 
challenge the grounds on which the CEO succession literature built arguments to explain 
heirs’ apparent ability to induce strategic change (Shen & Cannella, 2002). The prevailing 
literature focuses on two aspects. First, it focuses on the similarities between the mental 
models of heirs apparent and incumbent CEOs (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). Second, it 
argues the CEO-I’s socialization of the CEO-D leads to the CEO-D’s psychological and 
emotional commitment to the ongoing status-quo of the organization (Fondas & 
Wiersema, 1997). Both aspects result in assuming CEO-Ds’ cognitive capture from CEO-
Is. The fieldwork conducted during this research provided reasons to question these 
beliefs. CEO-Ds who double interacted with CEO-Is were actually involved in strategic 
orientation of the organization before they officially assumed the CEO role.  Also, CEO-
Ds who acted/interacted with CEO-Is built no/partial shared mental models with the 
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CEO-Is and in cases where CEO-Ds acted with CEO-Is they were not socialized by CEO-
Is. 
As insiders to the organization, CEO-Ds knew the strengths and weaknesses of the 
organization.  Engaging in double interact with the CEO-I allowed CEO-Ds to become 
more aware of the opportunities and threats facing the organization. When CEO-Ds 
engaged in double interact with CEO-Is, they built new mental models different from 
their espoused theories.  The new mental models were also different from the CEO-Is’ 
beliefs (Weick, 1979).  The CEO-Ds new mental models facilitated actions and 
behaviours different from those of the CEO-Is. CEO-D Philip for example, appreciated 
the debates he had with the CEO-I Ralph because they helped him appreciate the different 
types of growth strategies an organization may adopt and when to use each. He changed 
his mental models from focusing on organic growth to appreciating that M&As also 
provide potential for organizational growth. 
As I started to get closer and closer to this chair I needed to understand why the 
company is the way it is. It’s come from Ralph (CEO-I) and he has taught me how he 
thinks about the future, how he thinks about the strategy, execution of the company, 
how he built the company. That has helped me quite a bit…  I remember once Ralph 
says to me: ‘if I give you a billion dollars Philip, what would you do with The 
Company? So I give you a billion dollars, what would you do with the money for the 
company?’ And I remember sitting there (pointing to where I was sitting) and Ralph 
is a mergers and acquisitions and he has built this company and he has done big 
deals and I knew that and so I said: ‘I would reinvest it in our base business. I would 
improve our assets. I would make sure we can run more streamline’ and he looked at 
me and said: ‘nobody has ever told me that. Everybody has always said to me buy 
this or buy that’ and I said: ‘I know and that is one way to have a healthy company is 
to grow by M&A but the other way to a healthy company is to invest’ and so we have 
these philosophical discussions, right? You can then understand the advantages and 
disadvantages of the strategies he used versus the ones you think are better (CEO-D 
Philip) 
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I argued that CEO-Ds who double interact with CEO-Is develop “preserving and 
prospecting abilities” enabling them to take plausible action that might lead to 
organizational renewal (Hurst et al., 1989), preserving the core and experimenting with 
change, rather than mere strategic change. Under the competing premise, I argued CEO-
Ds who act/interact with the CEO-Is miss the opportunity to build shared mental models 
with CEO-Is and also miss the conversational environment giving them background 
information enabling them to build preserving abilities. Hence, I argued CEO-Ds who 
acted/interacted with CEO-Is were more likely to build prospecting abilities enabling 
them to take action and possibly change the status-quo of the organization. The aim of 
this research was to show the ability of CEO-Ds to change the status-quo of the 
organization rather than whether the change was good or bad.  
Data from the fieldwork provided indications to support both competing premises 
based on the enactment style of the CEO-Ds. This may be due to a limitation in my 
sample, namely the survival bias. The survival bias in this case is that I only interviewed 
CEO-Ds who successfully became CEOs and are still in the CEO role. However, my data 
provided reasons to doubt the premises used in the CEO succession literature to argue for 
the limited ability of heirs apparent to induce strategic change compared to other 
successors types. What is interesting nevertheless is that although all participants 
provided examples of action leading to strategic change, there was a difference in the 
timeline during which the change was implemented between the CEO-Ds who engaged in 
double interact with CEO-Is and those who were limited to interact and/or act. CEO-D 
Carl realized his lengthy experience within the organization, more than 20 years, might 
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lead to strategic myopia. Carl also knew that he needed to continue implementing 
necessary change while keeping the core of the business alive in order to survive. 
I do recognize that there is certain DNA that exists within me because I have been 
here so long. So I challenge myself all the time to think outside of that box. So you 
know the potential always exists for me to fall into that trap. But I am aware about it 
enough I think to understand if that starts to happen I need to be looking for new and 
different ways to do things without upsetting the core essence of what we have here. I 
want to add to it and I don’t want to blow it up but I do recognize we have always 
changed and will have to continue to change. 
All but one of the 22 CEOs I interviewed replaced successful predecessors. 
Journalist Arthur who covered many succession stories, reflecting upon my sampling 
frame, said: “you are looking at transitions where the current CEOs have succeeded 
larger than life personalities”.  Appendix H provides a sample of how some of the CEOs 
described their predecessors. Business newspapers have given the CEO-Is powerful 
aliases, unfortunately, I am not in any position to list these because this would reveal the 
identity of my respondents. This factor is important because as new CEOs they were 
cognizant that they were being watched closely by all stakeholders. The new CEOs could 
not and did not want to rock a boat that had been working well. They were aware they 
needed to use their “preserving abilities”, either because they believed they needed to 
defend the core as is or because they wanted the change to be slow and not to shake the 
trust of stakeholders in the company. Yet the new CEOs knew they needed to change the 
organization’s course of action. In most cases the new CEOs needed to change their 
leadership team.  Sometimes the new CEO needed to change the organization’s structure 
and in other cases they needed to change the direction of the organization. 
CEO-D Bill believed he won the competition against the other two candidates 
because his presentation to the board focused on a story about continuity rather than 
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change. He believed since the company was doing well, he should not suggest major 
changes which might shake the confidence of the board. He thought the board believed 
that if the company was really doing well there was no need to change strategy and 
direction; there were no justifications to take unnecessary risks.  
I asked the other two candidates: ‘can I see your presentations?’. Jeff said no, that 
was the other one. Stanis said sure. It was a remarkable presentation. But it was a 
little bit too much. I think both of them were really talking about changing the 
company and my point was: ‘that is the last thing we want to do’. So I think again 
that was one of the things that attracted the board to me, I was safe. My plan and 
strategy was don’t rock the boat. We are doing really well. Let’s continue the path. 
Whereas Stanis had a vision and Jeff had a vision and I think that may have hurt 
them as well. In this case you don’t want a vision. 
The main difference between CEO-Ds who acted/interacted with the CEO-I 
versus those who double interacted with the CEO-I was when rather than whether a 
change took place or not. CEO-Ds who double interacted with the CEO-Is implemented 
changes prior to the transition day relating to executive team members and strategic 
orientations with the CEO-Is extending through their tenure. The CEO-Ds engaged in 
debates with the CEO-Is and sought their advice. The CEO-Ds trusted the CEO-Is’ 
opinions and did not fear the CEO-Is would force their strategies. The CEO-Ds also 
discussed the execution of these changes with the CEO-Is such as who should execute the 
change: the CEO-I or the CEO-D? Together, they evaluated the benefits and risks of 
different courses of action and made decisions accordingly. Table 5.10 shows a sample of 
reports from current CEOs who engaged in double interact during their transition period 
to provide a description about the strategic changes they put in place and the time line for 
these changes. 
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Table 5.10: Reports of strategic change implemented by CEO-Ds who engaged in 
double interact 
CEO-D Strategic Change Timeline 
Carl You understand that maybe the strategies are bought into to the extent that 
they should be. And you have your own opinions as well. Like I said I 
didn’t always agree with Kathy (the CEO-I). I had different opinions on 
doing things so it’s different than if I was a clone of Kathy and I agreed 
with everything Kathy did and Kathy is the only way to go about and I 
think you may fall into that trap. But I don’t think that is the case here. I 
think we really, I am really looking at everything I have learned and I have 
talked to Kathy about how we see change and what areas should be 
exploited that we haven’t exploited. What are the sacred sorts of cows that 
we need to just say: ‘look we need to challenge this now?’ So I feel fairly 
well equipped to take that on and I also understand the ripple effect of 
making certain decisions on the entire organization and on the business so 
you won’t be able to know for some time whether or not I am successful at 
that so sitting here right now, I feel very confident about it but we have a 
bit of a rough patch to get through here at the company and we need to be 
prepared to come out at the other end stronger than we were when we had 
the rough patch. There is a lot of work between now and then and I think 
the people here who wanted some change I think are happy and optimistic 
about me being in this role. I have certainly heard a lot of that from a lot of 
people so… 
Especially near the end, I think understanding that I would potentially take 
her position, I think she let me go a little bit more, we would debate 
decisions, but she let me sort of, if you really feel that is the right way to 
go about it, then go ahead and do that. 
Upon 
Designation 
Charles We all have different management styles, my predecessor had one, I have 
one, and my successor will too. I have selected my own management team 
after I took over, my successor will select his own team, it’s a consistency 
and it changes our progress is evolutionary, not revolutionary. And that’s 
sort of what we mean, keep the culture. Change, but change and do it the 
right way.  
Upon 
Designation 
Cheryl There were three changes at the executive level that I felt needed to be 
made and that was going to be a very difficult thing. She (the CEO-I) 
knew that they needed to be made and we talked about, should she make 
them before she leaves or should she leave that to me. I really would have 
loved it if she made them before she left but I think she felt it was an 
important mark of a new leader to make those decisions yourself and to 
make the hires yourself. But we talked a lot over the summer about what 
would my new team looks like, how would I manage that process. I mean 
there were two people that were going to be immediately gone. There was 
a third person who I really wanted to give a chance to work with 
differently. In the end that person also left. 
Upon 
Designation 
Margaret I said you know, we went through a phase about 10 years ago where we 
needed more collaboration between the people in the company the silo 
things and so we started to hire people and adopt things that we would find 
collaboration in everything at one point I would say wow time out, we are 
like kittens without nails anymore, so we don’t challenge ourselves enough 
Upon 
Designation 
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CEO-D Strategic Change Timeline 
so we went back and because challenge is extremely important both from 
the individual perspective and the company’s perspective and to me it’s, I 
was raised like that and my father had an old book when he was young and 
now he is 84 and he still have the same old book and it’s called the art of 
contrary thinking just to make sure that everybody doesn’t go into the deep 
hole. But it was always done in a lot of respect and yeah, we challenged 
one another. I discussed this with Russell (the CEO-I) and I started the 
change in culture before I even took over the job and it is still going on. 
Philip Ralph (the CEO-I) and I would have hours of closed sessions discussing 
the future of the organization. How would it go? Well we each have a list 
of things that we wanted to talk about and we would just sit here or we 
would go off site at a quiet restaurant and just talk for hours about every 
topic under the sun, organization structure, strategy, key staff, high 
potentials, what the culture of the company is like, what the industry is 
doing, what do we think the market is going to look like 12 months from 
now, it ran the gamut of every topic under the sun. 
He was briefing me on, like I said on his direct reports now who were my 
peers. He was briefing me on the board dynamics and helping me 
understand all the players on the board and all their views on the company 
and of course strategy.  
We talked an awful lot about how they (industry players) are, can you trust 
them, what happened in the history with the companies, what they are 
looking for, what we should be looking for. It was complete download on 
all the industry players. 
By the time I got the job, I had chosen most of my team members and 
drafted the future organization strategy with input from Ralph.  
Few weeks 
after 
designation 
but long 
before 
assuming the 
role 
 
CEO-Ds who mainly acted and/or interacted with the CEO-Is made changes after 
their appointment as CEO. In most cases I heard the sentence “I would not change the ex-
CEO’s company until he or she had left”. They all felt the pressure to show continuity 
given the previous success of the company under the ex-CEO. The new CEOs were 
mindful about the optics of the change: making change appears seamless and a 
continuation of the ex-CEO’s success to avoid losing stakeholder confidence.  The 
stakeholders the new CEOs considered included the board members, the shareholders, 
and the staff and senior management teams. 
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Table 5.11 shows a sample of reports from CEO-Ds who engaged in act and/or 
interact with the CEO-Is during their transition period to provide examples about the 
strategic changes they put in place and the time line for these changes. 
 
Table 5.11: Reports of strategic change implemented by CEO-Ds who engaged in 
act/interact 
CEO-D Strategic Change Timeline 
Bill So the ex-COO was there. He was really Jeffrey’s guy and so I had to tell 
him to retire. He agreed. 
In the first year as a CEO, we laid off 1100 people of the company. So we 
didn’t, I didn’t want to make any drastic changes because what had 
happened to the company wasn’t as a result of succession, it was because 
of the economy. 
So if you go to our investors and talk to them about the company, the one 
fact they loved is there was no change in the company. So when Bill took 
over, no things just stayed the same, the company sounded the same. It’s 
been a gradual evolution. Basically I think on the outside, the world 
probably felt it was smooth, it was perfect, it was no real change but 
internally there is a whole bunch of moving parts going on and internally 
there were some major changes. Internally it was a major shift in our 
personality of leadership but externally they didn’t need to know that. 
Public does not need to see that and never did because that is a bit of a 
scare. Any time in a public company you give them the feeling that things 
are changing especially when you are doing well. There is panic. If they 
are going to change, that means they could not do as well next year as this 
year so then your share is going down. So I guess the success, you never 
measure success by share value but as I said, we went down to $18 in 2010 
and we are now at $65. It’s been an amazing year in that respect and I 
think the investment community is looking at it and feeling very 
comfortable about where we are and what we are doing so that is what 
makes the job harder now, it’s managing those expectations. 
Forced 
changes 
during the 
first year due 
to economic 
conditions 
 
 
 
Major changes 
started 2 years 
after assuming 
the role 
Bob I don’t think I really started making any footprints for a couple or three 
months till I got confident even though you are doing a lot of the job, there 
is still a few things that you just have to make sure that you are confident 
that they were right, so I think the first three to four months, it’s more or 
less of a feeling out and a confirmation that that is exactly how everything 
is laid out in the periods of three to six months starts slowly but surely 
putting out your thoughts and looking for some perhaps slightly different 
results. Garner the confidence of your board of directors, a confirmation 
that they have made the right choice. I think in our case which was pretty 
much status quo and the company was established and not having any real 
problems, when you are having the negative hurdles that you had to 
overcome in a short period of time I think then you would be having to 
make more rapid changes then perhaps I would have made, we were quite 
successful and we changed the company in the last five years to a big 
Nothing for 
the first four 
months 
 
 
 
After four 
months started 
strategizing 
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CEO-D Strategic Change Timeline 
degree but we did it slowly. 
I think everybody in the organization knew it was coming a long time 
before that and I had de facto fairly firm hand on it anyways. So the first 
month and a half were, as I said was really a nothing. We didn’t do a 
whole lot of anything different than what we had done. It was the period 
after that where we kind of strategize about what we might want to do and 
so on, so forth. You know, say you took over a company that was dodging 
in and out of bankruptcy type of issues would be a much more different 
situation but that isn’t the case, not our case at all. So it was really, to be 
frank the first two or three months, just evaluating the people that work 
directly for you to confirm that they are right people and so on, so forth 
and move forward.  
 
 
Changes 
started a year 
or so later 
Christopher Because by September (two months after taking over) I had an idea of 
what I wanted to do. Then I involved the other Executive Vice Presidents 
and we spent from September to January planning how we were going to 
do some of these things.  
When you come from the outside, I think you even more so try and shake 
things up for the sake of shaking things up and sometimes for the wrong 
reasons so that is always a risk. 
Except when I looked around the company, there were lots of people in 
roles they should not have been there and some of them in senior roles. So 
we had to let people go over time and I am guessing we let, we certainly 
let over a 150 go, not in one shot, like 1 here, 2 there, selective and it was 
thoughtful and it was done quietly. But one by one, we kept letting, and 
many of them, like I just fired my head of HR, the last big one, I did last 
May. I fired a head of HR who reported directly to me and she had been 
here 31 years and never worked anywhere else. Started as a secretary, now 
was the head of our HR. How did that happen, I don’t know but we had a 
lot of stories like that. We had another one who started as a secretary and 
then got into leasing, who ended up running a whole portfolio with no 
clue. 
Nothing for 2 
months 
 
Started 
planning to 
change 
months after. 
 
Implementing 
change very 
slowly at first, 
picking up the 
pace after 2 
years  
Douglas … that big personality of the entrepreneurial guy that took the business 
one place isn’t necessarily what is going to sustain the business for the 
long term … That maybe one of the reasons why after 10, 11, 12, 14 years, 
it’s time for somebody else to come in with a new point of view from a 
different area, take a look at the business, make an assessment and solve 
some of those things that you just don’t see because you have been there 
for 14 years. 
When I came in, the biggest change I think I made was in the overall 
direction of the organization. And that then had repercussions throughout 
because I took a very different point of view. I said this is our Parent’s 
business, this is the business they deployed globally so what we need to do 
is duplicate their processes and align our offer with their global offer to 
become completely seamless as much as we can. We will do it our parents’ 
way because this is a global business. So that sort of big strategic change 
has repercussions down the line. All sorts of repercussions come from it. 
All sorts of alignment issues and the way you manage the place and how 
you manage it, what you are willing to let go and move over to your 
parent’s changes. But I could not do it immediately, I had to plan it slowly, 
don’t forget Terrence (the ex-CEO) was successful, very much a great guy 
Nothing for 
the first year. 
 
 
Planning a 
presentation 
for change to 
the board for 
one year 
 
 
Implementing 
started 2 to 3 
years later 
 
167 
 
CEO-D Strategic Change Timeline 
and just a wonderful man. And people just willingly would follow him 
anywhere, I would, you know great going personality. So I had to make 
sure not to shake the company completely. 
Henry 
What I spent most of my time thinking about because I am not going to 
change Harold’s (CEO-I) organization till Harold was gone. Think about 
understanding what we have and how I would change it. So you have the 
key things sorted day one. Who would I put into some jobs because once 
executives take themselves out of the organization, then you got to backfill 
that job, who the rest of the management team are, what’s their tenure. 
They do want to retire with the CEO if they have been loyal to the CEO 
and have just been waiting for him to retire.  
Thinking 
started during 
the transition 
period, but 
implementing 
did not start 
till at least one 
year after 
assuming the 
role of CEO 
John You know I waited until he was then gone and then we had as an example 
a people first strategy, and I said no, gone, don’t agree with that, and it’s 
not that I don’t believe in people by the way, but our people first strategy 
was making our people had got to me, me, me, me culture. So I was on it, 
we developed a new vision and I took it out to all the senior executives and 
I got input from everybody around it, etc, etc. And then out to our people, 
and I started with laser focus on the market, and that was my kind of, 
that’s my, if you talk to people they’d say yeah, laser focus on the market 
that’s John, and employer of choice okay. But not people first because if I 
don’t have clients, I don’t need any people in this organisation. And so 
people are really important that we attract, develop, retain but you know 
what, we’re in business and we need customers, so for me that was a 
dramatic shift in the culture of the organisation was needed. So that was 
one of the big changes I’d made because David (ex-CEO) had brought in, 
not good or bad, just different, he brought in people first, and I didn’t think 
it was right to put it up on a pedestal. 
Thinking 
started during 
the transition 
period, but 
implementing 
did not start 
till at least one 
year after 
assuming the 
role of CEO 
Lee 
If there was anything like that (a disagreement with CEO-I), I’d just avoid 
dealing with until I was there. I wasn’t going to make any decisions that 
would “in a way embarrass or put in a position”. I learned very quickly 
through that process that I wanted to restructure the management team. I 
learned through the process that I wanted to make some changes of people 
but I wasn’t going to do those until after I was in the seat.  
Thinking 
started during 
the transition 
period, but 
implementing 
did not start 
till at least one 
year after 
assuming the 
role of CEO 
 
Comparisons amongst the experiences of CEO-Ds who double interacted with 
CEO-Is versus those who acted/interacted with CEO-Is provided indications for strategic 
change actions with differences in timeline. The special case of CEO-D Allen provided 
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support for similar findings within the experience of the same person. During the double 
interact era with CEO-I Curtis, CEO-D Allen co-authored and co-implemented many 
strategies of the organization. Should CEO-I Curtis have left as originally planned, CEO-
D Allen would have started his major changes during the transition and continued them 
after assuming the role of CEO. The change in enactment style from double interact 
enabling CEO-D Allen to start the changes he needed before assuming the job, to act 
prevented CEO-D Allen from implementing any of his planned changes. CEO-I Curtis 
opposed anything Allen wanted to do before assuming the job. 
CEO-D Allen induced major strategic change in the organization’s direction by 
halting some of the big strategic decisions made prior to his ascension to the job. He took 
the company in a different direction. He supported his decisions in a subtle way, the 
industry analysts portrayed his move in the business newspapers as the most appropriate 
strategic move for the success of the organization3. 
  In summary, I argued for two competing propositions in premise five of the 
theoretical model. The first being CEO-Ds who double interact with the CEO-I are more 
likely to build preserving and prospecting abilities, hence more cognitive complexity, 
than their counterparts who only act/interact with CEO-Is. The CEO-Ds with double 
interact exposure thus are more capable of taking actions leading to organizational 
renewal than the others. The second proposition was CEO-Ds who are limited to 
act/interact with CEO-Is may miss the opportunity to create shared mental models with 
these CEO-Is.  These CEO-Ds are therefore more likely to acquire prospecting abilities 
enabling them to take action that may change the status-quo of the organization.  My 
3 To keep my respondent’s identity confidential I am not able to quote directly from the newspapers. 
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fieldwork did not provide difference with respect to the cognitive complexity or abilities 
CEO-Ds build during the transition period. However, CEO-Ds who double interacted 
with CEO-Is built the preserving abilities faster as they had the help of the CEO-Is, while 
CEO-Ds who acted/interacted had to spend time after assuming the job building these 
abilities. Being able to build prospecting and preserving abilities during the transition 
period enabled CEO-Ds who double interacted with CEO-Is to start implementing 
changes faster than CEO-Ds who acted/interacted with CEO-Is as represented in Figure 
5.2 below. This figure shows CEO-Ds who double interacted with CEO-Is start thinking 
about and implementing change in the organization during the period from designation to 
assuming the CEO role. They had the support of the CEO-Is who pushed their thinking 
further and helped start the implementation. On the other hand, CEO-Ds who were 
limited to act/interact with CEO-Is started thinking about and implementing change in 
their organization after assuming the role in most cases. Only in very few cases these 
CEO-Ds started thinking about change in the transition period but decided to implement 
the change after the departure of the CEO-Is. 
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The fieldwork provided ground to doubt the premise on which the CEO 
succession literature built its argument to compare the heirs apparent ability to induce 
strategic change, at least for successful companies. The fieldwork provided indications 
that CEO-Ds built mental models which differ from CEO-Is, either evolved/shared mental 
models in case of double interact or distinct models in case of act/interact. The research 
also shows CEO-Ds are not necessarily socialized to their social context by CEO-Is; this 
is mainly in cases of act. These CEO-Ds took action to change the strategic direction of 
the organization; they were mindful they were taking the helm of successful 
 
CEO Designated 
- 12 to 1 months Time 0 + 2 - 7 months + 1 year + 2 years 
T I Change 
T I Change 
T I Change 
T I Change 
 CEO-Ds who acted/interacted 
 CEO-Ds who double interacted 
Figure 5.2: Timeline Difference 
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organizations. They knew they needed to implement changes but remained mindful of the 
impact of advertising major changes in the media on the perception of the markets on 
their organization financial performance. The sample in this research did not include 
external CEOs or CEO-Ds, and hence I could not compare the strategic change that 
internal CEO-Ds implemented to the change external CEOs and CEO-Ds implement. 
I believe the data showed enough examples to motivate re-conceptualizing or 
reconsidering the operationalization of the strategic change construct. The researchers 
mostly operationalize strategic change as change in diversification or power in the 
organization 1 to 3 years following the succession event. However, data from the 
fieldwork showed this operationalization may not be accurate to measure change induced 
by CEO-Ds. CEO-Ds who double interacted with CEO-Is started the change a few 
months before assuming the CEO role. CEO-Ds who acted or interacted with CEO-Is 
introduced the change smoothly and gradually as they were mindful of the negative 
impact of radical strategic change on the organization external evaluation. Revisiting the 
conceptualization and operationalization of the strategic change construct might provide a 
more complete understanding of the difference between the ability of external versus 
internal CEOs to induce change. I also believe the ability to induce strategic change 
between CEO-Ds selected from inside and those selected from outside should be 
conducted with some caution. Successors recruited from outside, and sometimes through 
public horse races, have the mandate to change the course of the organization (Helfat & 
Bailey, 2005). Outside and public horse race successors feel the need to advertise the 
changes they make. In doing so, these executives attempt to convince the board members 
they made the right choice selecting them. Successors recruited from inside have to be 
 
172 
 
mindful of the impact of publicly announcing their suggested changes on the 
organizational performance. 
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
6.1. Overview 
The initial aim of this research was to answer the following research question: 
“How the designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their learning and 
prepares them to become CEOs”. The purpose was to examine an assumption 
dominating the CEO succession literature about the learning heirs apparent obtain from 
hypothetically working closely with the CEO-I during the transition period (Bigley & 
Wiersema, 2002; Cannella & Shen, 2001; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004, 2006). I focused 
on uncovering the impact of the executives’ designation as CEO-Ds on two 
characteristics – identity and social context – which might affect their learning during the 
transition period. In addition, I explored how CEO-Ds managed their relationship with the 
CEO-Is and enacted their new environment affected their learning and sensemaking 
during the transition. 
This research explored the impact of the designation as the CEO-D on executives’ 
learning during the transition period using the two theoretical lenses of sensemaking and 
learning. Sensemaking explained the impact of identity, social context, and different types 
of enactment on learning. Learning explained how the CEO-Ds created the standards for 
their changed identity and transitioned from the identity of an executive/CEO-D to the 
identity of CEO. These processes combined explained the learning of CEO-Ds during the 
transition period, a phenomenon situated at the heart of CEO succession literature. In 
doing so, I contributed to a call by Inkpen and Crossan (1995) to explore the learning 
process itself rather than merely the relationship between the input and output variables of 
learning. 
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To study the research question of this thesis, I used a phenomenological approach 
to understand the learning experience of executives who went through the transition 
period. Using interviews as my main data collection tool (Creswell, 2013; Giorgi, 2009; 
Moustakas, 1994) supported by secondary data, I collected a rich data set allowing me to 
provide insights into the learning experience of CEO-Ds during the transition period. I 
mostly interviewed CEOs who experienced the designation as the CEO-D to understand 
their learning experience. I also interviewed outgoing CEOs in the process of passing the 
baton to the incoming one; CEO-Ds in the process of receiving the baton, ex-CEOs, 
senior executives, board members and chairs of boards in order to have a more complete 
understanding of the phenomenon. I also interviewed one consultant who is involved in 
CEO succession phases with the companies and a journalist who has reported on CEO 
successions’ news in a major newspaper in Canada. These interviews provided me with 
independent analysts’ perspectives on CEO succession in organizations. In doing so, I 
contributed to a call by Giambatista et al. (2005) asking researchers to use qualitative 
research to help in explaining some of the conjectures derived in the CEO succession 
literature dominated by the quantitative type of research. 
This research provided four main findings. First, while trying to establish the 
impact of the heir apparent designation on the executives’ learning, I discovered the 
prevailing understanding of relay succession and the associated heir apparent definition 
may not hold true in the situations I studied. The appointment of executives as COOs was 
not enough to signal their designation as heirs apparent. The explicit designation was 
what triggered the new identity for the executives and enabled them to start preparing 
themselves for the next step more than the implicit designation. 
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Second, I found the impact of the social change remained a major surprise to 
CEO-Ds despite their anticipation of the change. Some executives read several practice 
oriented publications discussing the change in the social context for the executive 
between being a senior executive and becoming THE CEO; however, they felt the change 
was more intense. Their designation changed how their peers, stakeholders external to the 
organization and the board of directors treated them. The power their opinions and 
behaviours acquired alerted most of the CEO-Ds to think before they spoke, to posture a 
special attitude, and/or to behave according to certain expectations in a social gathering. 
Third, relay succession research assumed the longer the heir apparent period, the 
longer the incoming and outgoing CEOs worked together, therefore the more likely they 
were to build similar cognitive maps (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). This research showed 
this was not necessarily the case. While some of the CEO-Ds had the opportunity to work 
more closely with the CEO-Is, others did not have this opportunity for multiple reasons. 
In all of these cases, the CEO-Ds seemed to have developed complex cognitive schemas 
different from their previous ones and those of the CEO-Is. This research showed, 
irrespective of their enactment styles, all CEO-Ds were able to build preserving and 
prospecting abilities. The major difference in their learning was the time line. CEO-Ds 
who double interacted with CEO-Is during the transition period learned and acted faster, 
while those who acted/interacted with CEO-Is took more time.  
Four, previous research on heirs apparent based on quantitative databases 
proclaims heirs apparent are the least likely among their counterparts to induce strategic 
change once attaining the CEO position (Shen & Cannella, 2002). This research showed 
there might be an alternative explanation to the premises used to build the argument for 
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this hypothesis. When boards of directors selected CEOs from within, the new CEOs may 
have avoided advertising the changes they made to the media to prevent negative impact 
on their organization’s stock price, or they might have postponed the change for a while 
after the succession. 
6.2. The Impact of the “CEO-D” Identity on Learning 
Identity affects the way people interpret their circumstances and changes their 
cognitive maps and behaviours (Burke & Stets, 2009; Jarvis, 2010; Mezirow, 2012). I 
found the designation of executives as CEO-D triggered the creation of a new identity and 
pushed them to understand cues in their environment from a different perspective. 
However, since the designation itself was of importance in this research, first, I discuss 
below the process of designation as I uncovered it during the fieldwork. Second, I explain 
the impact of this designation on the executives’ learning during the transition period. 
The prevailing definition of an heir apparent in the CEO succession literature is 
based on Vancil (1987)‘s description of an heir apparent. Vancil described the heir 
apparent as an officer in the organization designated as the sole successor to the CEO 
position a few years before the transition event. I found that in most of the organizations I 
studied, the designation of the executive as the CEO-D occurred a few months before the 
actual transition event. I also discovered that this designation happened, in most cases, 
after a non-publicized competition for the role of CEO. Some of the candidates were 
known to the organization internally and some were kept confidential. Some of the 
candidates were already COOs when they participated in the competition and others ran 
against the COOs – who ultimately lost the competition. In one of the cases I 
encountered, the CEO told me that he was covertly told by the CEO-I several years ahead 
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of time that he was her choice for the job and that she would groom him to be ready when 
the time comes. Two years before the transition, this CEO-D found out the board of 
directors would like to have options in choosing the next CEO. He also had to compete 
against another candidate for two years before he was selected the CEO-D eight weeks 
prior to the actual transition. 
While the literature’s definition of the heir apparent might have been relevant in 
the past, I found that this definition needs to be revisited to reflect current practices. I 
believe the increased board of directors’ activism in the CEO succession process in the 
recent years might have led to spanning the boundaries between the two types of inside 
succession: horse race versus relay succession. The chair of a board told me the board 
members prefer to take some measures to avoid being limited to choose the candidate 
nominated by the CEO-I. While the board values the CEO’s input, they prefer to have 
more than one candidate and they insist on being involved in the selection process. They 
consider the opinion of the CEO-I regarding the candidates, but they also hire an external 
organization to carry out the assessment of the potential candidates. Boards prefer not to 
involve the CEO-I in the final decision regarding the announcement of the successor. 
While the recent board activism regarding CEO succession might have blurred 
boundaries between relay succession and horse race, there is also the possibility previous 
research was biased by defining the heir apparent as the COO and/or president of the 
organization. As good/practical a proxy as that might be, this research provided 
reasonable doubt to question the established practice.  It is important to note that this 
research sample size was small compared to previous quantitative studies. Four of the 
interviewed CEOs were COOs of their companies before they participated in the 
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competition for the job, and three competed against the COOs of their companies. While 
some COOs won the competition and some lost, their previous appointment as COOs did 
not automatically make them heirs apparent. Seven of the other CEOs were given the title 
of COO or president, or equivalent title given the nature of their organization, after the 
designation and hence were COOs for a few months only. Quantitative databases that 
were not updated continuously might have picked up some of these designations and 
overlooked others. The remaining CEOs never held the title of COO and/or president. 
Though this finding was not the driver of this research, it definitely shortened the 
executives’ learning timeline from designation to ascension to the job. 
The designation of the executive as the CEO-D triggered many immediate 
changes in the cognition and behaviour of the executive. I found the executives had 
mixed feelings upon discovering they were chosen to be CEO-D. A common reaction 
was: “it is over – a relief the competition had ended” and “oh my god, I am the CEO-D – 
the realization their life would change from that moment on”. The designation changed 
the way they looked at the organization. They were no longer focused on their own 
department; they found themselves focusing on the organization as a whole. Most of them 
found themselves suddenly having to learn significantly about the organization. CEO-D 
Frank expressed this overwhelming period in terms of the amount of knowledge to learn 
with vivid description: 
In fact, you spend your six months of transition getting to know the rest of the 
organization that you don’t know. You spend so much time thinking, watching, 
observing, and then there is this groundswell of information that comes bubbling up 
from the organization to tell you what’s wrong with it, what’s right about it, much of 
it self-serving, some of it genuine. So you are just absorbing terabits of data every 
week through the transition period about what’s right, what’s wrong, what’s 
happening, what you should think about. You don’t take out Porter’s strategic 
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formula and the SWOT analysis, and sit down and somehow orchestrate all this in 
your own little head. 
In addition to the immediate change in cognition and behaviour, the designation 
triggered the need to think about their future identity. It forced them to think about who 
they would be as leaders and how they would behave. Would or could they have the same 
leadership style as the CEO-I? Would or could they treat their “now subordinates” the 
way the CEO-I did? They had to find ways to resolve these questions. Most of the CEOs 
went through a self/soul searching journey to know who they were and what would be 
their future identity. They also used a sounding board to help them discover their future 
CEO identity. The sounding board, in few cases was the CEO-I, in others was a family 
member who was or had been a CEO, a board member, or an outside consultant. 
6.3. The Impact of the Change in Social Context on Learning 
The designation of the executives as the CEO-D changed their social context. For 
most of the participants, the actors in their social contexts remained the same, however, 
the other actors’ expectations and perceptions of the designated executives changed. The 
nature of the relationship with the actors of their social context changed. Their peers 
became their subordinates, the board of directors – once their boss’s boss – became their 
boss, and the outside stakeholders – once distant acquaintances – became direct partners. 
The CEO-Ds believed their words and behaviours gained power upon designation 
and were interpreted to reflect the organization’s position rather than the executives’ own 
cognitive understanding, emotions, and personality. After their designations, the 
executives were mindful as to which emotions they showed, words they used, how they 
dressed, and how they treated their people. The transition period gave them the 
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opportunity to experience the change in the people’s perceptions and expectations. CEO-
Ds also tried to convince the board of directors that they chose the right candidate. CEO-
Ds met with the board members to understand their expectations. They acted confidently 
in order to gain the trust of their executive team. Some CEO-Ds kept their professional 
distance from their subordinates in order to be able to make tough decisions later. More 
than one executive mentioned that they were not at the organization to be loved or even 
liked; they were there to be respected. Most CEO-Ds remained mindful of their 
interaction with the outside partners because their promises were commitments for the 
organization. 
I found the designated executives appreciated the involvement of the CEO-Is in 
introducing the CEO-Ds to their new social context. CEO-Ds who were introduced to 
their environment by the CEO-Is appreciated the insight provided to them and saved them 
from many mistakes. These CEOs knew if they faced any problems they had the CEO-I to 
ask for help as noted by CEO-D Robert: 
When you think about your responsibilities and relationship with the investors, the 
board, managing rumors with your employees, improving client and broker 
experience, it was a pretty big challenge, in a part of, in a traumatic period, really, 
for financial institutions globally. But, I had the opportunity-- I jumped in the role 
with a lot of confidence because James (CEO-I) was the CEO and would become 
chairman of the board once I become CEO, so I knew if I needed help or advice I 
could rely on him. 
The lack of involvement of the CEO-Is had a negative impact on the designated 
CEOs. Though the executives I interviewed did not explicitly mention the impact of the 
lack of involvement on their learning during this period, they did express how it hurt 
them, it delayed their ability to assume their new identity and act accordingly. “Not in one 
of those meetings (meetings with the investors) did he introduce me as the CEO coming 
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in” Bill, CEO-D, said. Allen, CEO-D, said: “I don’t think I ever saw him say, “Here is 
Allen; my successor.” He never said that other than in front of the cameras and it was 
carefully scripted and quick”. Both these executives agreed that while the investors or the 
public knew they were the CEO-Ds and treated them accordingly, they would have 
appreciated the outgoing CEO introducing them as such. The introduction by the CEO-I 
of the CEO-D as the next leader of the organization would have helped the CEO-Ds start 
building the necessary status for their new identity. 
6.4. Types of Enactment and Learning Outcomes 
Bigley and Wiersema (2002) referenced managerial cognitive orientation 
literature to argue the longer executives had been designated as heirs apparent, the more 
likely they acquired the same cognitive orientation as the CEO-Is. In this way they used 
heir apparent tenure (independent variable) as the proxy for the similarity between the 
incoming and outgoing CEOs cognitive schemas. Bigley and Wiersema (2002) failed to 
account for the quality of interaction between the heir apparent and the CEO; they simply 
assumed the longer the interaction between the two executives the more similar their 
cognitive maps. Bigley and Wiersema (2002) also argued although heirs apparent had the 
opportunity to “learn the ropes” of the job from outgoing CEOs, the nature and the length 
of their work with incumbent CEOs may limit their abilities to develop their own 
mindsets. 
In the previous section, I discussed in detail how the length of heir apparent tenure 
changed and in most succession events was shorter than one year. The mean heir apparent 
tenure was 2.5 years in Bigley and Wiersema (2002)’s study and 4.5 years in Cannella 
and Shen (2001)’s study. Using their logic, and given shorter heir apparent tenures, one 
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can argue that the incoming and outgoing CEOs cognitive schemas are increasingly 
becoming less similar. Moreover, there is doubt around what more or less similar 
cognitive maps infer. If more similar cognitive maps mean the heir apparent and the CEO 
were on the same wave length and agreed on many decisions, this would also be in 
contradiction with my findings. This fieldwork showed the stronger the relationship 
between the CEO-D and the CEO-I, that is they worked together closely and well, the 
shorter and the smoother the transition period. Therefore, my findings dismissed the 
impact of the length of the heir apparent tenure on the “similarities” in the cognitive maps 
of the two CEOs and emphasised the importance of the quality of the interaction during 
the transition period. 
I developed three categories to classify the quality of interaction between the 
CEO-D and the CEO-I in fieldwork. At one extreme, I found the minimal amount of 
interaction which was represented in the findings as the “act” enactment mode. At the 
other extreme, I found the maximal amount of interaction which was described under 
“double interact” enactment mode. In between the minimal and maximal, there was the 
medium amount of interaction and this one was described under “interact” enactment 
mode. 
Act defined situations where the interaction between the CEO-D and the CEO-I 
was minimal or even adversarial. While hard to imagine this kind of relationship at such a 
senior level of the organization, five of the 22 transition cases fell under this category. In 
all of these cases, the CEO-Is were unwilling to leave, they did not want to give up the 
power, and purposely did not involve the CEO-Ds in any of the strategic meetings inside 
or outside the organization. This finding is partially in line with Cannella and Shen 
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(2001)’s finding that powerful CEOs of successful organization dislike supporting the 
ascension of the successor. Cannella and Shen (2001) argue CEOs entrenchment and 
refusal to relinquish power may force the heirs apparent out or at least frustrate them but 
they only include power in their operationalization of this construct. My findings showed 
that some powerful CEOs managed their emotions well with respect to giving up the 
power and were able to pass the baton as planned. However, powerful CEO-Is who 
refused to relinquish power created problems for their successors. The CEO-Ds in these 
cases had to act by themselves and took time to learn about the organization, assemble 
their teams, and attempted to diminish the power of the CEO-Is as much as possible 
during the transition period. Two of these executives unravelled some of the strategic 
commitments the ex-CEO undertook before transition. All three had to fire some 
executives who felt comfortable under previous leadership governance and could not 
operate within the new leadership regime. 
Double interact defines situations where the interaction between the CEO-D and 
the CEO-I was positive. Nine of the 22 cases fell under this category. In these cases, the 
CEO-Is were able to accept the passage of title to the CEO-Ds. In a few of these cases, 
the CEO-Is planned their retirement and informed the board a year or more before to give 
the board time to start the process. Under double interact, the CEO-Is played a major role 
in facilitating the transition to the CEO-Ds. They took time to meet with the CEO-Ds and 
discuss the handing over process. CEO-Is involved CEO-Ds in all the strategy 
formulation meetings, introduced them to their social context and let them take control. 
For example, the CEO-Is would briefly speak in town hall meetings, introduce the CEO-
Ds and then let the CEO-Ds handle the rest of the meeting. However, the CEO-Is would 
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not let this happen without preparation, so both CEOs would plan how to handle meetings 
whether town halls, with suppliers, government officials, the media, and so on so forth. 
CEO-Ds who benefited from this type of interaction during the transition period felt 
prepared to assume the job when the time came to take the reins of the organization. 
Interact defined situations where the interaction between the CEO-Is and the 
CEO-Ds was not adversarial but also lacked lengthy discussion sessions regarding the 
strategy or other responsibilities. Eight of the 22 cases fell under this category. Normally 
the CEO-Ds felt comfortable having a debate with the CEO-Is and challenging the CEO-
Is practices and strategies. In these cases, the CEO-Ds asked for advice from the CEO-Is 
on issues regarding the constitution of their executive teams, changing the communication 
channels with the employees, refocusing the strategy of the organization on different 
elements than the current ones. The CEO-Ds considered the CEO-Is advice in their 
decision making process but judged its value using their own mental models rather than 
seeking clarification. Once the CEO-Ds became CEOs, they implemented the changes 
they had planned rather than planting the seed for change during the transition much like 
the double interact. 
6.5. CEO-Ds and the Implementation of Strategic Change 
Previous research predominately concluded that heirs apparent are less likely than 
successors appointed from outside or following a public horse race to induce strategic 
change post succession. Many arguments supported this conclusion but they primarily 
relied upon the influence of the CEO-Is on the cognitive maps of the heirs apparent. 
Bigley and Wiersema (2002) argued heirs apparent built similar cognitive maps to the 
CEO-Is and hence were unable to induce change. Devries (1988) and Zajac and Westphal 
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(1996) argued CEO-Is chose successors who were similar to themselves and hence would 
carry out their vision. Charan (2005) and Fondas and Wiersema (1997) believed the 
intense socialization by the CEO-Is compromised the ability of heirs apparent to induce 
change. 
This research provided ground to challenge all three arguments. First, the heir 
apparent tenure might not be a good measure of the similarities in the cognitive maps 
between CEOs and CEO-Ds. The quality of interaction between these two might be a 
more reliable indicator of whether the CEO-Ds were able to create shared, rather than 
similar, mental models or not with the CEO-Is. Second, with the recent increase in board 
of directors’ activism in the CEO succession process, the CEO-Is ability to choose their 
own successors has diminished. CEO-Is are still able to nominate and provide their 
opinions about the potential candidates for the CEO position, but in most cases the 
decision was made by the board in “in-camera sessions” without the presence of the 
CEO-I. Third, similar to the argument related to the creation of shared mental models, the 
argument for intense socialization needs revision in light of the quality of interaction 
between the incumbent and CEO-Ds. Where act is the dominant form of behaviour in the 
relationship between the CEOs, the CEO-Is avoid willingly socializing the CEO-Ds. 
In addition to the doubts raised above, this research also showed some of the 
CEO-Ds, namely those who had the opportunity to double interact with the CEO-Is, were 
actively involved in setting the future strategic direction of the organization during the 
transition period. Therefore, it is worth revisiting how researchers operationalized the 
strategic change post succession based on large data sets. Were they actually measuring 
the change in strategy between the predecessor and the successor? Were they measuring 
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the continuity of the strategy as put on course by the successor during the transition 
period, especially in cases of double interact? Some CEO-Ds had less interaction with 
CEO-Is and implemented major change upon appointment as CEO. These CEO-Ds were 
very careful in framing these changes as a continuation of the existing “successful” 
strategic vision of the organization in order not to upset the market and negatively affect 
the company’s stock price. This leads to the question: would quantitative measures be 
able to account for this smoothly communicated strategic change?  
This research was conducted to address the research question around: “How the 
designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their learning and prepares them to 
become CEOs”. The findings of the research provided indications of the impact of 
identity and social context changes, triggered by the designation, on their learning. These 
changes combined with different enactment forms – act, interact, or double interact, 
explained the process and the outcome of learning for the designated executives during 
the transition period. I used a qualitative methodology to explore the research responding 
to a call from Giambatista et al. (2005) to use qualitative research in order to validate the 
conjectures of the CEO succession research heavily relying on quantitative studies.  This 
research showed this call was absolutely necessary as the results of this qualitative 
research provided reasonable ground to rethink some of the main assumptions made in 
previous CEO succession research. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
7.1. Summary of Contributions 
This work is situated within the CEO succession literature. It explored the 
learning CEO-Ds acquired during their transition period by combining the concepts of 
sensemaking and learning. This work described the process through which CEO-Ds made 
sense of their world upon designation and learned during the transition period to 
change/adjust their mental models, behaviours, and identities before assuming the role of 
CEO. I believe this research contributes to the existing CEO succession, sensemaking, 
and learning literatures in significant ways. 
7.1.1. Contributions to the CEO Succession Literature 
This research contributes to the CEO succession literature in two ways. First, the 
main contribution of this work is describing how the designation of executives actually 
affected their learning during the transition period. Most research on “heirs apparent” 
included some assumptions regarding the learning the CEO-D received from the CEO-Is 
during the transition period. The main assumption revolved around CEO-Ds capturing the 
cognitive schemas of CEO-Is. In developing the processes of the impact of designation on 
executives’ identity, social context and enactment types on their learning during the 
transition period, this research provided reasons to recheck many of the assumptions used 
in previous research. Previous research concluded the influence of CEO-Is on heirs 
apparent affected their learning outcome from the transition period without actually 
exploring this process. This research showed that instead of one general category of CEO-
Ds, the processes varied and consisted of three different categories.  The categories are 
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those who: (1) act, (2) interact, and (3) double interact. These interaction types affected 
the learning outcomes of executives during the transition period. This research thus 
provided an alternative explanation to the prevailing argument “heirs apparent” are less 
likely to induce change than other types of CEO successors. 
Second, this work introduced a relatively new methodology to the CEO 
succession research – namely, the phenomenological approach – to gain insight into the 
CEO succession transition period. The use of this method addressed a call by Giambatista 
et al. (2005) urging succession researchers to use qualitative research to clarify many of 
the conjectures in the prevailing literature. This method provided indications inviting the 
revisiting of the prevailing definitions and conceptualizations of heirs apparent, relay 
succession, and horse race succession in the literature. While existing definitions might 
reflect past practices, this research showed they are inaccurate descriptions of current 
ones. The research also provided reasonable ground to revisit the common practice of 
using the titles of COOs and presidents as proxies for the designation of executives as 
“heirs apparent”. 
7.1.2. Sensemaking Literature 
Sensemaking explains the humans’ thinking patterns as a social process 
influenced by one’s identities.  It does not explain how people change their identities. 
This research combined sensemaking and learning to provide an explanation as to how 
CEO-Ds adopt the CEO identity in a social context. Moreover, sensemaking had so far 
been extensively studied in contexts of crises – fire, plane crashes, and explosions – or 
extreme change – hiring a new leader for an organization.  This study contributed to our 
understanding of the sensemaking process in relatively more stable environments.  
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The sensemaking generic recipe: “how can I know what I think until I see what I 
say” (Weick, 2012, p. 135) suggests action precedes cognition (Smerek, 2011). This 
research showed this assumption is sometimes inaccurate at the level of CEO-Ds. CEO-
Ds took time during the transition period and went through a deep thinking and learning 
process to reflect on changes to their identity standards as the future CEO. They also tried 
to remain mindful of the impact of their status on the members of their social context and 
hence made an effort to think before they acted. 
7.1.3. Learning Literature 
This research contributed to the human learning perspective. Instead of 
concentrating only on the two most debated learning outcomes in the literature: change in 
behaviour and cognition, this work showed at the CEO-Ds level change also involves a 
change in being or identity. Findings of this research revealed the importance of learning 
from action as well as learning to perform an action. It provided insights on the learning 
process itself -- how different enactment types, in a social context, impact the expected 
learning outcome. So rather than merely discuss the learning outcomes for CEO-Ds 
during the transition period, this study explored the learning outcomes based on their 
enactment styles with the CEO-Is during the transition. Hence this work contributed to 
our understanding of the learning process, rather than the input-output relationships 
between variables. 
7.2. Practical Implications 
This work presents significant practical implications given the importance of CEO 
succession phenomenon in the life of organizations as an unavoidable event every 
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organization experiences (Grusky, 1960). There is a recent increase in stakeholders’ 
interest in understanding the CEO succession event. Shareholders more frequently ask 
organizations to publicly disclose their succession plans because they believe this affects 
corporate financial results. Banks are demanding organizations be more transparent about 
their succession plans. Boards of directors are becoming more involved in the succession 
process in order to ensure a smooth transition of CEO position.  
The major findings of this work are in describing the impact of designation on the 
executives’ identity and social change and resulting learning outcomes. It also shows the 
impact of different interaction types on the executives’ learning during the transition 
period. The act type of interaction between the CEO-Ds and the CEO-Is led to the lowest 
learning outcomes during the transition period. The double interact between CEO-Ds and 
CEO-Is on the other hand led to the best learning outcomes from the transition period and 
prepared the CEO-Ds to be ready to assume their job on the event day. This does not 
mean that CEO-Ds who act or interact with CEO-Is will fail, especially given the 
characteristics of this sample including only CEO-Ds who were successful in assuming 
the CEO role. Rather, it means CEO-Ds who double interact with CEO-Is may be able to 
assume the CEO responsibilities immediately and have less firefighting to do than CEO-
Ds who act/interact post CEO succession event. CEO-D Douglas described this 
relationship as follows: 
 One of the things if you are going to be CEO, you got to have a degree of self-
confidence. So you ask a question like that (how long do you need to be ready to take 
over?), I would tell you look, I would be fine on my own. I could have walked in here, 
he could have left six months beforehand and I would have figured it out. And, you 
have to have, if you are going to take these jobs, you have got to have that sense of 
self confidence. Like I could walk into any company anywhere at any time, within a 
very brief period of time, figure it out. Understand the economic dynamics, 
understand the environment it’s in, get the respect of the people and be able to drive 
 
191 
 
forward. So I don’t think there is any minimum required amount of time that you 
couldn’t go in, get rid of the existing CEO, plug in the new CEO and drive forward. 
However, if you are going to make it a true success, without firefighting like that, I 
think probably in the 9 months period of time. So the incoming CEO has the chance 
to come in, work with the outgoing CEO, see almost the full cycle of the year. After 9 
months you have been through enough of it, you can see through until the year end 
and that is probably enough time for anybody to get the lay of the land. Enough to 
understand what needs to change and what does not and pursue the changes for the 
next couple years that you think you should. 
It takes commitment from the two parties in a relationship, CEO-D and CEO-I, to 
engage in double interact. This research presents practical implications to assist the board 
of directors as the guardians of the process and the incoming and outgoing CEOs in 
improving the conditions leading to optimize the CEO-Ds’ learning outcomes during the 
transition period. 
7.2.1. Board of Directors 
Boards of directors are becoming increasingly involved in the CEO succession 
process. In 21 of the 22 CEO succession events I studied, the board of directors was the 
main guardian of the process. They were involved in nominating and evaluating the 
candidates. They sought help from CEO-Is and executive search firms. However, the 
CEOs noticed the board’s involvement decreased, and in certain cases even disappeared, 
after the announcement of the successor. One of the board members agreed: “I believe 
our role ends at the announcement of the successor. I do not think we should be involved 
in how the incumbent and incoming CEOs manage the transition. They are professionally 
mature and should be able to do that. However, I guess if there are problems, they can 
always come to the board.” 
According to the findings there are three factors impacting the learning outcomes 
of CEO-Ds during the transition period: (1) identity, (2) social context, and (3) type of 
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enactment. While the appointment of the CEO-Ds sets their learning journey in motion by 
evolving a new identity for them it does not guarantee the quality of the learning. The 
board’s involvement to establish the expectations from and monitor behaviours of both 
CEO-Ds and CEO-Is may improve the interaction between them, an important factor in 
achieving a smooth transition. 
The designation itself is important in activating the identity of the executive and 
kick starting the transition process; however, if the timeline for the passing of the baton is 
unclear, the learning may be affected. The two CEO-Ds who were privately told they 
were the heirs apparent a long time before the transition event lost confidence in the 
promise with the passage of time. CEO-Ds appreciated having a clear timeline for the 
transition. The board may need to be cognizant of the impact of lacking a clear timeline 
on the motivation of CEO-Ds. Both CEOs reported considering leaving should the board 
not act and specify a date for the transition. 
The quality of interaction between the CEO-Is and CEO-Ds was key in 
determining the learning outcomes during the transition period. Many CEO-Ds found 
informal discussions with CEO-Is as helpful if not more helpful than the formal ones. The 
board of directors might consider taking actions to increase and facilitate the informal 
interactions between the CEOs. Some CEO-Ds found being physically close to the CEO-
Is during the transition period, for example, helpful in asking for ad-hoc advice. 
The quality of interaction between the CEO-Is and CEO-Ds impacted the timing 
of undertaking strategic change affecting the performance of the organization. Double 
interact led to faster changes than act or interact. While the board of directors may  be 
unable to enforce one enactment type over the other, they may be able to start 
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implementing cultural values supporting double interact relationships as opposed to act or 
interact.  
The board of directors may need to be involved in monitoring the behaviours of 
the CEO-Ds and CEO-Is during the transition period, especially in cases where the CEO-
Is are unwilling to let go of the position. Previous research showed that in cases of well 
performing firms, CEO-Is might jeopardize the ascension of the successor to the top job 
(Cannella & Shen, 2001). This situation was obvious in the cases of CEO-D Bill and 
CEO-D Allen. Both of these executives had a difficult time during the transition period. 
However, CEO-D Bill had a board that supported and helped him minimize the influence 
of the CEO-I during and immediately after the transition. On the other hand CEO-D Allen 
was disappointed by how the board reacted to the behaviour of the CEO-I instead of 
supporting the CEO-D. The board felt indebted to the CEO-I and signed off on his 
strategy to commit organizational resources well into CEO-D Allen’s tenure without 
taking Allen’s opinion into consideration. As a result, Allen lost trust in the board’s 
ability to add value to the organization and replaced, after assuming the CEO position, 
many of the board members with others who were more likely to challenge the CEO-I. 
Given the importance of the impact of the changes in the social context on the 
CEO-D’s learning during the transition, the board may also consider increasing its 
involvement in monitoring the CEO-Is’ actions to introduce the CEO-Ds to their new 
social context. Many CEO-Ds mentioned the impact of the involvement of the CEO-Is in 
their introduction to their social environment on their learning process. Some CEO-Ds 
found it helpful to meet with other stakeholders jointly with the CEO-Is and learned from 
the way the CEO-Is handled the conversations. Other CEO-Ds preferred to face their 
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social context alone and establish their own footprint as leaders. In all cases, the 
involvement of the board in creating the expectations with respect to these issues may 
help the CEO-Ds prepare for their new position. 
Many of the participants mentioned the support provided by the board of directors 
to the candidates during the competition such as assigning coaches and mentors. Most of 
the CEO-Ds found mentors who had experience as CEOs or worked intensively with 
CEOs were very helpful whereas those who did not have such experience were less 
helpful. Some candidates had board members as mentors and found them to be helpful 
throughout the process. It might be worthwhile to discuss the identity of the mentor with 
the candidates before assigning someone. This suggestion stems from interviews with 
candidates who were designated. It might also be helpful to ask the candidates who were 
not designated about their experience with the mentors. Moreover, this psychological 
assistance ceased in most cases upon designation. Some CEO-Ds felt that these mentors 
or sounding boards might have remained helpful during the transition, especially in cases 
where the relationship with the CEO-I was not at its best. 
Some of the CEO-Is handled the passing of the “power” to the successor better 
than others. While this research was not directed at understanding this phenomenon, 
many outgoing CEOs as well as CEO-Ds mentioned it. Five of the interviewees 
appreciated the attitude of the CEO-Is at handing over their “power” and explicitly 
suggested to me to study this phenomenon. While other CEO-Ds suffered as a result of 
the CEO-Is’ attitude. CEO-Is reluctant to relinquish power delayed the learning of CEO-
Ds during the transition period.  These CEO-Is even impeded the CEO-Ds’ abilities to 
make changes or take actions to prepare for the job, such as selecting their executive 
 
195 
 
teams and setting budgets. It is natural for humans to fear losing their power (Allee, 1997; 
Devries, 1988; Goh, 2002). Some CEOs were cognizant of this fact, for example, CEO-I 
Howard said to help him manage these feelings of losing power he sought help from a 
professional consultant. The board of directors might want to consider providing 
assistance and recruiting professional consultants to CEO-Is to help them through the 
handing over of power, just as they recruit consultants for candidates to help them 
through the competition period. The board of directors may thereby help improve the 
transition process and enhance the learning of CEO-Ds during this period. 
7.2.2. CEOs: Designate and Incumbent 
This research provided insights into the outcomes of learning during the transition 
period given the type of interaction between designate and CEO-Is. CEO-Ds who double 
interacted with CEO-Is were the ones who learned the most during the transition period. 
They found the CEO-Is to be critical resources in helping them establish their identity as 
the future leaders. These CEO-Ds found that being open and willing to test your theories 
with the CEO-Is was particularly helpful given these CEO-Is had been through this 
experience and had valuable insights to share. Some of the CEO-Ds were very 
understanding of the feelings the CEO-Is might experience as they were losing power. It 
is important for the CEO-Ds to be mindful of these feelings and to address and 
understand the behaviours of CEO-Is from this perspective. 
Many CEO-Ds felt lonely in this transitional position. They could not discuss 
delicate matters inside the organization fearing that it might be interpreted negatively. 
However, most of the CEO-Ds found it helpful to have a mentor or a consultant or even a 
family member who had experience as a CEO who could serve as a sounding board and 
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critical analyst of their thinking process rather than as an enforcer of a decision or a 
course of action. 
Though this research was not directed toward outgoing CEOs it provided insights 
into their thought processes. Some outgoing CEOs were better at dealing with exiting the 
organization than others. Though all CEO-Is might have experienced a sense of loss upon 
passing the baton, those who had plans for post CEO life were better at dealing with their 
sense of loss. CEO-Ds believed that CEO-Is who became board members or had future 
plans accepted the transfer of their “power” to them more willingly than the CEO-Is who 
lacked plans. One of the CEOs had recruited help from a consultant to help him manage 
the process. 
7.3. Limitations and Future Research 
This study is limited due to the selection of the sample and choice of methods. 
First, my sample included CEO-Ds who were successful in reaching the CEO position. 
This design allowed me to understand how the designation of executives as the CEO-D 
affected their learning journey from designation to assuming the position. The fieldwork 
helped me observe CEO-Ds belonging to three categories of enactment type and it 
allowed me to understand the impact of different enactment types on the learning 
outcomes the CEO-Ds acquire during the transition period. However, this design did not 
allow me to explore the learning process of CEO-Ds who exited before getting the CEO 
position. Cannella and Shen (2001)’s sample based on archival databases showed that 
30% of heirs apparent exit before assuming the role of CEO. Though this number is 
calculated based on the outdated definition of an heir apparent, this phenomenon may still 
be substantial and deserves consideration.  Future research should investigate the learning 
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process of CEO-Ds who did not get the job in an attempt to compare learning processes 
of these the two groups (i.e. successful versus unsuccessful CEO-Ds). This remains an 
interesting area to study in future research and may provide insights into the CEO 
succession process. 
Second, my sample presents two limitations. The first limitation is, the 
participants, with the exception of one, were CEO-Ds who succeeded successful CEO-Is. 
This factor presented an additional layer of complexity to the transition period for the 
CEO-Ds. They felt the pressure to perform and knew many stakeholders were watching 
them. My sample was appropriate for the purpose of this study seeking to understand the 
learning between CEO-Ds and CEO-Is. This is because in other cases CEO-Is may have 
left the organization or double interact would have been avoided purposefully. Future 
research should investigate the learning process and especially the ability of CEO-Ds to 
induce change for those who succeeded CEOs who were less successful than the ones in 
my sample. This will provide a basis to compare different learning processes and have a 
clearer idea about their ability to induce strategic change. Also this sample does not allow 
me to comment on the impact of enactment type on learning and on the performance of 
the organization. The second limitation is, the initial sample was constructed with the 
objective to understand the learning process of CEO-Ds rather than the impact of 
enactment types on firm performance. I kept on interviewing until I was able to reach 
participants who experienced different enactment types with the CEO-Is. Nevertheless, 
the relationship between enactment and firm performance remains an interesting topic 
and future research may want to explore it. 
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Third, the use of the phenomenological approach allowed me to start with 
suggested premises, grounded in learning and sensemaking perspectives as presented by 
prior research unexplored. This particular framing might involve researcher bias in data 
analysis and results reporting. To mitigate this limitation, I followed two suggestions. 
Firstly, I adopted the bracketing process suggested by Moustakas (1994) and identified 
my own beliefs and presuppositions that might impact the research and informed the 
readers about their essence. Secondly, I followed Creswell’s (2013) recommendation and 
adopted a structured approach to phenomenology and the most widely used method in 
data analysis for this approach. The different iterations that the data analysis went through 
led me to challenge many of my assumptions and the assumptions that exist in current 
literature. 
Fourth, the phenomenological approach relies on interviews as the main source of 
data. This might lead to biases related to self-report as bases for evidence during data 
analysis (Polkinghorne, 2005). Participants might not have had access to accurate 
recounts of their experiences due to their sensemaking at the time of the interview, but the 
main interest in our study was the phenomenon as it was retained in the consciousness of 
the participants or the meaning they attributed to their behaviour (Giorgi, 2009; Giorgi, 
2006; Husserl, 1970; Moustakas, 1994; Polkinghorne, 1989). This research asked 
participants to recall specific events that happened during the transition rather than 
common, everyday ones. Previous research showed individuals could retrospectively 
recall accounts of specific events more accurately than recalling everyday events. One 
tends to muddle everyday events in one’s memories, resulting in more problematic recall. 
The availability heuristic explains the relative ease with which people recall unusual 
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events (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). 
Fifth, interview data may also suffer from social desirability bias. Participants 
may have been tempted to convey competent and attractive image given their status 
inside the organization and in their province. To avoid such a bias, I carefully constructed 
the interview questions and pilot tested them with individuals who had to take-over a new 
position from other people but not at the CEO level. I also attempted to triangulate with 
other data sources such as published articles in the newspapers given the public nature of 
the interviewees and their organizations. Most of these articles were crafted with the 
intention to preserve the image of the organization. However, my promise to the 
interviewees regarding the confidentiality of their identity as well as that of their 
organization, motivated the participants to be open and recall their experience as it 
happened as much as possible. Moreover, I analyzed recurring themes in the experiences 
of more than one participant (Polkinghorne, 2005). I also cross-checked the stories with 
members of the board of directors, other executives in the organization, and consultants 
who were involved in the succession process whenever possible. 
Fourth, the choice of Canada and namely Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta as my 
geographical locations might limit the generalizability of the findings to North American 
culture. Though the aim of phenomenology is to generalize back to theory, in this case 
learning and sensemaking, future research might replicate this study in other cultures to 
provide a base for comparison. 
Despite these limitations, I believe this study contributed significantly to the 
existing body of knowledge and to practice. First, it provided a window into the transition 
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period, considered a black box in the CEO succession literature. Second, it contributed 
valuable information for boards of directors and CEO-Is to enhance their practices and 
planning for CEO succession, an important event in the life of organizations. 
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APPENDIX A: LEARNING NEEDS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HEIRS 
APPARENT 
 
 Learning Needs 
Origin of Heir 
Apparent 
CEO role Organization: 
Products and 
People 
Industry 
Characteristics 
From within the 
organization Yes Familiar 
Familiar 
Different 
organization, same 
industry 
Yes Yes Familiar 
Different 
organization, 
different industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
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APPENDIX C: SUGGESTED INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Topic Suggested Questions 
Opening questions: 
History inside the 
company 
• Can you tell me how you functioned in the company until the 
date you were designated as heir apparent? 
• Which events were the most important to you throughout 
your work at the organization? 
• How did these events affect the way you do business? 
Questions about the 
period before the 
explicit heir 
apparency designation 
So you were the (title: COO, president, or other) before 
becoming the CEO. 
• What were your responsibilities? 
• Who were the most central parties you interacted with (both 
internally and externally: reporting to you, you reporting to, 
and others)? On which subject matters? 
• Can you tell us something about the nature of your 
interaction with these parties? How did you handle 
differences in opinion with these parties? 
Questions about the 
heir apparency 
designation to detect 
changes in identity 
• How did you see yourself in the organization when you first 
started? What did you see your role as? 
• When did your view of yourself and your role change? How 
did it change? 
• When did you know you were the future CEO of the 
company? 
• What did this realization mean to you? 
• Did your implicit designation as an heir apparent change 
your view of yourself and your role? 
• When was this information announced to different 
stakeholders of the organization? 
• What did this announcement mean to you? 
• Did your public designation as an heir apparent change your 
view of yourself and your role? 
• Did your view of yourself and your role change between the 
time you were designated as heir apparent and the time you 
actually became the CEO? How? 
• Did your priorities change? How? 
Questions about the 
heir apparency 
designation to detect 
changes in social 
context 
• Did this designation lead to any changes in who the parties 
were that you interacted with (who were the parties you kept 
interacting with, those you stopped interacting with, and 
those you started interacting with? Both internally and 
externally)? 
• Which of these interactions meant the most to you? How? 
• Which new interactions meant the most to you? How? 
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Topic Suggested Questions 
Questions about the 
heir apparency 
designation to detect 
changes in enactment 
• Can you describe the interactions with the CEO? BODs? 
Other important parties (such as meetings, private 
conversations, planning actions, etc.)? 
• Did these interactions influence the way you do business? 
The way you think? How did it influence the way you started 
doing business and the way you do business now? 
• Can you recall a special event that had a lasting impact on 
the way you think and the way you do business? Follow-up 
prompting questions: What was the subject? When did this 
happen? Where did it happen? Who was involved? What 
were the consequences on you (the way you think or act)? 
• Can you recall another event? 
Closing questions • Now that you are the CEO, how would you plan your 
succession? What would you repeat from your personal 
experience? What would you do differently? How would you 
go about this? 
• What would you want your successor to know before taking 
the reins of the organization? 
Appendix C: Suggested Interview Guide 
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APPENDIX D: LETTER REQUESTING PARTICIPATION∗ 
Dear <insert title and name>, 
Are outside or inside CEOs better for organizations? This question has been the centre of 
interest for many succession researchers and practitioners. There is no definite answer 
yet. However, the fact remains that more than 80% of publicly held organizations appoint 
inside CEOs. The success of a future CEO is usually linked to the organization’s success 
in managing the transition period. The question of interest that remains unanswered is 
how heirs apparent manage the transition to the CEO position. 
I am a PhD student at the Ivey Business School at Western University conducting my 
doctoral dissertation, under the supervision of Professor Rod White, Associate Dean of 
Faculty Development & Research. My doctoral thesis addresses the topic of how heirs 
apparent manage the transition to the CEO position. Its results will help organizations 
improve transitions to the CEO position. This research will assist future heirs apparent 
and incumbent CEOs in enhancing their transition practices and will give you a chance to 
have an impact on shaping the success of these transitions in major public organizations. 
In order to understand the transition period and its impact on the success of future CEOs, 
I am conducting in-depth interviews with current CEOs of large organizations, like you, 
who were appointed from inside. I will cover companies from a range of different 
industries and locations in Canada. The interview will be based on questions revolving 
around how you made sense of your experience when you were designated as heir 
apparent. What did you expect? What was unexpected? What events affected the way you 
lead your organization? Who influenced you the most during the transition period? The 
interview will take around one hour and will be tape recorded. Your identity will be kept 
confidential, known only to me and my supervisor. No identifying information about your 
organization will be disclosed to other parties or in any publications. Only pseudonyms 
will be used for participants and their organizations. The only document matching actual 
names and pseudonyms will be password secured and kept on my personal laptop. You 
will also be given a summary of our interview for your approval before I use its content 
for data analysis. 
This research is aimed at understanding a critical period in the life of organizations. Your 
contribution will help business students, heirs apparent, CEOs and board members benefit 
from having a closer look at the challenges encountered during the transition period and 
will improve transition practices. I would be very grateful if you would provide me with 
an interview and, as a sign of appreciation for your time, I commit to present you with a 
customized executive summary highlighting the findings of my research. I will also offer 
a comparison between your experience and the collective experience of other participant 
CEOs without revealing the identity of any of the other CEOs. 
I do hope you will accept my invitation to participate in this important research and I will 
follow up with you shortly. In the meantime, thank you very much for considering my 
∗ This letter is a standard one. I will customize the letter depending on the participant addresses and the 
availability of personal anecdotes related to the research topic that may enhance my chances of getting the 
interview. 
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request and if you need additional information about the research, please feel free to 
e-mail me at                                 or call me at                         . 
Yours truly, 
Rida Elias 
Appendix D: Letter Requesting Participation 
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APPENDIX E: CHECK LIST FOR BIASES 
 
Participant Pseudonym: ________________ Date of the interview: ____________ 
 
My Biases Remarks: how will my bias affect how I interpret the respondents’ statements 
1. When I read the stories about this 
participant I felt: 
 
2. Heir apparency is a good 
succession process 
 
3. Heirs apparent learn during 
transition 
 
4. Learning leads to human 
development 
 
5. Heirs apparent are aware of the 
negative consequences of learning 
 
6. Upon designation as heir apparent, 
the executive’s identity changes 
 
7. Upon designation as heir apparent, 
the executive’s social context 
changes 
 
8. Upon designation as heir apparent, 
the executive changes the way 
they enact their environment 
 
9. Upon designation as heir apparent, 
the executive’s interpretation of 
events changes (plausibility) 
 
10. Upon designation as heir apparent, 
the executive notices different 
cues 
 
11. Heirs apparent feel more powerful 
upon designation 
 
Comments: 
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APPENDIX F: ETHICS APPROVAL NOTICE 
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APPENDIX G: EXECUTIVES’ THOUGHT PROCESSES 
CEO-D Description of the executive’s thought processes 
Frank I was like can I make a difference? It’s a world class organization. Can I lead that 
organization 
Philip Well it’s like, so now all these emotions are going through your head. It’s, holy crap! I 
could be the CEO of The Company and you are saying temper that down. He (CEO-I 
Ralph) was very clear about: ‘look Philip, you are really young; you have only been with 
us a short period of time. But we like what we see so we are going to put you through this 
assessment and there are two other horses in the race.’ 
Margaret I said should I or should I not? And I said because, is this what I want? Do I want to lead 
the company and so I did not hesitate but I was stunned. I really was stunned. I said what? 
What do you mean, leaving in three years? You (CEO-I) just arrived and… 
I didn’t have, to say am I going to have a balanced life. It never was this. It was am I 
frankly, I knew that if I was to go there, I had to commit myself for a few years and it was 
not a matter of saying can I be happy at The Company for a few years. I knew I would and 
it’s been seven years now and it’s just I knew I would like this company but it is not, like I 
said to Russell, I came in for three years and I know you don’t take a CEO role for three 
years. You have to say okay, I am going to be doing this for a while and I needed to feel 
comfortable personally with that and personally with John too, because John could have 
been in Toronto, could have been anywhere else so you know is this a good thing. He said 
look, go for it, you like it; you are happy; I am happy; we like Montreal. Let’s do it. So to 
me, it was more, if it’s my path, I will make sure I’ll learn as much as possible to be ready 
and we will see. But to me it was more to say if I get there, I will have to stick around for a 
few years. That was the only thing. 
Stanley Part of the selection process was my own inner thinking of do I want this role. I put my 
hand up. That was an obvious thing to do and really what it came down to in my thinking 
what do I believe, who do I believe will be the right person to lead the culture of the 
company and the principles of the company going forward and so in my own thought 
process was around not just applying to the board and meeting their expectations but 
making sure that I wanted to do that Clearly I can tell you that I reached the commitment 
personally in my head that I believed that I was the right candidate because of my history 
in growing the company, because of the values that we had imbued in the company and 
that needed to carry on as we grew the company. So that would come across in my 
presentation if you will. But I can tell you that there was uncertainty between the middle of 
December and the second of January as to whether I was going to get the role or not and 
that uncertainty was an interesting dynamic in your mind which is what do you if you have 
convinced yourself you are getting the role. If you want to role, maybe don’t get it. 
Wayne Well again, you know I had been a CEO so it wasn’t something on my list to say, you 
know, my life is incomplete. Again, it was more to the point of when he asked me was to 
be able to contribute more to the company and also over that period of time, I accumulated 
more and more shares in the company so clearly it’s in my own interest to ensure that we 
had good leadership at the top. So that kind of built up, but there was never a commitment 
made to me anywhere along the line that I would be the CEO and we don’t do that here. 
We are not a company that says there are five leaders and say you are in the race to 
become the CEO because you run the risk of losing the other four when you are appointed 
plus you could have a situation where the person or persons you identify don’t perform. 
Appendix G: Executives’ thought processes  
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APPENDIX H: DESCRIPTION OF THE PREDECESSOR BY THE CEO 
CEO-D Description of predecessor 
Allen Curtis (CEO) was put in here as a young man and the company needed a turnaround.  He did 
a good job.  He has been in the job for a long time and significantly increased the size of the 
company.  
Bill He (CEO-I) made a very clear statement when he became CEO. We are going to be a billion 
dollar company. We are going to be 10000 people. We are going to be a top 10 firm globally. 
And it was a vision, a dream that at the time seemed totally impossible. Come on, a 1500 
person firm in Canada, and a little bit of people in the US, that was just not possible but it 
was his drive, his vision, his leadership that just took us, year after year in those 10 years and 
after the 10 years, in 2008, we had achieved it. We are a billion dollar company. It was an 
amazing journey.  
Cheryl She (CEO-I) grew our organization from 58 million to like a 110 million. It was massive 
growth for any Company. We went from being like the 20th largest in North America to 
being the biggest in North America 
Christopher The most challenging thing that I had to go through was trying to think of exactly what I was 
going to do January 1st because you have to remember, this company had done very well 
under him (CEO-I) and when you take on a new role, you want to make some impact in that 
first 90 days, 120 days, even six months 
Douglas He (CEO-I) was a highly respected individual who had grown the organization very well, 
turned it into a highly profitable organization. Terrence (CEO-I) was very much a great guy 
and just a wonderful man. And people just willingly would follow him anywhere, I would, 
you know great going personality 
Margaret Russell left a company that is well and ordered with the union relationship that was pure. I 
mean he left a company. You just turn the key into this company and the engine runs. That 
was the state of it and his point was: “don’t make it crash because you have everything to 
make it beautiful”. And he was right. 
Phillip The other thing is, he (CEO-I) has got a very strategic mind so he helped me with 
understanding how he thinks of the company and how he built the company. So the company 
is a different company and you have to understand the man (CEO-I) before you can 
understand the company and so it was really good for me. 
Randall If you think about the history of the company with Jack as CEO, it went from a very small 
company to a medium sized company. He grew it from 400 million in assets to when he 
retired at just around 17 billion in assets. So significant growth both in assets and in 
profitability as well. The company essentially doubled every five years. 
Rodney Barry (CEO-I) was a genius in how he took the company to the next level. 
Stanley We had grown dramatically in revenue and in number of stores and in number of employees  
Wayne He (CEO-I) took the company from one person in the 70s - which was Danny - to 68000, 
worldwide in 40 countries so it works 
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